Promoting cooperatives and workplace democracy to fight exploitation

1. Promoting cooperatives and workplace democracy to fight exploitation 15th Summer School on History of Economic Thought, Economic Philosophy and Economic History, Lille, France Thomas Ferretti Ph.D. Student – Université catholique de Louvain (UCL) Chaire Hoover d’éthique économique et sociale thomas.ferretti@student.uclouvain.be

2. I – Exploitation 1 – Whatis exploitation? - Given a particular conception of what justice or fairness is, “to exploit others is to take unfair advantage of them” (Wertheimer 2008, StandfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy). - There are many different uses of the term “exploitation” because there are many different conceptions of justice.

3. I – Exploitation 1.1 – Processes of exploitation - First precision : There must be a relationship or a transaction. To be exploited implies that one participates in the processes of socio-economic cooperation but does not receive his fair share. - That is why some forms of exploitation, while remaining unfair, can be “mutually beneficial”.

4. I – Exploitation 1.2 – Relationalvulnerability - Second precision : exploitation is more likely to occur when some people are more vulnerable than others (relational vulnerability). - This is why the distinction made by some researchers between “consensual” exploitation, and “non-consensual” exploitation seems to be week.

5. I – Exploitation 1.3 – The source of vulnerability - Third precision : the source of vulnerability is important. Vulnerability can exist before the exploitative interaction. But vulnerable people can also take part in socio-economic processes that will perpetuate and deepen their relational vulnerability. - Here, the relevance of structural processes involved in exploitation is clear.

6. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.1 – Choosing a theory of justice - Liberal egalitarianism - The primary subject of social justice is the basic structure of society : the most important institutions that distributes fundamental rights and duties, and the benefits of cooperation(Rawls 1971).

7. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.1 – Choosing a theory of justice - Principles of justice: 1- Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a full adequate scheme of equal basic liberties; 2- Socio-economic inequalities arising from institutions are acceptable if (a-) they are attached to positions open to all under a fair equality of opportunity and if (b-) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of the society (the difference principle)(Rawls 1971).

8. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.2 – Social policies and redistribution - In practice, in socio-economic systems such as welfare states, there is the desire to combine efficient economic mechanisms (i.e. a competitive market economy), with some principles of social justice, like “equality of opportunities”. - Very often, social justice concerns take the form of redistributive policies like a progressive tax system that taxes the rich to give to the poor, either directly or through public services (like public health or education systems) (Murphy, Nagel 2002, Hsieh 2009).

9. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.3 – Redistribution is not enough - One critique towards the liberal-egalitarian theory and redistributive policies is that they tend to focus on the distribution of social goods and less on economic processes (Young 2006, Hsieh 2009). - Two aspects of structural processes are left aside if we focus on distribution: 1- how these processes create the distribution, 2 – non-distributive aspects of these processes (Young 2006).

10. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.3 – Redistribution is not enough - Exploitation is a specialkind of injustice thatillustrateswellthisproblem. - I willgivethreeexamples.

11. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.3 – Redistribution is not enough 1) Rawls recognizes that the division of labor is an important aspect of the basic structure. However, for some authors like Young, this skips the question of what justice requires for the division of labor: “Is it just, for example, that an aspect of the basic structure of society consists in an occupational pyramid where the more plentiful positions at the bottom are relatively menial, repetitive, and subordinate to the decisions of others, while the few positions at the top carry broad autonomy, decision making power, and prestige?” (Young 2006).

12. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.3 – Redistribution is not enough 2) The second example is about decision-making power in socio-economic institutions. “Is it right for corporate, educational, religious or other institutions to be structured so that there are elites with major decision making power and others who work with or use the services of the institutions, yet who have little or no power over the institution’s policies, including over those that affect their own actions?” (Young 2006).

13. II – Justice and Redistribution 2.3 – Redistribution is not enough 3) Phillips says that liberal-egalitarians sometimes accept too quickly the ideal of a “market economy”. There is a risk to include, in the description of this ideal, contingent features of actual markets. Market mechanisms are not neutral. They do not only create inequalities, they also embody and transmit a set of conventions and norms that influence how people who live in a market economy conceive what justice, equality, merit, fair exchange, hierarchy, democracy are (Phillips 2008).

14. III – Institutional design 3.1 – Firms and justice - Firms are very important organizations in contemporary economic life. Most people spend a significant part of their active lives to work for them, they influence the dynamism of our economies, and they are partly responsible for the distribution of income and wealth, for the division of labor, for many economicdecisions… - It would be useful to modify the design of economic organizations to achieve various social goals.

15. III – Institutional design 3.2 – The example of cooperatives and workplacedemocracy • Firms organize the division of labor. Cooperatives or simply firms under employees’ control could divide tasks in a way better suited to all employees since the latter have the decision-making power. So this could create work of a less alienating nature and better quality. Heavy or repetitive tasks may be shared in such firms and if they are not, it will be employees’ choice (Fleurbaey 1993, 2006).

16. III – Institutional design 3.2 – The example of cooperatives and workplacedemocracy 2) Firms organisedecisionmaking. Different forms of workplace democracy or “labor-management”, applied in private enterprises or cooperatives may limit this relational vulnerability. (Fleurbaey 2006, Hsieh 2009)

17. III – Institutional design 3.2 – The example of cooperatives and workplacedemocracy 3) Firmspromotes values. Some institutions promoteslessdesirable values and others, likedemocraticfirmscanpromotes more desirable values likedeliberation and responsibility for example (Cohen ?).

18. III – Institutional design 3.3 – Reducing exploitation - All thosemechanisms, and others, can help to reduce exploitation - If wecan prouve that, we have good reasons to regulatefirms in orderto promotespecifickinds of institutional design aimingatreducingexploiation.

19. Future - Future society and regulation - Future research - Future exchanges