Reinventing the Resistance Applying EOM to Militant Organizations in Lebanon Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson Assistant Professor of Global Policy and Political Science Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota June 1, 2014
Puzzle • Beirut v. South Lebanon • Same orgs in 1982 • Why divergent emergence?
LEBANON BEIRUT Burjal-Barajna SAIDA ‘Ayn al-Hilwa SYRIA ISRAEL Puzzle
EOM and militant organizations • Autocatalysis/self-reproduction • Production and reproduction of economic, social, political, and military actors • Pre-1982: (Re)production of military actors called “guerrilla factions” • Evolution • Multiple interpenetrating networks • Cross-domain shifts in relational protocols in response to wartime conditions 1982-1989 • Emergent forms of military (and social) organization • Relational ontology • As seen and articulated by actors themselves • Methodological implications
Studying these processes in the field • Examine the content of relational ties over time within and between domains • Analyze constitutive ties through biographies over time • Focus on egocentric networks • Key actors
Argument Perturbation (Regionalized wartime violence) Transposition of relational ties across multiple network domains Emergence of novel organizational forms (collective fronts v. personalized militias)
Socially Embedded Militant Organization Organization #1 Political Organization #2 C A B Kinship Individual Families Diagram adapted from Padgett and McLean (2006)
Perturbation Organization #1 Political Organization #2 Kinship Individual Families C A B
Transposition/ Repurposing Invention Organization #1 Political Organization #2 C A B Kinship Broker between two families Individual Families
Research Design • Pre-war control • Shared shock • PLO withdrawal • Temporal and spatial variation in violence • 1982-1985: Israeli occupation v. Lebanese government control • 1985-1988 (War of the Camps): Siege v. guerrilla war 1985-1988 1982-1985 June 1982 Pre-1982 BEIRUT SAIDA SOUR
Beirut: Indiscriminate Targeting Militiamen and an emergency response team evacuate a wounded fighter from a refugee camp’s inter-organizational defensive front. PLO (mid-1980s).
Saida: Incarceration & Guerrilla Warfare Map drawn by Abu Riyad, a former inmate of mu‘askar 8 (Camp 8) in Ansar I prison. The three dark circles at the top illustrate the locations of IDF guard towers. Each rectangle is a 25-man tent. Sour, Summer 2012.
Networks and Organizations Men’s Military and Quotidian Networks Decentralized underground clusters Coordinated defensive front BEIRUT Coordinated underground front Immobile political cells Pre-1982 Militant Organization Local Structure Postwar Militant Organization Local Structure Mobile guerrilla cells Factionalized guerrilla organizations Factionalized guerrilla organizations Centralized personal militias SAIDA Phase 1 Clandestine Cell Systems Phase 2 City-Wide Networks Phase 3 Military Fronts
Initial observations/possible trajectories • Importance of both “positive” v. “negative” network content for emergence (or lack thereof) • Actors/entrepreneurs/amphibians don’t have to be “great men” • Re-evaluation of “gender roles” • Language: Boundary creation, maintenance, violation
Research Agendas • Opposition and rebel organizations • Modeling mobilization (Facebook is but ONE network…) • Conflict dynamics: Multiple-network embeddedness shapes adaptive trajectories • Relationship between structural vulnerability, adaptive potential, and sustained resistance • Regime building • Configuration of ties within regimes (e.g. the president’s brother-in-law is also the chief of military intelligence and primary shareholder in a tech company) • Rules of the game (protocols) • Resilience: Which regime configurations are particularly resilient (e.g. Egyptian military and business)