Building collaborative relationships with governments

1. Building collaborative relationships with governments A perspective from the OSCE

2. Structure Introduction including brief description of organisation for better understanding The case: Prison Reform, in the larger context of Rule of Law development work and criminal justice reform work. As an introduction: General overview of ODIHR OSCE Rule of Law programmes: Criminal Justice Reform and Fair Trials programme: 1. Background 2.�Approach 3. Implementation Case 1: Prison Reform work in Central Asia Case 2: Prison Reform work in the Caucasus

3. Tactics? Viewpoint from different angle: Intergovernmental organisation The countries we work in are member states of the organisation. We operate on request (by participating States) and assessed needs Our missions get deployed based on Invitation consensus

4. �from Vancouver to Vladivostok The OSCE is the only regional, international organisation to unite the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian communities. (1) How did we come to 55: Originals 34: + 14 - former USSR +1 - Cz-Slo divorce -1 - Reunification of FRG +4 - Secessions from FRY -1 - Susp of FRY +2 - Andorra and Albania admitted = 54 activesThe OSCE is the only regional, international organisation to unite the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian communities. (1) How did we come to 55: Originals 34: + 14 - former USSR +1 - Cz-Slo divorce -1 - Reunification of FRG +4 - Secessions from FRY -1 - Susp of FRY +2 - Andorra and Albania admitted = 54 actives

6. Basic principles CSCE/OSCE: comprehensive and co-operative approach to security commitments not legally but politically binding consensus among equal, sovereign states Unique organisation through Comprehensive and cooperative approach to security Participation of a wide range of states throughout the OSCE region Principle of consensus, pS are equal and sovereign In very specific instances decisions can be made without consensus (see also slides ahead, �decision-making (PC)�: �Consensus minus one�: decided in Prague 1992 (MC); appropriate action can be taken without the consent of the Statae concerned in �cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violation� of OSCE commitments. Option first used in 1992, in regard to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, resulting in the suspension of then rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) �Consensus minus two�: Stockholm 1992: the Min Council can instruct two pS that are in dispute to seek conciliation, regardless whether or not the pS object to the decision. So far not been made use of. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is uniquely positioned for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. There are at least three characteritics of the OSCE which contribute to this: The Comprehensive View of Security. The OSCE takes a broad and comprehensive view of security, which includes the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and economic and environmental issues are considered as important as political and military issues (? three dimensions of security, next slide). A Cooperative Approach to Security. Starting from the premise that security is indivisible, participating states have a common stake in security and should cooperate to prevent conflict, or to manage conflicts non-violently. A Unique Status. The OSCE has no legal status, and all decisions are politically but not legally binding. Moreover the OSCE is the only organization in Europe to declare itself a regional arrangement iaw Ch VIII of UN Charter. (3) (Read Arts 52, 53, 54 of Charter of UN) Unique organisation through Comprehensive and cooperative approach to security Participation of a wide range of states throughout the OSCE region Principle of consensus, pS are equal and sovereign In very specific instances decisions can be made without consensus (see also slides ahead, �decision-making (PC)�: �Consensus minus one�: decided in Prague 1992 (MC); appropriate action can be taken without the consent of the Statae concerned in �cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violation� of OSCE commitments. Option first used in 1992, in regard to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, resulting in the suspension of then rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) �Consensus minus two�: Stockholm 1992: the Min Council can instruct two pS that are in dispute to seek conciliation, regardless whether or not the pS object to the decision. So far not been made use of. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is uniquely positioned for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. There are at least three characteritics of the OSCE which contribute to this: The Comprehensive View of Security. The OSCE takes a broad and comprehensive view of security, which includes the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and economic and environmental issues are considered as important as political and military issues (? three dimensions of security, next slide). A Cooperative Approach to Security. Starting from the premise that security is indivisible, participating states have a common stake in security and should cooperate to prevent conflict, or to manage conflicts non-violently. A Unique Status. The OSCE has no legal status, and all decisions are politically but not legally binding. Moreover the OSCE is the only organization in Europe to declare itself a regional arrangement iaw Ch VIII of UN Charter. (3) (Read Arts 52, 53, 54 of Charter of UN)

