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How to Own the Internet in your spare time

How to Own the Internet in your spare time. Ashish Gupta Network Security April 2004. Overview. What is the paper about ? Code Red Analysis Three new techniques for fast spreading Surreptitious worms Summary. The threat. Millions of hosts  enormous damage Distributed DOS

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How to Own the Internet in your spare time

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  1. How to Own the Internet in your spare time Ashish Gupta Network Security April 2004

  2. Overview • What is the paper about ? • Code Red Analysis • Three new techniques for fast spreading • Surreptitious worms • Summary

  3. The threat • Millions of hosts  enormous damage • Distributed DOS • Access Sensitive Information • Sow Confusion and Disruption • This paper is about • Fast spreading of worms

  4. Analysis of Code Red I • Compromises MS IIS Web servers • Spreads by random IP generation – 99 threads • Earlier bug  Code Red I • DDOS attack to whitehouse.gov • Modeling  Random Constant Spread (RCS) • Gives an exponential eq: • Depends only on K, not N

  5. Better Worms • Code Red II • Used a localized scanning technique • 3/8  Class B, 1/2  class A, 1/8  rest • Very successful strategy • Affects many vulnerable hosts • Proceeds quicker 1/8 1/2 3/8

  6. Nimda Worm • Nimda Worm  August 2001 • Maintained itself for months , multi-mode worm • Infected Web servers • Bulk emailing • Infecting Web clients • Using CodeRed II backdoors

  7. Onset • Very rapid onset • Mail based spread  very effective • Full functionality  ?

  8. Faster Worms

  9. Creating Better Worms • Hit List Scanning • “getting off the ground” very fast • Say first 10,000 hosts • Pre-select 10,000-50,000 vulnerable machines • First worm carries the entire hit list • Hit list split in half on each infection • Can establish itself in few seconds

  10. Permutation Scanning • Random scanning inefficient  lot of overlap • All worms share a common pseudo – random permutation 32 bit block cipher key Index Permutation scanning IP Address

  11. How it works: • After first infection, start scanning after their point in permutation • If machine already infected, random starting index • Minimizes duplication of effort • W sees W’  W’ already working on the permutation list of W  W re-starts at a random point • Keeps infection rate very high, comprehensive scan • Permutation key can be changed periodically for effective rescan

  12. A Warhol Worm • Combination of hit-list and permutation scanning • Can spread widely in less than 15 mins • Simulation results

  13. Topological scanning • Use info on victim to identify new targets • Email lists • P2P applications • List of web servers from IE favorites etc.

  14. Faster Worms : Recap • Fast Startup  Hit List Scanning • Extremely Efficient  Permutation scanning • Combine the above  Warhol worms • exploit local information Topological scanning

  15. Flash Worms • Fastest Method  Entire internet in 10s of seconds • Obtain hit-list of vulnerable servers in advance • 2 hours for entire IP space on OC-12 link (622 mbps) • List would be big ( ~ 48 MB ) • Divide into n blocks • Infect first of each block and hand over the block to the new worm • Repeat for each block • Alternative: Store pre-assigned chunks on a high BW server • Two limitations • Large list size • Latency • Analysis: Sub-thirty limit on total infection time on a 256 kbps DSL link

  16. For 3 million hosts, just 7 layers deep ( n = 10)

  17. Stealth Worms • No peculiar communication patterns • Very difficult to detect • Working: • Pair of exploits: Es for server, Ec for client ??? • Server  Client  Server , …. • Limitations • Pair of threats required • Depends on web surfing

  18. Exploiting P2P systems • Large set, all running same software • Only single exploit now needed • More favorable for infection: • Interconnect with large number of peers • Transfer large files • Not mainstream protocols • Execute on desktops, not servers • Potentially immense size

  19. Analysis of KaZaA traffic • Immense traffic: 5-10 million conns per day • Huge diversity !  9 million distinct hosts contacted in November ( from 5,800 univ hosts ) • If Kazaa exploited (variable size headers ? ), than a large number can infected stealthily in a month • Starting point : brute force infect all university hosts ??? • Actual spread much faster ? • Much work remaining  total Kazaa size ?

  20. Remote Control • Distributed control • Each worm knows about other worms *it* has infected • Analysis: High connectivity , Average degree= 4 • Without a single point of communication, updates can be passed • Programatic Updates • Worms as “computing capsules” • Can send arbitrary code !

  21. Conclusion • Worms present an extremely serious threat to the safety of the Internet

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