Elections in Russia: parties, parliament and power

1. Elections in Russia: parties, parliament and power The Department for Russian and Eurasian studies’ annual conference 2011 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

2. Program (09.30-15.00): Welcome address by Helge Blakkisrud, NUPI Session 1: Russia’s political parties: United Russia, loyal and real opposition (09.30 – 11.15) Coffee (11.15 -11.30) Session 2: The elections and election campaign (11.30 – 12.45) Lunch (12.45 – 13.30) Session 3: Looking ahead: the aftermath of the Duma elections and the March 2012 presidential election (13.30 – 15.00)

3. Session 1: Russia’s political parties: United Russia, loyal and real opposition (09.30 – 11.15) Panel: Sean Roberts, Visiting Fellow, Aleksanteri Institute Geir Flikke, Senior Researcher, NUPI David White, Senior Researcher and Lecturer, CREES, Birmingham Chair: Indra Overland, NUPI

4. Another election victory but how much longer will United Russia remain a dominant force? Sean Roberts, Visiting Fellow, Aleksanteri Institute

5. Overview How much longer will United Russia remain a dominant force? Looking forward – United Russia’s growing dominance Looking backwards – the life-cycle of the party of power Beyond 2011 – three reasons to keep/replace United Russia Conclusion: how much longer?

6. December 4: another victory Levada Center (www.levada.ru), ‘approval ratings’, 8 November 2011

7. 2011: business as usual Return of Putin – to run for president , confirmed at weekend? Demise of A Just Russia – strengthens UR’s hand. Rival party of power may not pass 7% barrier 3 consecutive majorities – the party shows its durability and becomes ‘dominant’ Fulfilling its historical mission? United Russia’s task is: ‘not just to win in 2007, but to …do everything possible to be the dominant party for a minimum of 10-15 years’ (Surkov 2006)

8. A Modern-day CPSU? Created to be a dominant force: Majorities in most regional legislatures Constitutional majority in 2007 Most regional governors affiliated with party Domination in Federation Council 2,600 district offices, 53,000 local offices 2 million members by 2008 But will it have the longevity of the CPSU?

9. The assumption: more of the same • The problem – organisations can follow a regressive path • This happened to United Russia’s predecessors – the party is just one of several Kremlin attempts at creating top-down ‘parties of power’ • The fate of the party of power – to serve power-holders in and around the federal executive branch • Previous parties of power – seem very different from United Russia, but they all share one thing in common: they have no real independence as organisations • Party of power – follows a life-cycle of inevitable decay

10. Party of power development • Party of power – shows signs of evolutionary and dialectical development, but also a life-cycle • Looking backwards – parties of power have an underlying logic inherent in their organisation that leads to decay • What logic? – the party of power cannot easily renew itself (no time in opposition). At the same time, power-holders need to present something fresh to voters • Disposable parties? – circumstances change and so too the relationship between power and party. Preserving power is more important than preserving a party

11. Reasons to replace a party of power: Party becomes disobedient Party label or ‘brand’ becomes unpopular Party no longer needed in its current form Russia’s Choice created in 1993 unpopular and disobedient. duration: 12 months Our Home is Russia created in 1995 Unpopular duration: 5 years Unity Created in 1999 no longer needed as an electoral bloc duration: 2 years When to dispose of a party of power?

12. Is UR becoming disobedient? Have the Kremlin created a monster? ‘Having tasted victory, they are beginning to feel like real politicians and have forgotten that they are really nothing more than cardboard characters’ (Kagarlitsky 2006) Pockets of dissent? – United Russia operates as a ‘franchise’ in some regions Internal conflict: ‘Under certain conditions the party may be disbanded’ (Piligin 2010)

13. Not disobedient, just unresponsive • Hands on approach – rumours that Putin’s secretariat and Sobyanin run the party • Haphazard recruiting – the party has been cleaning up its ranks in recent years • Putin’s ‘Popular Front’ – an attempt to inject some new blood. 180 non party members on UR’s party list

14. United Russia's ‘brand’ Established and recognisable Voters make associations with party and Putin (as intended) Voters like a winner, they like voting for power too But…

