1 / 18

Status of DSS

Status of DSS. Safety and protection in ALICE. Safety & Protection. What do we understand by Safety: Safety of people (prevent injuries or worse) Safety of equipment (protect capital investment) Who is involved: CSAM: CERN Level3 Alarm System (smoke, gas etc.)

louisa
Télécharger la présentation

Status of DSS

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Status of DSS Safety and protection in ALICE ALICE Technical Board

  2. Safety & Protection • What do we understand by Safety: • Safety of people (prevent injuries or worse) • Safety of equipment (protect capital investment) • Who is involved: • CSAM: CERN Level3 Alarm System (smoke, gas etc.) • Immediate action by the Fire and Rescue Group • “switch off” (Safety Actions); inform relevant services • Various Control Systems (Detector Control System, Magnet Control System, Gas Control System, …) Ensure integrity through: • Detailed control on detector level and control of infrastructure and services (with high granularity) • Alarm reporting (for operator intervention) and automation • Interlocks and ‘local safety systems’ ALICE Technical Board

  3. Primarypower, water, gas Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Context The technical Servicesprovide power, water, primary gas (general services) and distribute them to the different experiment services that are needed to operate the experiment ALICE Technical Board This and some of the following slides are inspired by slides of Stefan Lüders et al. (DSS Team)

  4. Sensors Sensors Sensors Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Primarypower, water, gas CERN Safety System • The safety for personnel is ensured by theCERN Safety System. It is required by law and conforms to relevant International, European, and National standards • It has its own sensors (smoke, gas, emergency stops, etc.) and reacts globally, on a “zone” (i.e. the cavern, the counting rooms in PX24) CSAM ALICE Technical Board

  5. Sensors Sensors Sensors Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Primarypower, water, gas CERN Safety System • Upon detection of a hazard TCR Fire Brigade to P2 • Fire Brigade will come to point 2and TCR (and ACR) is informed • “Safety actions” can be performede.g. stop of power (to be defined by the experiment) CSAM safety action Smoke, Gas Leak ALICE Technical Board

  6. Sensors Sensors Sensors Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Primarypower, water, gas Control systems • The various control systems are responsible for the overall monitoring and control of the detector or services • They will take corrective action to maintain normal operation • Are able to act with fine granularity • In case the control system fails to maintain normal operation, the operator is informed and can take corrective action DCS detector A ST/EL (power) GCS (gas) DCS detector B DCS detector C MCS (magnets) ST/CV (water) CCS (cooling) control monitor control monitor Trip ALICE Technical Board

  7. Sensors Sensors Sensors Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Primarypower, water, gas Local safety systems(e.g. MSS, Interlocks) • Control systems are relatively complex, therefore: • Additional “local safety systems” preserve the integrity of well defined systems, e.g.: • The Magnet Safety System (MSS) protects the magnets • “System-to-system” interlocks protect sub-detectors Magnet Control DCS detector A DCS detector B DCS detector C MSS MCS (magnets) Ramp downhigh voltage Ramp down magnet gasfail waterfailure ALICE Technical Board

  8. Sensors Sensors Sensors Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Primarypower, water, gas Did we cover all events? • What happens if a counting room gets hot? • Action only if individual items overheat (or burn…) • What happens if there is a water leak in the racks? • Action only if electronics gets wet and short-circuit… • What happens if temperature goes up inside the detector volume? • Action only if one of the sub-detectors sees it DCS detector A DCS detector B DCS detector C ALICE Technical Board

  9. Sensors Sensors Sensors Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Primarypower, water, gas Detector Safety System • Therefore: Detector Safety System (DSS) • Name might be slightly misleading: Think of it as experimental area surveillance system • We are not inventing something new: • DSS covers some of the functionality that was covered in LEP times by a dedicated safety system. • Also, it is not ‘yet another’ system… DCS detector A DCS detector B DCS detector C ALICE Technical Board

