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Introduction

Country 1 Market Zone A. border. Country 2 Market Zone B. Introduction. Example for 1:n bundling with three TSOs. Each TSO creates it ’ s individual network point on the PRISMA platform The individual network points are not bundled yet and can only be used for unbundled auctions.

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Introduction

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  1. Country 1 Market Zone A border Country 2 Market Zone B • Introduction • Example for 1:n bundling with three TSOs • Each TSO creates it’s individual network point on the PRISMA platform • The individual network points are not bundled yet and can only be used for unbundled auctions IPb_TSO1_EXIT IPa_TSO1_ENTRY B A C IPc_TSO1_EXIT

  2. Country 1 Market Zone A border Country 2 Market Zone B • Introduction • Example for 1:n bundling with three TSOs IPb_TSO1_EXIT B AB IPa_TSO1_ENTRY A AC C IPc_TSO1_EXIT • To market bundled capacities two additional (virtual) bundled network points are created on the PRISMA platform • The additional network points use the master data of the underlying unbundled network points

  3. Situation 1: • available capacity at A > sum of available capacity at B and C • several bundled products are created, for the remaining capacity a unbundled product may be created • Ascending Clock Auction • Capacity situation leads to competing auctions B Unbundled A AB Bundle 40 40 C 200 AC Bundle AC 90 90 • Situation 2: • available capacity at A < sum of available capacity at B and C • several bundled products are created • the sum of the allocated capacity must not exceed the available capacity at A, the two products are therefore competing for the amount of A B A Bundle AB 40 40 C 100 Bundle AC 90 90

  4. Ascending Clock Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The two auctions at the bundle AB and AC take place in parallel on the PRISMA platform, according to the rules and procedures of a standard competing clock auction as described in the NC CAM. • After each bidding round the results are analysed and it is checked whether the competition constraint – available capacity at A (100) - is solved. • In case the competition constraint is solved, the capacity is allocated. B A Bundle AB 40 40 C 100 Bundle AC 90 90

  5. Ascending Clock Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC is bigger than the competition constraint (AB +AC > A). • The competition constraint is not solved, therefore the next bidding round is necessary. • In the next bidding round the first large price step is applied to both auctions. Bundle AB Bundle AC Price Price avail. capacity avail. capacity P0 P0 70 140 Bids Bids 40 90

  6. Ascending Clock Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC is bigger than the competition constraint (AB +AC > A). • The competition constraint is not solved, therefore the next bidding round is necessary. • In the next bidding round the second large price step is applied to both auctions. Bundle AB Bundle AC Price Price avail. capacity avail. capacity P1 P1 50 80 Bids Bids 40 90

  7. Ascending Clock Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC smaller than the competition constraint (AB + AC < A). • In order to solve the competition the auctions are split and continued independently from each other. • Since AB is still in oversell the marketable capacity for AB stays 40 whereas AC is restricted to 60. Bundle AB Bundle AC Price Price avail. capacity avail. capacity P2 P2 45 50 Bids Bids 40 90

  8. Ascending Clock Auction • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC is bigger than the competition constraint (AB +AC > A). • The competition constraint is not solved, therefore the next bidding round is necessary. • In the next bidding round the first small price step is applied to auctions AB and the second to AC. • Simulation of competing auctions Bundle AB Bundle AC Price Price avail. capacity avail. capacity P3 38 internal restriction P4 65 Bids Bids 40 60 90

  9. Ascending Clock Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC is smaller than the competition constraint (AB +AC < A). • The competition constraint is solved and both auctions are in undersell, the auctions are finished. • The capacity is allocated as follows: AB=39 and AC=55. Bundle AB Bundle AC Price Price avail. capacity avail. capacity P5 39 internal restriction P6 55 Bids Bids 40 60 90

  10. Uniform Price Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The two auctions at the bundle AB and AC take place in parallel on the PRISMA platform, according to the rules and procedures of a standard uniform price auction as described in the NC CAM. • After each bidding round the results are analysed and it is checked whether the competition constraint - available capacity at A (100) - is solved. • In case the competition constraint is solved, the capacity is allocated. B A Bundle AB 40 40 C 100 Bundle AC 90 90

  11. Uniform Price Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The Shippers place their bids during the bidding round. • Uniform price auctions only have one bidding round in which up to 10 bids (price + amount) can be placed. • The evaluation of the placed bids and the allocation of capacity is done in three steps. Bundle AB Bundle AC Surcharge Surcharge avail. capacity avail. capacity 2 2 80 1 1 40 50 Bids Bids 40 90 Legend: Maximum amount Shipper 1 Maximum amount Shipper 2 Maximum amount Shipper 3 Minimum amount Shipper 1 Minimum amount Shipper 2 Minimum amount Shipper 3

  12. 1st step: intermediate evaluation • Uniform Price Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • During the intermediate evaluation both auctions are evaluated independently. • The maximum amount of the bid of Shipper 3 for bundle AC is exceeding the available capacity and is amended to 10 in order to meet the available capacity (taking into account, that the minimum amount of the bid is still met). Bundle AB Bundle AC Surcharge Surcharge avail. capacity avail. capacity 2 2 80 1 1 40 10 Bids Bids 40 90 Legend: Maximum amount Shipper 1 Maximum amount Shipper 2 Maximum amount Shipper 3 Minimum amount Shipper 1 Minimum amount Shipper 2 Minimum amount Shipper 3

  13. 2nd step: consolidation of all bids • Uniform Price Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • In order to resolve the competition the two auctions have to be evaluated together. • In preparation of the evaluation all bids that were placed are internally consolidated. Bundle AB and AC Surcharge avail. capacity 2 80 1 40 10 Bids 100 Legend: Maximum amount Shipper 1 Maximum amount Shipper 2 Maximum amount Shipper 3 Minimum amount Shipper 1 Minimum amount Shipper 2 Minimum amount Shipper 3

  14. 3rd step: final evaluation and allocation • Uniform Price Auction • Simulation of competing auctions • The consolidated bids are evaluated according to the rules and procedures described in the NC CAM. • The maximum amount of the bid of Shipper 2 is allocated, since the Shipper is willing to pay a higher surcharge. • The remaining capacity (20) is allocated according to the rules of NC CAM. In this case the allocation is donepro-rata to the remaining bids (40 and 10). Bundle AB and AC Surcharge avail. capacity 2 80 Clearingsurcharge 1 16 4 Bids 100 Legend: Maximum amount Shipper 1 Maximum amount Shipper 2 Maximum amount Shipper 3 Minimum amount Shipper 1 Minimum amount Shipper 2 Minimum amount Shipper 3

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