15. A campaign with no ‘bump’ Levada Center (www.levada.ru), ‘approval ratings’, 8 November 2011

16. Election year glitch Source: www.cikrf.ru

17. Decline of the brand Source: www.cikrf.ru

18. ‘Party of swindlers and thieves’ Source: http://www.ng.ru/politics/2011-11-18/1_marafon.htm

19. Is United Russia still needed? United Russia’s purpose in 2011: • Pass laws – without asking too many questions • Corral elites together – socialise and subject them to party discipline • Provide an extra layer of administration across the regions – eyes and ears, monitor administrations and public opinion • Provide election victories – collect the popularity of the president/prime minister

20. The regime needs something new: polemics Levada Center (www.levada.ru), ‘approval ratings’, 8 November 2011

21. Conclusion: how much longer? What to do? – United Russia’s image may contaminate Putin’s image. But the party is still essential in a centralised system Duplicate – build a new party of power? Mutate – split United Russia in two? Short-term – damage limitation. Putin backs off to protect his image, reactivates the ‘Popular Front’. Medvedev is left to try and renew party

22. Russia’s 2011 Duma Elections: The “Veteran Parties” Presentation to the Department of Russian and Eurasian Studies Annual Conference 2011 Geir Flikke (NUPI)

23. The Russian “Party” System: A Framework • Russia’s Party System is not a system of parties: • (Hale (2006): Dominant party, substitute parties, one-off parties and “veteran parties”. • A political system becomes a party system when parties get a “competitive edge over party substitutes in the electoral market”. • The major function of a “party”: • Serving as a resource base and vehicle for bringing party officials into office (Hale, 2006). • Preserve organizational stability and define electoral “hunting grounds” (Panebianco, 1988).

24. The Market Logic: Availability and Habit • Availability: the number of “effective parties” (electoral design); or the number of parties presented to the electoral market (transitional design)? • Russia’s electoral design: 7 per cent threshold, simultaneous regional and federal elections, prolonged mandate for Duma deputies. • Outcome: most actors not likely to rock the boat (bringing party officials to parliament is more important). • Number of parties presented: two cohorts of parties: early 1990s and early 2000s. • Outcome: only three survivors - the CPRF, LDPR and Yabloko (trademark, organizational strength or electorate?)

25. The Market Logic: Availability and Habit • Habit: electoral preferences in a “design area”. • Levada poll September (2011): most respondents consider that the interests of vlast and society do not correspond. • Dominant parties may appeal to several “habits” and preferences (the snowball argument). • Why then talk about the “opposition”? • Will “ideationally driven” parties survive in a trademark political market? Hale (2006): “ideational-driven capital” versus “administrative-driven capital” – the former fails. • If not: the “return” of ideational markers in Russian politics.

26. The ideational-driven veterans: CPRF • 24th Party Congress: 234 delegates (average age 54 years); 73 regional branches and over-all membership. • Traditional hunting-ground: the “nostalgic electorate”. • First three: Ziuganov, former admiral Komoyedov, Afonin (leader of the Union of Young Communists) • Organization and leadership: Levada poll: http://www.levada.ru/02-07-2004/elektoraty-partii-o-smene-rukovodstva-kprf

27. The less ideational-driven veterans: the LDPR • 23rd Congress of the LDPR (September): 40 Duma deputies, 169 representatives in regional Dumas, 200 000 members in 85 regional cells. • Traditional hunting-ground: nationalists and protest-votes. • First three: Zhirinovsky, Ostrovskiy (Duma deputy), Lebedev (LDPR fraction leader). • Organization and leadership: chairman spoke for three hours at the congress.

28. The veterans and campaigning: CPRF • CPRF: popular mobilization (Minin and Pozharsky monument). • Counter-movement: a single appearance by the tandem at the very same site on 4 November (Russian Unity Day). • CPRF: countering the All-Russian National Front (ONF) and UR. • ONF steals traditional CPRF-votes (labor unions etc.): the Russian Post Agency case. • Conference on “black technology”, and filing a case against lop-sided elections at the procurator’s office (November 21st). • CPRF paradoxically appeals to international observers. • CPRF: policy issues. • Ziuganov: no modernization without the “Soviet” experience.