7. Three dimensions of security Politico-military dimension Economic and environmental dimension Human dimension The Different Dimensions of OSCE�s approach to security a) The Human dimension b) The Military aspects c) The economic dimension d) The co-operative approach: i) Inter-institutional co-operation, through the Parliamentary Assembly ii)The OSCE vis-�-vis other I.O.s and agencies: External Co-operation iii) Partnership for Co-operation: (1) Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Marocco, Tunisia,) (2) Other partners (Japan since 1992, the Republic of Korea (1994), Thailand (2000) and most recently Afghanistan (2003)The Different Dimensions of OSCE�s approach to security a) The Human dimension b) The Military aspects c) The economic dimension d) The co-operative approach: i) Inter-institutional co-operation, through the Parliamentary Assembly ii)The OSCE vis-�-vis other I.O.s and agencies: External Co-operation iii) Partnership for Co-operation: (1) Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Marocco, Tunisia,) (2) Other partners (Japan since 1992, the Republic of Korea (1994), Thailand (2000) and most recently Afghanistan (2003)

8. Helsinki Final Act... signed 1 August 1975 Helsinki Final Act encompasses 3 main sets of recs ? �baskets�: Basket I: relating to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relations between and among participating States (the �Decalogue�) and military confidence-building measures (Zeitgeist)\ Basket II: concerned cooperation in a number of fields including economics, science and technology and environment Basket III: dealt with �cooperation in humanitarian and other fields�. This formula covered human rights issues under the headings of �human contacts�, �information�, �cooperation in the field of culture� and �cooperation in the field of education�. Helsinki Final Act encompasses 3 main sets of recs ? �baskets�: Basket I: relating to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relations between and among participating States (the �Decalogue�) and military confidence-building measures (Zeitgeist)\ Basket II: concerned cooperation in a number of fields including economics, science and technology and environment Basket III: dealt with �cooperation in humanitarian and other fields�. This formula covered human rights issues under the headings of �human contacts�, �information�, �cooperation in the field of culture� and �cooperation in the field of education�.

9. Helsinki Decalogue Sovereign equality of States Refraining from the threat or use of force Inviolability of frontiers Territorial integrity of States Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Non-intervention in internal affairs Respect for Human Rights & fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief Equal rights & self-determination of peoples Co-operation among States Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law Souveraenitaet und Gleichberechtigung Unverletzlichkeit der Grenzen Territoriale Integritaet der Staaten Verzicht auf Intervention in innere Angelegenheiten Menschenrechte: Recht auf eigene Meinung, Religion und Glauben Gleichberechtigung und Selbstbestimmung der Voelker Note apparently conflicting principles of sovereignty (RED) vs. human rights(GREEN) in Decalogue; compare to Arts 2.1, 2.7 of Charter of UN. Samuel Johnson said, �Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.� Will sovereignty continue to be �the last refuge of the scoundrel�? Or is the bottom line �international law,� (BLUE) reinforced in the OSCE by �consensus minus one�?Souveraenitaet und Gleichberechtigung Unverletzlichkeit der Grenzen Territoriale Integritaet der Staaten Verzicht auf Intervention in innere Angelegenheiten Menschenrechte: Recht auf eigene Meinung, Religion und Glauben Gleichberechtigung und Selbstbestimmung der Voelker Note apparently conflicting principles of sovereignty (RED) vs. human rights(GREEN) in Decalogue; compare to Arts 2.1, 2.7 of Charter of UN. Samuel Johnson said, �Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.� Will sovereignty continue to be �the last refuge of the scoundrel�? Or is the bottom line �international law,� (BLUE) reinforced in the OSCE by �consensus minus one�?

