Return to the Moon - Expanding Earth’s Economic Sphere

1. Return to the Moon - Expanding Earth’s Economic Sphere Harrison H. Schmitt Rutgers Symposium on Lunar Settlements New Brunswick, NJ June 4, 2007

2. Why Return to the Moon? • Satisfy basic human instincts for exploration • Freedom, betterment, curiosity • New lands, trade, and knowledge • Continue at least 40,000 years of exploration’s benefits to modern humans • New homes, livelihoods, know-how, resources • Supported by both “government” and private initiatives • Perpetuate exploration and eventual settlement of space • Comparable to past migrations into our global habitat • Opportunity for the expansion of free institutions

3. Conditions for True Space Settlement • Economic Self-sufficiency • Initial Capitalization • Affordable Access • Compatible Space Law

4. Economic Self-sufficiency • Settlers from the Start • Cost and Commitment • Exports • Helium-3 and/or Beamed Energy • Space Consumables • Lunar Production • Construction Materials (Immediate) • Water, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Food and other Consumables (Early to Mid-term) • Indigenous Manufacturing (Long-term) • Need Initially Covered by Imports • Paid for by Energy and Consumables Revenues

5. Initial Capitalization • U.S. Government • ~$150 Billion Dollars (15 years) • International Partnership • >> $150 billion Dollars (>>15 years) • Intelsat / Inmarsat Model Only Potentially Feasible International Management Approach • Private Investors • ~$15 Billion Dollars (~15 years)

6. Affordable Access • <$3000/kg to TLI for >50T in 2007 dollars (fully burdened) • Constellation System (54MT) Estimate: ~$6000 marginal cost • Griffin: 2007 (Congress/OMB Driven) • Saturn VI / “Orion” System (100MT) Estimate: ~$3000/kg • Schmitt: 2006 (Private Investor Driven) • Ancillary Consequences • Lunar Tourism • Moon-based Science and Technology Applications

7. Technical And Financial Envelope For Private Lunar Initiative • Demonstration of Commercial Viability of Helium-3 Fusion (“Fly-off” Between 4-5 Approaches) • ~US$5 Billion Investment for Demonstration Plant • Re-creation of a Saturn V Class of Heavy Lift Boosters with payload costs <US$3000/kg to the Moon • ~US$5 Billion Investment [? Ares 1-5 Development] • Lunar Settlement’s Capability to Produce 100kg/yr Helium-3 (Miner-Processors, Infrastructure, and “The Company Town”.) • ~US$2.5 Billion Investment (? Lunar Outpost Devel.) • Financially Viable at >US$2.50/million Btu for Steam Coal ($140 Million/100kg Helium-3) [$2.5-5 Billion Reserve - 17-33%] University of Wisconsin-Madison Photo NASA PHOTO

8. CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO SPACE EARTHSPACE ANTARCTIC TREATY LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES CONVENTION ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT PROTOCOL RIO ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS LAW OF THE SEA RE-NEGOTIATED “AGREEMENT” KYOTO AGREEMENT 1959 1964 INTELSAT AGREEMENT OUTER SPACE TREATY RESCUE/RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS, ETC. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE IN SPACE REGISTRATION OF OBJECTS LAUNCHED IMMARSAT AGREEMENT MOON AGREEMENT SPACE STATION AGREEMENT 1967 1968 1972 1975 1976 1979 1982 1988 1988 1991 ITALICS - NOT RATIFIED BY U.S. RED - ONLY SPACE TREATY DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO RESOURCES TO WHICH THE U.S. IS A PARTY 1992 1994 1997 1997 COMMERCIAL SPACE ACT OF 1997 COMMERCIAL SPACE ACT OF 1998 2003 200? SENATE RATIFICATION “LAW OF THE SEA” ? COMMERCIAL SPACE ACT OF 2003

9. SPACE LAW AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT • 1967 Space Treaty • Compatible with Signatory Nation Oversight • 1979 Moon Agreement • Not Compatible • Requires International Regulatory and Management Structure to be in Place

10. SPACE LAW • Outer Space Treaty of 1967 • Only Truly Operative Space Treaty Relative to Resources • Implementation of Moon Agreement would be Self-defeating • 1967 Treaty Permissive Relative to Access to Space Resources • Private, Government, Multilateral or International Initiative Equally Permissible • Private Entity Must Be Sponsored (Licensed) by Party to Treaty • Multilateral Private Property Regime Desirable

11. Law Of The Sea Convention:1994 Revised Agreement • President Bush, on the 15th of May, Asked the Senate to Ratify the 1994 Revised Convention Previously Signed and Submitted to the Senate by President Clinton • Major Improvements In Language Were Made Over What The Senate Studied and Refused to Consider in 1982, But…….. • "Common Heritage Of Mankind" Reference Remains Undefined, However, The President Clinton’s Message To The Senate Indicated That It Means: • The Oceans And Its Floor Are Not Subject To National Appropriation • Private Economic Activity Is Consistent With This Concept • Only Mining Activity Is Subject To Regulation By The Convention's International Seabed Authority • Similar Language And Regulatory Intent Relative to Resources Implied In The 1979 Moon Agreement

12. Law Of The Sea Convention1994 Revised Agreement • Existence Of The International Seabed Authority Is A Problem • The Existence Of The Convention's Own Operating Arm, “The Enterprise,” Creates Internationally Supported Competition To Any Private Initiatives. • Clinton’s Transmittal Statement Contends That They Have Made This Harmless But Provision Still Exists • Special Status Also Conferred On Developing Nations At The Expense Of Others • Compulsory Dispute Settlement Provisions Gives Up National Sovereignty • Potential For Inhibiting Litigation Against Any Development • Supposedly, The U.S. Has Veto Power Over Implementation, But How Can Anyone Be Certain That Power Will Be Exercised?

13. Law Of The Sea Convention • Status (02/18/01): Convention And Agreement Are “In Force” • 135 Nations (Including The EC) Ratified The 1982 Convention • 100 Nations Have Ratified The 1994 Revised Agreement • Absence Of U.S. Inhibits Implementation • Existing United States Deep Seabed Mining Law (DSHMRA) • Stated By Clinton Administration To Be Similar To Provisions In “The Agreement [Revised]” • Mining, However, Remains Subject To Both International Regulation, Fees And Potentially Unfair Competition From “The Enterprise”

14. Law Of The Sea Convention1994 Agreement • Questions Relative To The Wisdom Of Senate Ratification • Did 1994 Agreement Really Fix U.S. Objections To The 1982 Convention? • Complexity Of International Seabed Authority • Special Status Of Developing Nations At Expense Of U.S. • Compulsory Dispute Settlement Provisions • Conflicts With Existing U.S. Laws • Implications Of “Common Heritage Of Mankind” Language • Commitments Implied • Commitment To Funding Of International Seabed Authority • Potential For The Authority To Create Its Own Mining Arm • Reach and Reliability of U.S. Veto • At The Very Least, The Senate Should Be Forced to Fully Analyze The National and Space Related Implications of Ratification

15. Primary Problem That Many Have With International Treaties Such As The Law Of The Sea Convention (And Kyoto):Incremental Loss Of U.S. Sovereignty To An International Majority With Fundamentally Different Interests and Values

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