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Ariel Fiszbein (World Bank) Yasuhiko Matsuda (World Bank)

Matching Reforms to Institutional Realities: A Framework for Assessing Social Service Delivery Reform Strategies in Developing Countries . Ariel Fiszbein (World Bank) Yasuhiko Matsuda (World Bank) Improving the Quality of Public Services: A Multinational Conference on Public Management

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Ariel Fiszbein (World Bank) Yasuhiko Matsuda (World Bank)

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  1. Matching Reforms to Institutional Realities: A Framework for Assessing Social Service Delivery Reform Strategies in Developing Countries Ariel Fiszbein (World Bank) Yasuhiko Matsuda (World Bank) Improving the Quality of Public Services: A Multinational Conference on Public Management 27-29 June 2011, Moscow, Russian Federation

  2. Service delivery reform as a development challenge • Weak social service delivery is a common development challenge across the world • Motivating service providers and holding them accountable for performance has been a challenge • Examples of provider absence

  3. Emerging lessons: Context matters! • Recent reviews of service delivery reforms • World Development Report 2004 • Citizens, Politicians, and Providers (Fiszbein 2005); • Evaluations of CCT (Fiszbein and Shady 2009), School Accountability Reforms (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011)

  4. A Network of Influence and Accountability Mechanisms

  5. Fitting service delivery to institutional characteristics: Decentralized delivery • Does the “long route” work at the local level? • “Efficient”, competitive elections as a key accountability mechanism (Faguet 2004, Skoufias et al. 2011, Keefer & Khemani 2005) • Can the central government exert sufficient influence over local governments? • Is the central government motivated to improve local service delivery (e.g., nature of support coalition)? • Does the central government have stewardship capability (e.g., fiscal incentives, legal sanctions, party discipline?

  6. Matrix of Central Government Influence

  7. Applying the framework Central Government Influence High Local Accountability Low High Low

  8. Applying the framework Conditional grants, contracting out Broad regulations, coordination Central Government Influence High Accountability Substitution by Central Gov: Brazil-state/Education Ceara-municipalities Effective Federalism: Minas Gerais - Brazil Local Accountability CDD, Private, unregulated) provision Radicaldevolution, dissemination of innovations High Low Accountability Substitution by NGOs: Cambodia-health El Salvador-EDUCO Islands of Excellence: e.g, Naga, Philippines Low

  9. Future research agenda • Better characterization of central and local government features • Indicators • Application to a larger set of country/sector cases for robustness tests and refinement

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