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EIP Revisited

EIP Revisited. Exploitation & Defense in 2013 Dan Guido – BruCon – 09/26/2013. Introductions. @ dguido. Exploit Intelligence Project. Intel-driven case study from 2011 How do we use intel to mitigate a threat? What are optimal defenses for mass malware?

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EIP Revisited

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  1. EIP Revisited Exploitation & Defense in 2013 Dan Guido – BruCon – 09/26/2013

  2. Introductions @dguido

  3. Exploit Intelligence Project • Intel-driven case study from 2011 • How do we use intel to mitigate a threat? • What are optimal defenses for mass malware? • How do crimepacks acquire exploits? • Is security research being applied by crimepack authors? • Separate what could happen from what is happening

  4. Clear Market Leaders

  5. Limited Target Support

  6. Low Quality Exploits

  7. Developed Elsewhere

  8. Java is a Path Forward Google Chrome DEP/ASLR Bypass Sandbox Escape Shell Malicious HTML IE8 DEP/ASLR Bypass Integrity Escalation Java

  9. Derived Optimal Defenses • Recommended to defend against crimepacks in 2011: • Enable DEP on browser and plugins • Remove Java from Internet Zone • Secure Adobe Reader configuration • Use EMET when possible / where needed • Then, continue to monitor threat intel for changes…

  10. Where are they now? Crimepacks in 2013

  11. Crimepacks in 2013 • Standard desktop builds use DEP/ASLR/Sandboxes • 2009: Windows XP, IE7, Flash 9, Office 2007, Java 6 • 2013: Windows 7, IE9, Flash 11, Office 2010, Java 7 • Blackhole / Cool, Sweet Orange, and Gong Da • Have these kits invested in bypassing our new defenses? • How have crimeware packs dealt with the pressure?

  12. The World is Changing Source: StatCounter January 2011 – August 2013 Browser Versions

  13. Supported Targets

  14. Exploit Origins IE / Flash Java All memory corruption exploits came from APT campaigns or the VUPEN blog. All Java exploits came from security researchers: JeroenFrijters TELUS Security Labs Adam Gowdiak (Security Explorations) Stefan Cornellius Sami Koivu via ZDI Michael Schierl via ZDI “Whitehats Shrugged”

  15. Cool Exploit Kit • Premium version of Blackhole, by the same author • Launched a $100k bug bounty for improved exploits • Only offered as a hosted service to prevent source leaks • As a result, Cool has several unique exploits: • CVE-2011-3402: Windows Kernel TTF font(Duqu) • CVE-2012-1876: IE 9 (VUPEN Pwn2Own) • CVE-2012-0775: Reader 9/10 (self-developed?) • No privesc included for these targets, relies on payload

  16. How did we stack up? • DEP, remove Java, secure Reader, EMET as necessary • Safe from all but TTF font exploit w/o patching! • Systems being deployed now w/o Java are out of reach • Win7, IE9, Reader X, EMET as necessary • Mixed messages coming from this data • Success! We have pushed crimepacks to the margins • Warning! It is easy to predict if you will get owned

  17. The Advanced Persistent Threat How effective are exploit mitigations against this threat?

  18. Aurora et al. • Highly regarded technical capabilities • Prolific developers of zero-day exploits • Original source for many crimepackexploits • Pioneered “watering hole” attack campaigns • Notable for successful compromises of Google, Bit9 • Continues to cross paths with Trail of Bits • Exploit profiled in Assured Exploitation • Elderwood Exploit Kit dissection and analysis

  19. Elderwood • Think, a “startup” for Aurora to invest in • Developed several reusable vuln disc / exploit tools • Requires less-skilled people to operate the tools • Launch zero-day watering holes on a regular basis • Released new attacks every ~3 months in 2011/2012 • 4 Internet Explorer, 5 Adobe Flash zero-days • Dozens of prominent websites compromised (CFR)

  20. Quality Exploits? All Computers Internet Explorer 8 Flash, Java, and Office plugins available 50% of the time Modest exploit mitigations are surprisingly effective!

  21. Meet NYU-Poly…

  22. … and Davis

  23. It’s Easy to Get Better

  24. Reality • RSA – phishing email with malicious Excel doc • Exploited Flash vuln no longer viable in IE • Google – IE6 in remote office to total control of Gmail • They found the ONE guy in Google using IE6 • Amateurs push as hard as they can. Professionals push as hard as they have to. • Rapid discovery and shift to low cost attack vectors

  25. APT Discoveries Maybewe should try to make protections that cannot be bypassed by CS undergrads with 40 hrs of training? We need to push harder since the professional bad guys can own things without caring about mitigations APT can get better, we know they will, but is it prudent not to act just because you know they will respond?

  26. Taming the Tiger Use the Kill Chain and Courses of Action the way they were intended

  27. Variety of Approaches or “An APT breached my network despite my $750,000 IPS and $2,000,000 SIEM. What other vendor products should I buy to protect myself?” –Jerkface

  28. External Exposure

  29. Phishing Resistance “99% of the security breaches it investigated in 2012 started with a targeted spearphishingattack.” –Mandiant “If you go from 35 to 12% on fire, you’re still on fire.” –Zane Lackey

  30. Exploitability

  31. Final Conclusions Let’s make defenses that bored undergrads can’t take out in one semester, that would be cool! Let’s build things that help understand your adversary’s capability and intent. Let’s use the defenses we have. They work, and they work against the people you care about. Thanks Andrew Ruef and Hal Brodigan!

  32. References • Contagio: An Overview of Exploit Packs • http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/overview-of-exploit-packs-update.html • Elderwood Kit Analysis • http://blog.trailofbits.com/2013/05/13/elderwood-and-the-department-of-labor-hack/ • Detecting Targeted Malicious Email • http://papers.rohanamin.com/wp-content/uploads/papers.rohanamin.com/2010/11/Amin2011-dissertation.pdf

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