IT Security Game & Economic Indicators - Defending Against Cyberattacks

1. ? What is the scenario? An enterprise and its IT system

2. ? What are the players? Attacker Defender

3. ? What is the game? Diffusion of reserved information Interruption of service Loss of data

4. ? What is the game? Diffusion of reserved information Interruption of service Loss of data

5. agenda 1 1 Defence trees + indexes 2 2 Strategic games 3 3 Three novel indicators 4 4 ……

6. 1 Risk Management process • Risk Assessmentidentification of the: • assets, • threats and vulnerabilities, • countermeasures • Risk Analysisdetermination of the acceptable risk threshold. • Risk Mitigationprioritize, evaluate and implement the countermeasure recommended. Defencetrees Economic Indexes

7. 1 Defence tree Defence trees are an extension of attack trees [Schneier00]. • Attack tree: • the root is an asset of an IT system • the paths from the root to the leaf are the way to attack the root • the non-leaf nodes can be: • and-nodes • or-nodes root or-nodes and-nodes • Defence tree: • attack tree • a set of countermeasures

8. An enterprise server is used to store information about customers… An attacker wants to steal this server…

9. 1 c1 c2 c4 c2 Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock c3 c3 Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard An example: (1) Steal theserver a2 a1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Have the keys Go outunobserved

10. 1 Steal theserver a2 a1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Have the keys Go outunobserved c1 c2 c4 c2 Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock c3 c3 Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard Estimate the cost of investment • the annual loss produced by an attack • the effectiveness of a countermeasure in mitigating the risks • the cost of a countermeasure

11. 1 Economic index: SLE The Single Loss Exposure (SLE) represents a measure of an enterprise's loss from a single threat event and can be computed by using the following formula: • where: • the Asset Value (AV) is the cost of creation, development, support, replacement and ownership values of an asset, • the Exposure Factor (EF) represents a measure of the magnitude of loss or impact on the value of an asset arising from a threat event.

12. 1 Economic index: ALE The Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) is the annually expected financial loss of an enterprise that can be ascribed to a threat and can be computed by using the following formula: • where: • the Annualized Rate of Occurrence, (ARO) is a number that represents the estimated number of annual occurrences of a threat.

13. 1 Economic index: ROI The Return on Investment (ROI) indicator can be computed by using the following formula: • where: • MR is the risk mitigated by a countermeasure and represents the effectiveness of a countermeasure in mitigating the risk of loss deriving from exploiting a vulnerability • CSI is the cost of security investment that an enterprise must face for implementing a given countermeasure.

14. 1 Economic index: ROI

15. 1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard Economic index: ROI AV Asset Value EF Exposure Factor SLE Single Loss Exposure ARO Annualized Rate of Occurrence ALE Annualized Loss Expectancy RM Risk Mitigated CSI Cost Security Investment AV=100.000 € Steal theserver EF=90% SLE=93.000 € EF=93% SLE=90.000 € ARO=0,10 ALE=9.300 € ALE=9.000 € ARO=0,10 Have the keys Go outunobserved RM=10% RM=10% CSI=3.000€ CSI=3.000€ ROI= - 0,70 ROI= - 0,69 RM=20% RM=70% RM=50% RM=50% CSI=300€ CSI=1.500€ CSI=12.000€ CSI=12.000€ ROI=5,20 ROI=3,20 ROI= - 0,62 ROI= - 0,61

16. 1 Steal theserver a2 a1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Have the keys Go outunobserved c1 c2 c4 c2 Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock c3 c3 Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard Estimate the cost of the attack • the expected gain from the successful attack on the target • the cost sustained by the attacker to succeed, • the additional cost brought by a possible countermeasure

17. 1 Economic index: ROA Return On Attack (ROA) measures the gain that an attacker expects from a successful attack over the losses that he sustains due to the adoption of security measures by his target • GI is the expected gain from the successful attack on the specifiedtarget • costa is the cost sustained by the attacker to succeed, • costac is the additional cost brought by the countermeasure c adopted by the defender to mitigate the attack a.

18. 1 Economic index: ROA

19. 1 Steal theserver Have the keys Go outunobserved Break downthe door Go outunobserved Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard Economic index: ROA GI Asset Value RM Risk Mitigated costa Cost of the attack costac Additional cost produced by a countermeasure GI=30.000 € costa=4.000 € costa=4.200 € costac=1.000€ costac= 1.000 € ROA=6 ROA=5,77 costac= 2.000 € costac= 1.500 € costac= 1.500 € costac=200€ ROA=5,00 ROA=5,26 ROA=5,45 ROA=6,82

20. 1 Evaluation Steal theserver a2 a1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Have the keys Go outunobserved c1 c2 c4 c2 ROI=3.20 ROA=0.50 ROI=-0.70 ROA=4.40 ROI=5.20 ROA=4.45 ROI=-0.69 ROA=4.19 Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock c3 c3 Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard ROI=-0.63 ROA=1.73 ROI=-0.61 ROA=1.63

21.  Future Works: attack graphs Steal theserver a2 a1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Have the keys Go outunobserved c3 c1 c2 c4 Assumea securityguard Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock

22.  Future Works: journal version? Old ROI New version of ROI • 1 attack 1 countermeasure • 1 attack n countermeasures where f is fC=max(c) or fC=sum(c) and CRMc 1

23.  Future Works: journal version? Old ROI New version of ROI • m attacks 1 countermeasure whereg is gA=sum(a) and gA AV • m attacks, n countermeasures

