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Types

Types. The dollar game (divider and decider) As the decider, what would be your strategy to “win” Once the decider moves, the divider has no incentive to carry out any threats

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Types

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  1. Types • The dollar game (divider and decider) • As the decider, what would be your strategy to “win” • Once the decider moves, the divider has no incentive to carry out any threats • If the decider would actually carry out some threat (even though it would not be in his best interest), the divider will make a split the decider will approve of. Otherwise, she will not • The decider’s “type” (resolved or unresolved) is private information

  2. Game trees • Sometimes we can draw two game trees showing two different types of players. P1 may be resolved or unresolved, and P2 does not know which it P1 is

  3. Reservations Points • The question might be thought of as, “how do you get another player to believe something about your reservation point” • It is easier to get another person to believe a truth than a falsehood

  4. Trade Offs • Actors have interests. One interest is to avoid war. But they also want to gain resources and wield influence. • The further an actor moves her reservation point toward her optimal bargain, the more likely it is she will risk war. • States set reservation points based on three factors: • P(win) • E(costs) • Issue importance

  5. Resolve • A players resolve determines her reservatio point (P(win) + e(costs) + issue = resolve) • Resolve is the will to continue fighting despite costs • How can states communicate resolve? • In order to avoid war but still get what you want, you need to move your adversary’s reservation point and break her resolve.

  6. Coercive Bargaining • Reduce the amount of costs you expect • Increase the probability you will win • Increase the apparent importance of the issue • Increase the amount of costs the opponent expects • Decrease the probability the opponent will win • Decrease the issue importance to the opponent

  7. Military Capabilities • The easiest way to manipulate p(win) and e(costs) is to increase military strength • This may not be practical for specific crises • This may lead to an arms race and a security dilemma

  8. Verbal Statements • The most common way of manipulating perceived issue importance is through verbal statements, threats, proclamations • Commitment problems

  9. Commitments • Talk is cheap • A successful commitment has three elements • Committal to the act • Communication that you are committed to the adversary • A decision by the adversary to back down or concede

  10. Commitment vs. Open Options • Commitment makes it more likely that you get your way • It also makes it more likely you end up in a war • Keeping open options allows for flexibility and lets you avoid war • But it makes your bargaining position weaker • More commitment = more risk

  11. Irrationality • States may have incentives to act “crazy” • This may do more to deter threats than to make own threats more credible • It can also backfire

  12. A Puzzle • War gives us information • 5% of dyads are responsible for about 50% of wars • Why do some states fight over and over? • Learning theory • Domestic politics • Cognitive psychology

  13. Learning (Leng) • The type of strategy used in one conflict affects future interactions • If an aggressive strategy is used successfully, the state will continue to use aggressive behavior in the future • If a state loses a conflict, it may learn that it ought to be more aggressive next time • Add this to the bitterness caused by a loss and …

  14. Domestic Politics (Colaresi) • Leaders who are dovish toward rivals are punished electorally • Leaders who are hawkish toward rivals are rewarded electorally • Leaders are also punished for backing down from a crisis • So domestic politics may push a leader toward a crisis and prevent her from backing down

  15. Cognitive Errors • People may strive to be rational, but human capacity for rational thought is limited • The world is a complex place and people may see what they expect rather than what is there

  16. Cognitive “Shortcuts” • Primacy Effect • Opinions are formed quickly • Opinions are formed based on initial information only • Recency Effect • The most recent event stand out • Fighting the last war • Bounded Rationality • Satisficing instead of optimizing • Take the first option that is “good enough”

  17. Attribution Theory • Based on concept of “self” and “other” • For self • Good behavior is dispositional • Bad behavior is situational • For other • Bad behavior is dispositional • Good behavior is situational

  18. Prospect Theory • In the “domain of gains” actors are risk averse • In the “domain of losses” actors are risk acceptant • Even Howie Mandel knows this • What are some ways that prospect theory might affect bargaining?

  19. Cognitive dissonance • Cognitive dissonance • People hold on to “truths” about themselves • Updating those beliefs in a negative way is painful • People want to be right • Overconfidence • Justification of actions

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