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ESCAPE from FREERIDERS. J un Kobayashi (U of Chicago) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo U) Hideki Ishihara (Rikkyo U) August 21, 2003 Marstrand, Sweden. 1 QUESTION. In MODERN SOCIETIES… We can CHANGE PARTNERS . Divorce, Move, Change Job, Immigration. COOPERATION in Dilemmas…
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ESCAPEfromFREERIDERS Jun Kobayashi (U of Chicago) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo U) Hideki Ishihara (Rikkyo U) August 21, 2003 Marstrand, Sweden
1 QUESTION • In MODERN SOCIETIES… We can CHANGE PARTNERS. • Divorce, Move, Change Job, Immigration. COOPERATION in Dilemmas… when CHANGE PARTNERS?
C C D D C D D C 2 THEORY • SELECTIVE INTERACTION (Dawes), • ESCAPING (Hayashi). • Prediction… ESCAPE COOPERATION. • But NOT SELF-EVIDENT… b/c Defectors FOLLOW.
3 HYPOTHESES • "ESCAPING TIT-for-TAT"… • TIT-for-TAT in a Group, • EXIT when DEFECTED, • Cooperate in NEW Group. • H1 SOME play "Escaping TFT." • H2 Earn MORE than DEFECTORS.
4 EXPERIMENT • WEB-BASED. • Repeat S.D. Game in a GROUP, • MOVE to Anther Group, No COST. • ANONYMOUS. • 15-20 Subjects (students). • 20-40 Games, 3-6 Moves. • 6 Sessions, 111 Subjects. • 2 Universities in Japan, Nov. 2002.
Defection Payoff Cooperation # Cooperators 5 GAME • Work at one of 4 FIRMS. • If D (Work LAZILY), PAYOFF… # Cooperators 4 . # Workers in Firm • If C (Work HARD), PAYOFF… D's Payoff - 2.
Your CHOICE, PAYOFF Each FIRM's PAYOFF, #Workers HOW to WORK? EACH MONTH
History of Each FIRM's PAYOFF, #Workers Each FIRM's AVERAGE PAYOFF WHERE to WORK? EVERY 6 MONTHS
7 ESCAPING TFT? 27% →YES!
8 BETTER? →NO!
9 CONCLUSION • COOPERATION by ESCAPING? • Something MORE. • Theory… MOVING COST. • Test… More Experiments / Surveys.