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This document outlines innovative approaches to abstract state space exploration (ASSE) focusing on the computation of reachable states using monomial invariants and boolean expressions. It discusses the complexities of the methods (τ1 and τ2), highlighting computational costs, dependencies among predicates, and efficiency improvements via backward analysis. It explores the generation of abstract state graphs, invariant checking, and the refinement of abstractions through the integration with PVS, emphasizing the need for precise invariants and the role of dependency predicates. These advancements aim to enhance the verification of properties within systems.
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Abstract state space exploration • Method: (1) start in the abstract initial state (2) use to compute reachable states (invariants)
Abstract state space exploration • Approximation 1: all reachable states are monomials. • Where
Least upper bound on lattice L length of longest chains
Abstract state space exploration • Approximation 2 : strongest invariant of by allowing approximation to be boolean expressions on B1 … Bland applying only on canonical monomials ( B1 … Bl ) representing a single state
Abstract state space exploration • Canonical monomial : the set ofatoms of M0 ---- the set 2lover B1 … Bl • Note: • Boolean expressions on B1 … Bl = arbitrary elements of Qk
Complexity of 1 and 2 • Complexity of computation: • The number of necessary proofs • Successor of expA K=2*p*l*1 • 2: B.1 – B.2 • P: number of transitions • L: number of predicates • 1: enabledness
Complexity of 1 and 2 • Computation of 1 : • Needs maximally l*k proofs • Computation of 2: • Worst case 2l * k proofs (all successors computed)
Computation of 2 • Much better in practice • Some j leave Iunchanged (or transform Iindependently) • Only a small subset of all abstract states is reachable • 1… I need not be independent not all 2l canonical monomials represent a non-empty set of concrete states • Dependency predicate : consider only non-spurious abstract states
Improvements of the computed invariants • Use backwards analysis: where
Improvements of the computed invariants • Approximations yj • are arbitrary predicates of the concrete property lattice and not necessarily boolean combinations of 1… I • Abstract backwards analysis • Would require a lower approximation of
Construction of the abstract state graph • Computation of a successor: require several proofs • Only a small abstract state (few thousand) can be explored • Additional cost of storing transitions is almost negligible
Advantages of storing the abs. state graph • Use model checker to verify any temporal logic formula on atomic proposition on B1 … Blwithout existential quantifier over executions • Precise global control flow graph • Especially if guards of the program are boolean combination over I • Stronger structure invariants than for initial control structure used to improve backwards analysis
Refinement of the abstract state graph • Add more predicates to 1… I: deduced form • The so far constructed transition relation • See later: abstraction refinement (done in an incremental way)
Given expA and Bnew • Not all implications in (3) have to be checked • Only the new ones and those which could not be proved valid during the computation of the successors of expA
When to add • If the abstract state space exploration by using does not allow to verify some property • Construct more precise abstraction by adding new predicates
Implementation Overview • Invariant checker tool impliments: • 1)backwards computation of inductive invariants (true in initial state and preserved by transitions) • 2) generation of structural invariants (preserved by system structure) • 3) abstract state graph generation (added)
Integration with PVS • All implications (3) submitted to PVS • Proof strategy combining decision procedures, rewriting and boolean simplification using BDDs is systematically applied
Abstract state • Is a tuple (ctrl, ) where: • ctrl ---- is a concrete control configuration • ---- is a valuation of a set of boolean vars B1 … Bl
Dependency predicate • Given {1… I} an upper approximation of a dependency predicate is computed and used to generate successors • Exact computation if {1… I} can be divided using syntactical independency into a set of small sets of potentially dependent predicates
Auxiliary invariants • Generated using initial control structure where • Qk control configuration of a system consisting of several parallel components are considered reachable
Abstract state graph • The invariant is a conjunction of • Already known invariants in the system relevant for the transition under study • is used to smaller successors by replacing (3) by weaker ones • Only implication compatible with dependency predicate and not already computed are generated
Reachability algorithm (Defs) • For simplicity: shown for systems without explicit control locations • Based on QA and over B1 … Bl ,can be implemented with BDDs • Abstract invariant : by analysis of dependencies between 1… I
Reachability algorithm (Defs) • Concrete invariant : generated using the facilities of the tool • Constraints Ctau[i](B1 … Bl, B’1 … B’l): for each i by static analysis • E.g. which predicates j are not touched => B’j = Bj
Reachability algorithm (Defs) • Abstract predicate Aguard[i]=’(gi): generated for each i • 1… I are chosen such that Aguard[i] is exactly the guard of i • AReach: the so far computed set of reachable states (invariant at the end)
Reachability algorithm (Defs) • Atau[i]: at each stage an upper approximation of • To_explore: auxiliary variable representing the set of states for which we have to compute the successors
Reachability algorithm Initializations: AInit:= ’(init); For all i: Atau[i]:= AReach := AInit; To_explore := AInit; Iteration: While To_explore != false choose m in To_explore; To_explore:= To_explore m; if m=> Aguard[i] then SEE NEXT PAGE ATau[i]:= ATau[i] ( ) To_explore := To_explore (succ AReach); AReach := AReach succ;
Choice of the Predicates i • Use guards in the transitions the system: • Allows to construct successors only via transitions enabled in all represented concrete states • Replaces enabledness checks (3.0) by boolean tests. • To prove that is an invariant • One can also try to use for the definition of the abstract state space
Choice of the Predicates i • Split each predicate into its set of literals (atomic pred.) • E.g. use 1 = (out =in) and Choice of the Predicates 2= (out= tail(in)) instead of 1 v 2 • Alternating bit protocol example: verified that:□(out =in V out= tail(in)) • List of already received messages Out is a prefix of the list of messages sent so far In
Alternating bit protocol verification • Verified correctness :□(out =in V out= tail(in)) • Already received message Out is prefix of messages sent so far : In • Using implemented backward computation: • The computation of the appropriate inductive invariant does not terminate • The computation of structual invariants does not generate interesting results
Alternating bit protocol verification • Using the two predicates as 1 and 2: • Deterministic graph is generated • 34 decidable implications • 5 abstract states • 68s
Alternating bit protocol verification • Obtaining more precise approximation: • 3= message (message_channel) = head(In) • Internal predicate • Last sent message is the head of In -- same graph but all states satisfy either In=Out or out=tail(In) • Use abstract state graph to generate stronger structural invariants • Apply strengthening backward computation- (6) proved
Bounded retransmission protocol • Extension of ABP: • Message pockets are sent, retransmitted bounded by max per message. • Full parameterized version of BRP: • Pockets can be of any size • Max can be any positive number • Proven so far by hand • Large amount of user interaction
Protocol description mess receiver Receiving client Sending client sender ack
Protocol description • Sender: receive message pocket from client • Delivers confirmation to client • OK ----- all messages are transmitted • Not_OK -----transmission has been aborted • DON’T_KNOW ----last message not acknowledged
Protocol description • Receiver: acknowledge each received message • Delivers indication to the receiving client • First –1st message received • OK –last message received • Incomplete --- for any intermediate messages • NOT_OK ---transmission aborted
Protocol description • Timers T1,T2: • T1 ---message has been lost • T2 ---transmission ahs been aborted
Correctness • Verification: As for ABP • 19 predicates from guards Abstract state graph: 475 states, 685 transitions, 3 hours