29. The veterans and campaigning: LDPR • LDPR: campaign profile as more respectable “law and order” party. • Zhirinovsky: no one drinks or smokes in the LDPR. • No more washing of boots in the Indian Ocean, but prime campaign issue: 15 federal okrugs (including Kiev, Minsk and Odessa federal okrugs). • Mixed campaign message: Federal level: “LDPR for Russians” – regional level (Tatarstan) just “LDPR”. • LDPR: less “edged” against the tandem – blames local authorities and “evil-doers” for restrictions imposed on candidates. • Registration in Hanty-Mansiysk. • The leaflet containing a picture of Mironov as LDRP leader.

30. Symbolic campaigning: the “honest election” leaflet • The “dual use” of the “honest elections” message: • CEC: Russia can manage its own elections: explaining the low number of international observers. • The “catch-22” of not signing: hard to be against. • CPRF and LDPR refused to sign the UR “honest elections” – but there are regional variations. • Leningrad oblast: CPRF tries to swap signing for extended membership in local electoral commissions. • Irkutsk: CPRF forms its own committee: “for honest elections against administrative resources”. • Yekaterinburg: LDPR says it labels party as “fascist” and “nationalist” – stresses its main-stream “law and order” profile.

31. Organizational dynamics: Re-nomination rate (source Kommersant) • UR: 172 out of 315 (45 per cent). • CPRF: 52 out of 57 (8.8 per cent). • Just Russia (JR): 32 out of 38 (15.8 per cent). • LDPR (23 out of 40) (42.5 per cent). • http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1807623?isSearch=True

32. Conclusions • Priority one: organizational survival – major incentive is the Duma. • Highest re-nomination rate CPRF (more is at stake?) • Lowest re-nomination rate LDPR (less is at stake?) • Priority two: recognizable iconography, but no change of leadership. • Major challenge CPRF: ONF designed to mobilize support for the UR “primaries”. • Major challenge for the LDPR: ?

33. Elections without opposition? David White, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham

34. What do Russians think about opposition?

35. ‘Why is opposition necessary in Russia’

36. Defining political opposition in Russia

37. Kremlin-loyal opposition Pravoe Delo: Right Cause

38. Semi-opposition Yabloko

39. Principal opposition The Party of People’s Freedom (PARNAS)

40. Raising the costs of authoritarian rule "Authorities are rational enough not to follow the Chinese path. They would happily break the arms of protesters, but when these protesters number 1,500 or even 10,000, it's better to find a compromise with them. This signals an evolution of society's political culture, a very slow evolution that is taking place with the change in generation.“ Dmitrii Oreshkin

41. ‘While an opposition victory is not impossible . . . It requires a level of opposition mobilisation, unity and skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a democracy’ Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’

42. Session 2: The elections and election campaign (11.30 – 12.45) Panel: Derek Hutcheson, Lecturer and Head of European Studies, University College Dublin Regina Smyth, Associate Professor, Indiana University Pavel Baev, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo Chair: Julie Wilhelmsen, NUPI

43. Campaign Finance

44. The matrix of funding Russia Source: Ingrid van Biezen, in LeDuc et al., Comparting Democracies 3, p.68.

45. Above the ‘iceberg’ • Permanent Party Organisational Funds: • Membership fees; state funding; donations; events & business activity; civil-law transactions & other. • Separate election funds: • Own party funds (up to 50% of max. expenditure) • Voluntary donations • Max 0.07% per individual & 3.5% per legal entity of central fund. • Max. 5% per individual/50% per legal entity of regional funds. • Declarations & transparency: • First & final accounts. • Declaration of donations over 400K roubles (legal entity) or 40K (person) to central funds (50K/20K to regional funds. (Law on Parties, §§28-34 & State Duma Law §§ 63-71 )

46. Expenditure, 2007 State Duma Roubles Votes 7% barrier

47. Where does the money come from? Income sources 2007 Roubles 7% barrier

48. Relative income proportions 2007 7% barrier

49. And where does it go?Expenditure breakdown, 2007 7% barrier

50. Expenditure limit changes 2007-11 (roubles) Source: §64, State Duma Law, as amended by Law N384-F3 (23 December 2010) * = in 2007, these thresholds applied up to/from 3 million voters – changed to 2m in 2011.