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So You Say You Want A Revolution: Experimental Findings from Indonesia

So You Say You Want A Revolution: Experimental Findings from Indonesia. Berly Martawardaya LabSi – Universita’ di Siena (Italy) and Universitas Indonesia. Structure. Introduction Literature Experiment Setup Results Conclusion. Introduction.

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So You Say You Want A Revolution: Experimental Findings from Indonesia

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  1. So You Say You Want A Revolution: Experimental Findings from Indonesia Berly Martawardaya LabSi – Universita’ di Siena (Italy) and Universitas Indonesia

  2. Structure • Introduction • Literature • Experiment Setup • Results • Conclusion

  3. Introduction • Revolution has strong impact to social and economics conditions • Economic factor has role in many revolutions • But a rarely touch topic in economics, unlike in political science

  4. Literature • Dudley (2000) revolution in Europe (950-1950) by relative importance of fixed costs and network effects in producing the information to allocate society resources. • Navqi and Wemhoner (1995) three agents models (landlord, labourer and merchant) and three commodities landlord can wield power in SBPE of an infinite-move, extensive-form game of complete and perfect information. • Hatlebakk (2002) allowed the landlord to pay the merchant and  stage game with less rationality (more robust SBPE)

  5. Experiment Setup • Combining dicator game and social exclusion game • Revolution as movement of the many poor against the few rich • The poor must make colective contribution to make a succesful revolution • Insufficient contribution = failed revolution

  6. Experiment Setup (2) 1) Three player game (A, B, C) 2) Endowment of B = Endowment of C = Rp 200 rupiah but Endowment of A is very high (Rp 1000). 4) A decide how much to give (equally) to B & C 5) B & C contribute to common pool. If > threshold (Rp 300) then it succed, if less then revolution fail but B & C keep the gain. If B or C don’t contribute then both get 0 5) Repeat for 5 rounds Dictator setting: A is randomly chosen Merit setting: A is chosen by a short test

  7. Game Tree A (give x/2 ) B B B SB + SC ≥ T SB + SC < T SB or SC = 0 0 EA – x EA - x EA / 2 EB + x/2 - SB 0

  8. Experiment Setup (3) • N: 114 • Location U of Indonesia • Subject: undergrad in econ/business • Paper base • Anonymous • Random assignment

  9. Results : Average Proposer’s gift

  10. Results : Average Proposer’s gift

  11. Results : Average Responders’ contribution

  12. Results : Average Responders’ contribution

  13. Result: Average Revolt

  14. Conclusion • The proposer is more generous in dictator setting where they did not earn their position. • the merit setting lead to higher rate of revolution. • Regret? Where everyone could be supreme leader, all non supreme leader are losers.

  15. You say you want a revolutionWell you knowWe all want to change the worldYou ask me for a contributionWell you knowWe're doing what we canDon't you know it's gonna be alrightAlright AlrightJohn Lennon in “Revolution”

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