24.  Future Works: journal version? Old ROA New version of ROA • 1 attack 1 countermeasure • 1 attack n countermeasures where f is fC=max(c) or fC=sum(c) and CRMc 1

25.  Future Works: journal version? Old ROA New version of ROA • m attacks 1 countermeasure whereg is gA=sum(a) and • m attacks, n countermeasures

26.  Future Works: min set cover c1 c1 a1 c2 a1 c2 a2 a2 c3 a3 c4 a3 c3 c4 RM=[max(c1,c2), min(1, c1+c2)]

27.  Future Works: intervals Intervals to represent the possible values of the exposure factor (EF), and risk mitigated (RM) 20% 40% 20% 40% 30% 80% Devo ridefinire tutte le formule considerando adesso gli intervalli! Ad se x<EF<y  AV ottengo che anche SLE è un intervallo! E quindi anche ALE e anche ROI

28. 1 Paper Defense trees for economic evaluation of security investmentsS. Bistarelli, F. Fioravanti, P. Pamela In: 1st International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2006). Vienna, Austria, April 20-22 2006.

29. 2 Strategic game We consider a strategic game: • 2 players: the defender and the attacker of a system. • Sd: the set of defender's strategies (the countermeasures) • Sa: the set of attacker's strategies (the vulnerability) • ROI and ROA: payoff functions for the defender and the attacker

30. 2 Strategic game: an example • Sa={a1, a2} • Sd={c1, c2, c3} • payoff: ud(ci,ai) and ua(ci,ai) a1 a2 Ud=1 Ua=1 c2 c3 Ud=0 Ua=2 c1 c3 Ud=1 Ua=2 Ud=1 Ua=0

31. 2 Nash equilibrium Nash Equilibrium The combination of strategy (s1*,s2*) with s1* S1 and s2* S2 is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if, for each player i, the action si* is the best response to the other player: ! This game admits two different Nash Equilibrium: the couple of strategies {c1,a1}and {c3,a2}. Dip. Scienze, 2 settembre 2014

32. 2 pa1 pa2 1 pc1 ½ pc2 ½ pc3 Mixed strategy: an example ? If a player does not know the behaviour of the other player? Mixed strategies

33. 2 Steal theserver a2 a1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Have the keys Go outunobserved c1 c2 c4 c2 Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock c3 c3 Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard Our game • Selection of a single countermeasure/attack ! The set of strategies for the defender and the attacker is composed by a single action.

34. 2 Our game • Selection of a single countermeasure/attack ! The set of strategies for the defender and the attacker is composed by a single action.

35. 2 31 52 21 52 205 769 564 769 Our game • Selection of a single countermeasure/attack ! There is one Nash Equilibrium with mixed strategies.

36. 2 Steal theserver a2 a1 Break downthe door Go outunobserved Have the keys Go outunobserved c1 c2 c4 c2 Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install a videosurveillanceequipment Install asecurity door Install asafety lock c3 c3 Assumea securityguard Assumea securityguard Our game • Selection of a set of countermeasures/attack ! Each player can play any set of countermeasuresattacks together.

37. 2 Our game • Selection of a set of countermeasures/attack

38. 2 5 21 16 21 39 55 16 55 Our game ! • Selection of a set of countermeasures/attack There is one Nash Equilibrium with mixed strategies.

39.  Future Works Considerare giochi con 1 attaccante e n-1 difensori Cooperazione tra attaccanti Tipi di attaccanti (giochi bayesiani) Giochi dinamici, giochi ripetuti

40. 2 Papers Strategic game on defense treesS. Bistarelli, M. Dall’Aglio, P. Pamela In: 4th International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST2006).Hamilton, ON, Canada, August 26-27 2006.

41. 3 Three novel indicators • Critical time • Retaliation • Collusion

42. 3 Critical time

43. 3   If CTF=0, then EFCT = EF If CTF=1, then EFCT = 1 If EF=0, then EFCT=CTF If EF=1, then EFCT=1 Critical time Exposure Factor duringCritical Time expresses the influence that the criticality of a specific time instance plays on the EF as follows: CTF being the Critical Time Factor that expresses the percentage of criticality of a specific time instance.

44. 3 Critical time: the indicators • Annualized Rate of Occurrence, AROCT, is the rate of occurrence of an attack at a specific CTF per year. • Single Loss Exposure, SLECT, is the cost of a single attack at a specific CTF: • Annualized Loss Expectancy, ALECT, is the cost per year of an attack at a specific CTF: • Return On Investment, ROICT, is the economic return of an enterprise's investment against an attack mounted at a specific CTF:

45. 3 Critical time: an example

46. 3 Retaliation

47. 3   If RF=0, then EFR = EF If RF=1, then EFR = 0 If EF=0, then EFR=0 If EF=1, then EFR=1-RF Retaliation Exposure Factor underRetaliation expresses the influence that the chance of retaliating an attack to an asset plays on the EF as follows: RF being the Retaliation Factor that expresses the percentage of retaliation that can be performed.

48. 3 Retaliation: the indicators • Annualized Rate of Occurrence, AROR, is the rate of occurrence per year of an attack that can be retaliated. • Single Loss Exposure, SLER, is the cost of a single attack that can retaliated: • Annualized Loss Expectancy, ALER, is the cost per year of an attack that can be retaliated: • Return On Investment, ROIR, is the economic return of an enterprise's investment against an attack that can be retaliated:

49. 3 Retaliation : an example

50. 3 Collusion