RFID Security and Privacy Concerns

1. RFID Security and Privacy Concerns Corby Ziesman

2. Privacy and Security • Privacy and security are important factors that need to be considered in every project • If the users’ privacy rights are not protected, the product becomes unfeasible • If security consequences are not kept in mind during product development, then the product will be flawed by design and a workaround may need to be patched in later on at a greater expense

3. Controversy “Some privacy activists see RFID’s widespread and unrestricted deployment as a kind of doomsday scenario in which corporate and government interests can pervasively track individuals—paving the way for a techno-totalitarian state in which each person’s movements, associates, and casual acquaintances are carefully monitored and recorded in futuristic data centers.” [1] “One of the leading crusaders here is Katherine Albrecht, director of Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (Caspian). Albrecht variously calls RFID tags ‘spy chips’ and ‘tracking devices’; she organized a Benetton boycott that forced the company to officially repudiate any RFID testing plans.” [1]

4. RFID’s Situation • RFID is small and cheap, and therefore easily deployed on a large scale without being conspicuous • RFID transmits wirelessly, and sensitive identifying data can be eavesdropped upon • RFID data from multiple sources can be combined to create a history of a person’s daily activities • As a result, RFID poses the risk of compromising a person’s private information

5. Security Hazards RFID Environment Abstract [1]

6. Security Hazards RFID Threat Contexts [1]

7. Some Current Uses of RFID [1] [4] [5] • Automobile Immobilizers • Key sends signal so car can start • Animal Tracking • Sub-dermal implant identified lost pets • Payment Systems • Allows quicker check-outs at the store • Automobile Toll Collection • Helps traffic flow quickly • Inventory Management • Improves supply chain efficiency • Bank Notes • Prevents forgery • Libraries • Allows easier management of books and materials • Passports, Drivers’ Licenses, and National IDs • Provides an extra way to verify identities …and more everyday

8. [1] Corporate Data Security Threats • Corporate Espionage Threat • Competitors can collect confidential supply chain data • Competitive Marketing Threat • Competitors steal users’ preferences and use that to enhance their own competing product • Infrastructure Threat • As companies become reliant on RFID, they become more susceptible to new forms of denial-of-service attacks • Trust Perimeter Threat • As more data is shared, the sharing mechanisms increasingly provide new opportunities for attack

9. [1] Personal Privacy Threats • Action Threat • A person’s behavior or intent is inferred from RFID data, which may be inaccurate • (e.g. expensive store items suddenly disappearing from the shelf may indicate shoplifting and customer is approached as a potential criminal, when the customer actually only bumped some clothes onto the floor by accident) • Association Threat • A person’s identity is linked with a purchased item • Different from loyalty cars (e.g. Fry’s VIP) because this may be involuntary, and linked to a specific item (serial number) as opposed to a product

10. [1] Personal Privacy Threats • Location Threat • If an item is linked to a specific person (as in Association Threat), and there are clandestine RFID readers in various locations, a person’s location may be tracked or be open to unauthorized disclosure • Preference Threat • A person’s preferences may be revealed and abused • (e.g. a thief who targets those who purchase high-cost items as opposed to cheaper items)

11. [1] Personal Privacy Threats • Constellation Threat • Even if a person’s actual identity is not known, the RFID tags around that person form a unique constellation which can be tracked • Transaction Threat • When an item moves from one constellation to another, it can be inferred some transaction has taken place between the two individuals associated with each constellation • Breadcrumb Threat • As a person collects tagged items, they build a database of items associated with their identity • Some items get discarded (“breadcrumbs”) but the association still remains with the original owner • If the breadcrumb is picked up by another individual and involved in some crime, the breadcrumb leads back to the original owner, and not the criminal • The original owner is liable, at the very least, to be bothered by law enforcement

12. [3] An Example Way to Protect RFID • Provide a mechanism to lock/unlock RFID tags (using a hash function) • While unlocked, the full functionality and memory of the tag are available to anyone in the interrogation zone • Tags will be equipped with a physical self-destruct mechanism and will only be unlocked during communication with an authorized reader • In the event of power loss or transmission interruption, tags will return to a default locked state

13. [3] Locking Tags • To lock a tag, the owner computes a hash value of a random key and sends it to the tag as a lock value • The tag stores the lock value in the meta-ID memory location and enters the locked state • While locked, a tag responds to all queries with the current meta-ID value and restricts all other functionality • Each tag always responds to queries in some form and thus always reveals its existence

14. [3] Unlocking Tags • To unlock a tag, the owner sends the original key value to the tag • The tag then hashes this value and compares it to the lock stored under the meta-ID • If the values match, the tag unlocks itself

15. [1] [2] Another Example Blocker Tags • Require no change in hardware • Use auxiliary tags to create a noisy RF environment for unauthorized readers • Unauthorized readers see a lot of “spam” RFID messages and can not pick out the real messages • Authorized readers are able to function normally • A blocker can simulate all RFID tags simultaneously, or selectively simulate a subset of the ID codes • (Such as for a specific brand, or some subset determined to be in a “privacy zone”) • A blocking device may be worn by a consumer to create the noisy RF environment around their body to prevent unwanted RFID scanning of items they may be carrying or wearing

16. Conclusion • RFID offers many benefits and useful properties • RFID systems require that privacy and security be taken into account during every step of the design because of the unique avenues they provide to be abused • There are methods that can be used to help protect against abuse, so that they may be utilized without sacrificing security or privacy, preventing possible consumer backlash

17. References [1]RFID Privacy: An Overview of Problems and Proposed Solutions; S. Garfinkel, A. Juels, R. Pappu; IEEE 2005 [2]The Blocker Tag: Selective Blocking of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy; A. Juels, R. Rivest, M. Szydlo [3]RFID Systems and Security and Privacy Implications; S. Sarma, S. Weis, D. Engels; 2003 [4]Squealing Euros: Privacy Protection in RFID-Enabled Banknotes; A. Juels, R. Pappu; 2003 [5]Privacy and Security in Library RFID Issues, Practices, and Architectures; D. Molnar, D. Wagner; ACM 2004

18. End Questions and Discussion