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Modeling and verifying security protocol using PAT approach

This paper presents a framework for modeling and verifying security protocols using the PAT (Process Analysis Toolkit) approach. It identifies intruder behaviors, including message interception, message decryption, and replay attacks, within the Dolev-Yao network model. We emphasize important security goals like authentication, secrecy, integrity, and non-repudiation while offering a user-friendly SEVE language to express specifications. The framework ensures automatic translation from SEVE to PAT language, facilitating thorough security verification and the analysis of both traditional and emerging protocols.

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Modeling and verifying security protocol using PAT approach

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  1. Modeling and verifying security protocol using PAT approach Luu Anh Tuan

  2. Security protocol Intruder

  3. Intruder behaviors • Overhead and intercept any messages being passed in the system • Decrypt messages that are encrypted with his public key so as to learn new knowledge • Introduce new messages into the systems, using his knowledge he knows • Replay any message he has seen (possibly changing plain-text parts), even if he does not understand the contents of the encrypted part.

  4. Network together (Dolev-Yao model) System = (|||X AgentX ) |[send_message,receive_message]| Intruder

  5. Security goals • Authentication: confirm something/someone as authentic • Secrecy: prevent the intruder from deriving secret information • Non-repudiation: the author of a message cannot later claim not to be the author • Integrity: any message corruption will always be detected • Anonymity: the identity of an agent is protected with respect to the message he sent • Fairness: each player receives the item it expects and neither player receives any additional information about other’s item

  6. Security module in PAT • Easy for user to specify and verify → SEVE language. • Has the powerful expressiveness, but still be friendly with the user • Fully automatic specification and verification • Support many kinds of security goals verification and user requirement • Flexibility and adaptability

  7. Framework for SEVE module(translator way) User specification using SEVE language Blackbox with the user Automatic translation from SEVE language to PAT language Adding intruder behavior and specification Using PAT tool to check the security requirement Verification output to user Transformation from counter example (if have) to human reading form

  8. Framework for SEVE module (direct way) User specification using SEVE language Adding intruder behavior and specification Compiling and System analysis Transformation from counter example (if have) to human reading form Blackbox with the user Verification output to user

  9. An example: Needham-Schroeder protocol B A {A,NA}pkB {NA,NB}pkA {NB}pkB

  10. SEVE language • Declaration language. • Easy to specify as similar with security protocol declaration. #Variables Agents:a,b; Nonces:na,nb; Public_keys: {ka,kb}; #Initial declare a knows {na,ka}; b knows {nb,kb}; #Protocol description a -> b : {a, na}kb; b -> a : {na, nb}ka; a -> b : {nb}kb; Declaration part

  11. SEVE language #System Initiator: Alice; Responder: Bob; Intruder: Caron; #Verification Secrecy:{ka} of Alice Agent authentication: Alice is authenticated with Bob using {na} Alice sendsnabefore Bob sendsnb Actual system part Verification part

  12. An attack on the Needham protocol {A,NA}pkI {A,NA}pkB {NA,NB}pkA {NA,NB}pkA {NB}pkI {NB}pkB

  13. Future work • Build in the time model semantic for security program. • Support others cryptography scheme: Diffle-Hellman key agreements, hash key function. • Apply some techniques to reduce the state space: symmetry reduction … • Support not only for security protocols but also for other transaction protocols, e.g. network layer.

  14. Thank you • Q & A

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