  10. Sensors Sensors Sensors Experiment servicesgas, cooling, magnet, power Experiment:detectors, crates, racks Primarypower, water, gas Detector Safety System • … but consider DSS as the ‘safe’ part of the Detector Control System • It is an integral, robust, simple part of DCS • It will monitor the environment of the experiment • and automatically react to hazardoussituations (e.g. water leak, high temperature) Detector Control DSS DCS detector A DCS detector B DCS detector C Water Leak ALICE Technical Board

  11. Detector Safety System • Can, with moderation(!), also be used by sub-detectors to convey interlocks • Sub-detectors can provide (status) inputs to DSS • DSS can generate outputs (interlocks) to sub-detectors • Can implement “cross-detector” interlocks • DSS should not replace the (more reliable!) direct system-to-system interlocks within a sub-detector • Such as Cooling → LV or Gas → HV • To be studied on a case-by-case basis ALICE Technical Board

  12. DSS Implementation gateway • Collaboration between LHC experiments • A redundant PLC system (Siemens) for the ‘front-end’ • CPUs are physically separatedto minimize danger of accidental damage • Interconnection with optical link • Cabling redundant through different cable paths • Local network, with external access through gateway CERNLAN Surface PX24 DSSLAN Optical Link CR4 PROFIbus ALICE Technical Board

  13. DSS implementation • The ‘back-end’ is based on PVSSII and will be fully integrated in the DCS • User panels for DSS and CERN safety system (concentrating all ‘alarm’ information) • Configuration of the DSS system • Defining what action for what (combination of) alarms:“Alarm-Action matrix” • Installation, maintenance and support will be done with the help of a central (LHC-wide) team ALICE Technical Board

  14. Strategy and statusCSAM (Level3) • Safety and protection can only be seen as a whole; DSS is merely one of the components • For the experiment ‘environment’ a document is being written to address all aspects (Level 3 safety, DSS and DCS) • Concerning CSAM: • The “Level 3” safety system is defined as a collaboration between: • ALICE (the GLIMOS, requirements), • TIS (safety aspects) and • ST/MA (technical aspects) • Discussions are initiated and will intensify next year • Installation mainly driven by the needs of ALICE ALICE Technical Board

  15. Strategy and statusControl Systems (including DSS) • For DSS and control systems we start from the requirements • Sub-detectors define what they need in terms of safety and protection • Remember that the DCS is the first level of protection • For most of the sub-detectors we collected more or less detailed information (URD, Questionnaire) • Mainly system-to-system interlocks: “stop HV if gas is bad”, etc. • Writing a document proposing common solutions (Jan 2004) • Identify missing information and implications on service control systems (e.g. gas and cooling) • Request additional information from sub-detectors (return by Feb 2004) • Propose solution for interlocks and DSS (sub-detector part) in March workshop ALICE Technical Board

  16. DSS status • Inputs and outputs to the DSS have been defined • Temperatures (ambient, water); Water leaks; Status inputs • Outputs to cut power or water, to sub-detectors • Dimensioned to leave room for future expansion • Core hardware is ready: 2 racks with PLC, I/O interfaces, patch panels etc. • Delivered at Point2 this week • Define cabling, type of sensors, location of sensors early next year • Installation and commissioning spring next year • Limited number of inputs and outputs only • Will evolve with the installation of the experiment ALICE Technical Board

  17. DSS status Actuators andInterlocks Outputs (~30) well defined. Location/mechanism to be defined “Services” Det. Outputs (actions) Mechanism is defined. Actual matrix to be defined AlarmActionMatrix Inputs and Outputs reserved.Wait for input from sub-detectors Inputs (alarms) “Environment” Det. Inputs (~100) well defined. Location to be defined Sensors andstatuses ALICE Technical Board

  18. Conclusions • Safety and protection seen as a whole • Safety and control systems are complementary • Definition “Level3” system ongoing; installation is driven by ALICE (GLIMOS) • Definition of safety and protection aspects with sub-detectors ongoing • Identifying common solutions and implication on control systems of services • DSS is mainly defined; installation and commissioning 1st half 2004 • Will evolve with the installation ALICE Technical Board

More Related