1 / 24

Efficient Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle

Efficient Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle. Stephanie Bayer University College London Jens Groth University College London. Motivation – e-voting. Voting: - Voter casts secret vote - Authorities reveal votes in random permuted order

magnar
Télécharger la présentation

Efficient Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Efficient Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle Stephanie Bayer University College London Jens Groth University College London

  2. Motivation – e-voting • Voting: - Voter casts secret vote - Authorities reveal votes in random permuted order • E-voting: - voter casts secret votes on a computer • The votes are sent to a server who sends all votes to the central authorities • Authorities reveal votes in random permuted order

  3. Background - ElGamal encryption • Setup: Group G of prime order with generator • Public key: • Encryption: E() = () • Decryption: D() = • Homomorphic: • E() ×E() = E() • Re-rencryption: • E() ×E() = E()

  4. Shuffle . . . Input ciphertexts Permute to get Re-encrypt them E() Output ciphertexts . . .

  5. Mix-net: Threshold decryption …

  6. Problem: Corrupt mix-server Threshold decryption …

  7. Solution: Zero-knowledge argument Threshold decryption ZK argumentPermutation still secret(zero-knowledge) ZK argumentNo message changed(soundness) N …

  8. Zero-Knowledge Argument Statement: () Prover Verifier The Shuffle was done correctly Requested Properties: • Soundness: The Verifier reject with overwhelming probability if the Prover tries to cheat • Zero-Knowledge: Nothing but the truth is revealed; permutation is secret • Efficient: Small computation and small communication complexity

  9. Public coin honest verifier zero-knowledge Setup: (G,,) and common reference string Statement: () Honest verifier zero-knowledgeNothing but truth revealed; permutation secret Prover Verifier Can convert to standard zero-knowledge argument

  10. Our contribution • 9-move public coin honest verifier zero-knowledge argument for correctness of shuffle in common reference string model • For ciphertexts • Communication: O()k bitsProver’s computation: O() exposVerifier’s computation: O() expos

  11. Comparison of ElGamal shuffles ()

  12. Commitments • Commit to a column vector Z as A=com() • Length reducing • Computational binding • Perfectly hiding • Homomorphic • com(;)*com(;) = com(; ) • Pedersen Commitment: com(;) =

  13. Techniques - Sublinear cost • Length reducing commitments • Batch verification • Structured Vandermonde challenges Sublinear communication cost

  14. Shuffle argument • Given public keys and • Given ciphertexts and • Prover knows permutation and randomizers and wants to convince the verifierE() E()

  15. Shuffle argument The prover commits to a permutation by committing to • Verifier sends challenge Z The prover commits to The prover gives an argument that both commitments are constructed using the same permutation The proverdemonstrates that the input ciphertexts are permuted using the same permutation and knowledge of the randomizers used in the re-encryption.

  16. Shuffleargument • Prover commits to as • A=com()=com() • and after receiving challenge Z to • B= com() =com(s) Both polynomials are equal, only the roots are permuted InexpensiveSee full paper • Prover gives product argument for A, B such that • = ExpensiveWill sketch idea • Sketch idea focusing on soundness • Ignore ZK (easy and cheap to add) • Will also for simplicity assume randomness

  17. Notation • B contains commitments B, , Bwhere • B= com=com(), , B= com () • Arrange ciphertexts in matrix • = • Define inner product = to simplify the statement as

  18. Multi-exponentiation argument idea

  19. Multi-exponentiation argument Communicaton:O() elements Verifier computation: + O() expos Prover sends 2ciphertexts • Verifier sends challenge Z • Prover opens • to elements in Zq ciphertext expos • Verifier computes and checks ciphertext expos ciphertext expos

  20. Prover’s computation Computingthis matrix costs m2n = mNciphertextexpos

  21. Reducing the prover’s computation • Do not compute entire matrix • Instead use techniques for multiplication of polynomials “in the exponent” of ciphertexts • Fast Fourier Transform • O(N log m) exponentiations O (1) rounds • Interaction • O (N) exponentiations O (log m) rounds

  22. Implementation • Implementation in C++ using the NTL library and the GMP library • Different levels of optimization • Multi-exponentiation techniques • Fast Fourier Transform • Extra Interaction and Toom-Cook

  23. Comparison • Runtime comparison of Verificatum (Wikström) to our shuffle argument • MacBook Pro; CPU: 2.54 GHZ, RAM: 4GB • , 60 • ciphertexts,

  24. Thank You

More Related