10. 1989 beginning of rapid transition across the CSCE area CSCE institutionalization process, with: permanent structures operational capabilities first Institutions first field activities Start with permanent admin structures ? including Secretariat, a CPC, Off for Free Elections (later ODIHR). Avoidance of large bureaucracies: small offices; decentralised; seconded. 1991: Parl Assembly 1992: FSC; HCNM; Economic Forum; CiO function formalised; Secretary General Autumn: first OSCE Mission of long-duration to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina (FRY) ? by 1994: eight missions In 1992: CSCE declared itself to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VII of the UN Charter With these developments: CSCE de facto evolved from being a process to being an organisation (therefore: 1995 �organisation�)Start with permanent admin structures ? including Secretariat, a CPC, Off for Free Elections (later ODIHR). Avoidance of large bureaucracies: small offices; decentralised; seconded. 1991: Parl Assembly 1992: FSC; HCNM; Economic Forum; CiO function formalised; Secretary General Autumn: first OSCE Mission of long-duration to Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina (FRY) ? by 1994: eight missions In 1992: CSCE declared itself to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VII of the UN Charter With these developments: CSCE de facto evolved from being a process to being an organisation (therefore: 1995 �organisation�)

11. Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 1991 �The participating States (�) categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.�

12. OSCE �Tools� Political instruments Chairman in Office Institutions Mechanisms �Most important�: Field operations

13. OSCE Field Operations Monitor compliance with human dimension commitments Point out weaknesses Assist in finding solutions Hier Einschub uber Feldarbeit (understanding modus operandi; strengths/weaknesses; practical effects (im Hinblick auf moegliche Beruehrungen im Feld zu spaeterem Zeitpunkt) Frontline of OSCE�s work: active presence of the org. & vehicle through which political decisions are translated into action. Address all phases of conflict cycle: early-warning, conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), conflict management, post-conflict rehabilitation/reconstruction No mandate same, but generally purpose 2-fold: a) facilitate political processes intended to prevent or settle conflicts, and b) ensure that OSCE pS is informed of developments in mission area/countries.Hier Einschub uber Feldarbeit (understanding modus operandi; strengths/weaknesses; practical effects (im Hinblick auf moegliche Beruehrungen im Feld zu spaeterem Zeitpunkt) Frontline of OSCE�s work: active presence of the org. & vehicle through which political decisions are translated into action. Address all phases of conflict cycle: early-warning, conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), conflict management, post-conflict rehabilitation/reconstruction No mandate same, but generally purpose 2-fold: a) facilitate political processes intended to prevent or settle conflicts, and b) ensure that OSCE pS is informed of developments in mission area/countries.

14. OSCE Institutions HCNM - High Commissioner on National Minorities ODIHR - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights RFOM - OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media PA - Parliamentary Assembly Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media High Commissioner on* National Minorities: on, not for - not an investigative role in the case of individual violations, rather to identify and to seek early resolution of ethnic tensions which might endanger the peace, stability or friendly relations between member states Instrument of early warning ? Mandate: Provide �early warning� of, and eventually also �early action� on, ethnic tensions with conflict potential. also: instrument of conflict prevention not an Ombudsman Impartial third party Negotiates at highest political level �silent diplomacy� The Concept of National Minority Open concept (not given in mandate) Existence of linguistic, cultural or ethnic characteristics which differ from majority Group not only wishes to maintain, but also to reinforce that identity ii) Belonging to a National Minority is an individual choice d) The HCNM will not deal with any institution, group, etc. which directly or indirectly supports terrorism or violence; thus little involvement to date with ethnic Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, who have been in armed conflict. Key points to ethnic conflict resolution: Minority self-assertion does not imply fracture of a current State nor require a territorial expression: �� it may very well be achieved through legislation promoting the development of � identity of the minority � culture, education or public affairs.� (98) �The Copenhagen Document� (2nd Mtg of Conf on Hum Dim CSCE, 1990) makes clear that territorial autonomy (for a minority) is an option and not a right; nothing in that document implies any contravention of the principal of the territorial integrity of States, nor is there any necessity for a minority to be formally recognised by the State (OSCE Newsletter, Aug 99).Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media High Commissioner on* National Minorities: on, not for - not an investigative role in the case of individual violations, rather to identify and to seek early resolution of ethnic tensions which might endanger the peace, stability or friendly relations between member states Instrument of early warning ? Mandate: Provide �early warning� of, and eventually also �early action� on, ethnic tensions with conflict potential. also: instrument of conflict prevention not an Ombudsman Impartial third party Negotiates at highest political level �silent diplomacy� The Concept of National Minority Open concept (not given in mandate) Existence of linguistic, cultural or ethnic characteristics which differ from majority Group not only wishes to maintain, but also to reinforce that identity ii) Belonging to a National Minority is an individual choice d) The HCNM will not deal with any institution, group, etc. which directly or indirectly supports terrorism or violence; thus little involvement to date with ethnic Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, who have been in armed conflict. Key points to ethnic conflict resolution: Minority self-assertion does not imply fracture of a current State nor require a territorial expression: �� it may very well be achieved through legislation promoting the development of � identity of the minority � culture, education or public affairs.� (98) �The Copenhagen Document� (2nd Mtg of Conf on Hum Dim CSCE, 1990) makes clear that territorial autonomy (for a minority) is an option and not a right; nothing in that document implies any contravention of the principal of the territorial integrity of States, nor is there any necessity for a minority to be formally recognised by the State (OSCE Newsletter, Aug 99).

15. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

16. Why prison reform as case? governments are more willing to engage in prison reform than in other areas that are closer to the centre of power (judicial reform, police reform etc) relatively �easy� reform area to engage governments cost argument prison reform as an entry point with a view to expand to other, more sensitive areas of the criminal justice system

17. OSCE ODIHR Rule of Law programmes Criminal justice reform programme Fair Trials programme

18. Background Approach Programme objectives Results / output Activities / input Indicators Strategy / Methodology Assumptions and risks Implementation

19. Case 1 Prison Reform in Central Asia Background Overcrowding Cost factor Political will �Competition to reform�: regional competition and cooperation

20. Concrete results Transfer of prison administrations from the Ministries of Interior to Justice Demilitarisation Humanisation Reduction of number of inmates Reduction of torture and ill-treatment (at least in post-trial) Abolishment of death penalty

21. Case 2 Prison reform in the Caucasus: The creation of a public and institutionalised monitoring board of civil society representatives to monitor places of detention (case study Armenia)

22. Key aspects Context Desired outcomes (goals and objectives) Strategy employed � tactic/methodology of project implementation

23. How did it work? The process Start: request by government to help creating monitoring system Two draft laws to comment: from MoJ and a coalition of NGOs Assessment (by RoL Unit): Sense? Prospects for impact? Political will? Decision

24. First actions � preparing the ground Assessment visit to country Separate Meetings with MoJ and Civil Society coalition Roundtable with civil society Consensus among two entities about core issues Differencies about way ahead

25. Framework conditions: Minimum conditions setting agenda: Monitoring board Staffed with civil society representatives Established by and linked to Ministry of Justice Independence This was the frame and non-negotiable to MOJ

26. Next steps Creating alliance of international actors for support Creation of standing expert team to comment and serve as resource to the process Opinion on draft law Harmonisation process in focus

27. Next steps Submission of legal expert opinion to stakeholders Roundtable (Dec. 2002) bringing together governmental and non-governmental as well as international actors

28. Results of roundtable Basic agreement on issue New draft to be prepared Harmonising both positions in one single draft Drafting of road map Open communication links for constant negotiation and dialogue OSCE: Political support and advice

29. Next steps New draft legal basis (January 2003) � sent out to all stakeholders March: drafting of detailed roadmap setting actions and timelines Two-phased roadmap: pre- and post-establishment of board

30. Continuation of process Drafting process Political process in country Constant presence of mission on ground: dialogue/negotiations with both sides, lobbying � providing information to ODIHR

31. Formal creation of board Adoption of draft law in August Shortcomings: key provisions kicked out � restricted operational capacity and authority given to board Alarm bell: quick response needed Amendments (October 2003) re-introducing recommended minimal standard provisions

32. After enactment of decree Selection process (Oct 03 � Feb 04) Nomination process (Feb � April 04) Appointment process (April 04) Appointment ceremony in April 04 Board established � first phase of mission accomplished

33. Phase II: post-creation of board First monitoring visits carried out Training series initiated in July 04 Practical training concept: Knowledge transfer �Shadowing� approach: on-the-job training with short-term resident expert Debriefings and evaluations

34. Process ongoing

35. Review development of tactic Targets affected: Behavious and mentality change Institutional change Individual change Actual outcomes � further reaching effects: Reduction of ill-treatment Higher awareness Input to reform process through reports

36. Lessons learned What worked � what not What do differently Recommendations