Las explicaciones de la crisis: Neoclásica

1. Las explicaciones de la crisis: Neoclásica Alejandro Valle Baeza Posgrado, Fac. Econom., UNAM 2013

2. La explicaciónneoclásica • Lo escencialesque la crisis viene de fuera del sistemacapitalista: • Geopolitical changes following the end of the Cold War induced a worldwide decline in real long-term interest rates that, in turn, produced home price bubbles across more than a dozen countries.

4. However, it was the heavy securitization of the U.S. subprime mortgage market from 2003 to 2006 that spawned the toxic assets that triggered the disruptive collapse of the global bubble in 2007–08. . La gestión corporativa del riesgo y la regulación gubernamental no han podido establecer los niveles de capital y de liquidez que habrían frustrado el contagio financiero y mitigado el impacto de la crisis.

6. Estos lamentables sucesos han impulsado una reforma regulatoria, pero también sugieren que las regulaciones que requieren pronósticos son propensas a fallar. En cambio, el imperativo primordial tiene que ser aumentar el capital, la liquidez y los requerimientos de garantías para los bancos y los bancos en la sombra por igual. Las políticas que suponen que algunas instituciones son "demasiado grandes para quebrar " no se pueden permitir. Por último, una serie de evidencias sugieren que la política monetaria no es la causa de la burbuja.

7. Preámbulo • The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 precipitated what, in retrospect, is likely to be judged the most virulent global financial crisis ever. To be sure, the contraction in economic activity that followed in its wake has fallen far short of the depression of the 1930s. But a precedent for the virtual withdrawal, on so global a scale, of private short-term credit, the leading edge of financial crisis, is not readily evident in our financial history.

8. El colapso de la vigilancia corporativa del crédito, afinada durante tantas décadas, junto con el fracaso del sistema de regulación global, exige la revisión exhaustiva de los gobiernos y los gestores privados de riesgos que están en funciones. El tema central de este trabajo es que en los años previos a la crisis, la intermediación financiera intentó funcionar con una porción muy pequeña de capital, debido a una mala interpretación del grado de riesgo inherente en los cada vez más complejos productos y mercados financieros.

9. II.A. The Arbitraged Global Bond Market and the Housing Crisis • II.B. Securitization of Subprimes: The Crisis Story Unfolds • II.C. A Classic Euphoric Bubble Takes Hold • II.D. Why Did the Boom Reach Such Heights?

10. Origen de la burbuja: el sector real … • the origins of the crisis reach back, as best I can judge, to the aftermath of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall exposed the economic ruin produced by the Soviet bloc’s economic system. In response, competitive markets quietly, but rapidly, displaced much of the discredited central planning so prevalent in the Soviet bloc and the then Third World.

12. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that in 2005 more than 800 million members of the world’s labor force were engaged in export-oriented and therefore competitive markets, an increase of 500 million since the fall of the Berlin Wall.3 Additional hundreds of millions became subject to domestic competitive forces, especially in the former Soviet Union. As a consequence, between 2000 and 2007 the real GDP growth rate of the developing world was almost double that of the developed world.

13. Consumption in the developing world, however, restrained by culture and inadequate consumer finance, could not keep up with the surge of income, and consequently the saving rate of the developing world soared from 24 percent of nominal GDP in 1999 to 34 percent by 2007…

14. With investment elsewhere in the world slow to take up the slack, the result was a pronounced fall from 2000 to 2005 in global long-term interest rates, both nominal (figure 1) and real. Although the decline in global interest rates indicated, of necessity, that global saving intentions were chronically exceeding global intentions to invest, ex post global saving and investment rates in 2007, overall, were only modestly higher than in 1999, suggesting that the uptrend in the saving intentions of developing economies tempered declining investment intentions in the developed world.4 Of course, whether it was a glut of intended saving or a shortfall of investment intentions, the conclusion is the same: real long-term interest rates had to fall.