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A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attacks

S. Hansman and R. Hunt, “ A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attacks, ” Comp. & Sec. , vol. 24, no. 1, Feb. 2005, pp. 31 – 43. A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attacks. Simon Hansman & Ray Hunt Computers & Security (2005). Present by Mike Hsiao, 20080613. Before going to details (1/2).

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A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attacks

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  1. S. Hansman and R. Hunt, “A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attacks,”Comp. & Sec., vol. 24, no. 1, Feb. 2005, pp. 31–43. A Taxonomy of Network and Computer Attacks Simon Hansman & Ray Hunt Computers & Security (2005) Present by Mike Hsiao, 20080613

  2. Before going to details (1/2) • Why do we need taxonomy? • Their main goal was to organize information about known vulnerabilities or attacks, so that designers could use that information to build more secure systems or defense systems. • If the classification is based on the actual vulnerability exploited by the attack, the dimension of classification can be considered as the cause of flaw.

  3. Before going to details (2/2) • Why do we need taxonomy? • The taxonomy provides useful information to find unknown vulnerabilities as well as to avoid introducing similar vulnerabilities in future designs. • They provide a classification of testing techniques based on the vulnerability the test is meant to discover. Each test class discovers all the vulnerabilities that have similar characteristics.

  4. In This Paper • The authors aim to develop a “pragmatic taxonomy that is useful to those dealing with attacks on a regular basis.” • They conclude that it is difficult to develop an effective tree-structure taxonomy of attacks. • developing a single tree-structure taxonomy incorporating all these dimensions would be cumbersome.

  5. Example: tree

  6. Outline • Introduction • [X] Requirements and existing classification methods • Proposal for a new prototype taxonomy • Classification using dimensions • Classification case study • Conclusions

  7. Introduction: Attack sophistication vs. intruder technical knowledge

  8. Introduction • The proposed taxonomy • is an attempt to provide a common classification scheme that can be shared between organizations. • allows previous knowledge to be applied to new attacks as well as providing a structured way to view such attacks. • aims to take into account all parts of the attack (from the vulnerability, to the target, to the attack itself) and talk in terms of the target being.

  9. Requirements 1 • Accepted (Amoroso, 1994; Howard, 1997): The taxonomy should be structured so that it can become generally approved. • Comprehensible (Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997): A comprehensible taxonomy will be able to be understood by those who are in the security field, as well as those who only have an interest in it. • Completeness (Amoroso, 1994)/Exhaustive (Howard, 1997; Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997): For a taxonomy to be complete/exhaustive, it should account for all possible attacks and provide categories accordingly. • While it is hard to prove a taxonomy that is complete or exhaustive, it can be justified through the successful categorization of actual attacks.

  10. Requirements 2 • Determinism (Krsul, 1998): The procedure of classifying must be clearly defined. • Mutually exclusive (Howard, 1997; Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997): A mutually exclusive taxonomy will categorize each attack into, at most, one category. • Repeatable (Howard, 1997; Krsul, 1998): Classifications should be repeatable. • Terminology complying with established security terminology (Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997)

  11. Requirements 3 • Terms well defined (Bishop, 1999): There should be no confusion as to what a term means. • Unambiguous (Howard, 1997; Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997): Each category of the taxonomy must be clearly defined so that there is no ambiguity with respect to an attack’s classification. • Useful (Howard, 1997; Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997): A useful taxonomy will be able to be used in the security industry and particularly by incident response teams.

  12. Taxonomy:animal kingdom’s taxonomy? • The initial approach was to create a taxonomy analogous to the animal kingdom’s taxonomy. • The resulting taxonomy would be a tree-like structure with the more general categories at the top, and specific categories at the leaves. • However, • How to deal with blended attacks? • Attacks, unlike animals, often do not have many common traits.

  13. Taxonomy:list-based (flat-list of categories)? • A flat-list with general categories could be suggested, • general categories are of limited use • or secondly, a flat-list with very specific categories could be proposed. • the list would become almost infinite, with few instances within each category

  14. Proposal for a new prototypetaxonomy: alternative • using the concept of dimensions • attack vector • the method by which an attack reaches its target • attack target • classified down to very specific targets, such as Sendmail 8.12.10 or can cover a class of targets, such as Unix-based systems. • vulnerabilities and exploits • do not have a structured classification, CVE • possibility for an attack to have a payload or effect beyond itself • For example, a virus that installs a trojan horse, is still clearly a virus, but has a trojan as a payload.

  15. 1st dimension: attack vector • the method by which an attack reaches its target • If the attack uses a single attack vector, categorise by the vector. • Otherwise find the most appropriate category, using the descriptions for each category below.

  16. 1st dimension: nine classes

  17. 2nd dimension: attack target • classified down to very specific targets • Hardware • Computer • Hard-disks • Network Equipment • Peripheral devices • Software • Operating System • Windows family • Unix family • MacOS family • Application • Server • User • Network • Protocols

  18. 3rd dimension: vulnerabilities and exploits • Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) • Or • Vulnerability in implementation • Vulnerability in design • Vulnerability in configuration

  19. 4th dimension: payloads or effects • First dimension attack payload • Corruption of information • Disclosure of information • Theft of service • use a system’s services without authorization • Subversion • gain control over part of the target and use it for its own use

  20. other dimensions • Damage: A damage dimension would attempt to measure the amount of damage that the attack does. • Cost: Cleaning up after an attack costs money. • Propagation: The speed at which it reproduces or spreads. • Defense: The methods by which an attack has been defended against could be made into a further defense dimension.

  21. Conclusion • Attacks are easily categorized. • Some requirements have not been fully met. • The issue here is not so much the taxonomy, but how the blended attacks have been analyzed and described.

  22. Comments • All network activities conduct through the network protocols. • A communication between two hosts relies on the undergoing protocol stacks. • Attack itself is a kind of communication, however this specific communication it can exploit certain vulnerabilities • to get remote access, (many other goals, intentions, ...) • Producing a taxonomy of network protocol vulnerabilities seems an alternative to classify the attacks. • flaws caused by implementation or specification

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