THE EUROPEAN UNION Institutions,decision-making, politics

1. THE EUROPEAN UNION Institutions,decision-making, politics

2. The Commission Types of EU decisions • regulations (= laws) directly applicable after publication in OJ • directives (= framework laws) need to be implemented by national legislation within a certain period, content mandatory – ‘direct effects’ doctrine: may be applicable despite nonimplementation • decisions adressed to individual recipients (e.g. state aids) • recommendations and resolutions non-binding (Art. 288 TFEU) Commissioners I • distinction between Commissioners (political level) and administration (civil servants) • 27 Commissioners – until 2005: large countries had 2 Commissioners – now: 1 per country -> state representation (increases with enlargement), not functional needs – after 2014: number of Commissioners = 2/3 of MS • major political and distributional issue -> shift entry into force to future. • European Council may decide otherwise

3. Commissioners I • distinction between Commissioners (political level) and administration (civil servants) • 27 Commissioners – until 2005: large countries had 2 Commissioners. – now:1 per country -> state representation (increases withenlargement), not functional needs. – after 2014: number of Commissioners = 2/3 of MS • major political and distributional issue -> shift entry into force to future. • European Council may decide otherwise • Art 17 TEU

4. Commissioners II • collective responsibility (defense against state influence) • no political responsibility of Commissioner for single DG – Commissioners are not Ministers – but trends to have 1 Commissioner for 1 DG (e.g.environment) • increase of President powers in Lisbon Treaty – set guidelines for Commission work (Art. 17 (6) a TEU) – ask individual Commissioners to resign. • Cabinets: very powerful; French system –strengthens Commissioner, resented by administration; needed for coordination

5. Appointment of Commissioners • past practice: each MS nominated 1-2 candidates, others agreed-> de facto individual national appointments • now: – President proposed by European Council by QMV, elected by EP – Council chooses Commissioners by common accord with President-elect – formally: Commission as a whole elected by EP, reality: individual hearings • trends: EP has achieved more influence by informal practice – threat of Commission censure, block budget – invite Commissioners for hearings, discussion of Commission work programme • trends: state decision-making moves more towards collective choice (including majority decisions), away from individual national appointments. 27 Member States Combined population of EU Member States 490 million 7 Percent of world’s population Percent of global GDP 30 Percent of combined worldwide Official Development Assistance 55

6. Profile of Commissioners • independence required, should serve European public interest – very few cases of direct national representatives; national ways of thinking more important – Commissioners become more independent during office. – but have to think about possible return • political weight has increased (esp. COM President) Commission administration • hierarchical structure: Directorate-Generals – Directorates –Units • no direct responsibility to Commissioner (but collectively to Commission) • sectoral segmentation weaker than in MS but increasing (strong collective identity of some DGs, e.g.competition, environment, agriculture) • European civil service – strong task expansion, personell remains largely constant at quite low level – consequence: reliance on temporary contracts, consulting, lack of oversight capacities -> puts independence and effectiveness into question – development of comitology • nationality becomes more important in higher ranks European Parliament in session

7. Tasks • initiate policy – monopoly of legislative initiative in many fields – huge freedom (lack of political guidance), often takes initiative (green and white books) – has to respect Council veto power: mutual dependency • control implementation – legal implementation, now with substantial sanctions (infringement procedure, Artc. 258 TFEU) – information problems (often has to rely on third parties) • manage budget – fraud cases (lack of politicalcontrol and personell?) Tasks II • independent regulatory activity – control state aids (Art. 107-109 TFEU) – merger control (Merger Control Regulation) • needs independent decision-making in order to avoid competitive state aids or mergers (but not very popular in ‘target states’) • external representation of EU – missions in and from most countries – conducts trade negotiations (exclusive EU competence) • mediation among MS: COM as neutral arbiter(more credible than Council).

8. Trends • task expansion, increased importance, increasingly prominent Commissioners – but: Council develops independent structure • Foreign and Security Policy, JHA • increasing EP involvement (but no direct political responsibility), break-up of old alliance COM-EP against Council • COM has lost its ‘technocratic innocence’ (e.g. ‘liberal Barroso Commission’) Problems and issues • task-staff mismatch – reliance on many external actors (independence) – lack of information about national conditions (both poliy making and implementation) • control of the Commission – runaway technocracy? – independence from direct state influence may be good, but how to ensure link to European common good? – is politicization the answer?

9. Council + Europe • European Council – Heads of State or Government from EU Member States • Council of Europe – distinct international organization, not EU • EU Council/Council of Ministers – “the” Council – legally distinct from European Council European Council • evolved out of informal gatherings in the 1960s, now at least 4 meetings per year, new building in construction … • Heads of state/gov + Pres + COM Pres + HR • President: Herman van Rompuy (former PM Belgium) – elected by Europ. Council by QMV, 2,5 year term of office, renewable once – chairs and prepares European Council sessions • functions – strategic guidelines – shape foreign policy – some decision-making on Community matters – extra-treaty decision-making – open discussion – amend treaties (IGCs)

10. Functions of the Council of Ministers • Executive – with COM – Comitology – Foreign and security policy, J`HA significant executive and operational functions – EMU • Legislative – interaction with COM (initiatives) and EP (esp. ordinary legislative procedure, Budget) • Other – Steering; act as a Forum; Mediation

11. Working Mechanisms I • General Secretariat of the Council – headed by Secretary-General (Pierre de Boissieu) – assisted by Deputy SG for day-to-day management – tasks: management and organization of meetings, committee servicing (agenda, minutes, procedural & legal advice) • Presidency – rotates every 6 months between MS • Foreign Affairs Council: chaired by HR – tasks: evolved from just chairing meetings to organization of Council working programme (including all meetings); representation (of the EU to other states, of the Council to other EU institutions); internal promotion of initiatives and mediation

12. Working Mechanisms II • Internal hierarchy leaves only the most difficult questions to the Ministers. • top: nine Council configurations (e.g. agriculture, environment, ECOFIN) – legally 1 Council! • next: Coreper II and I – II more senior, I for technical issues – they work in practice for different Council configurations • middle: sector-specific Senior Committees, e.g. SCA, PSC • ground: specialized Working Parties • around 250 WPs and Committees – Officials are socialized into the EU

13. Reality of Council Meetings • place: usually Brussels (sometimes Luxembourg) + informal sessions in the country holding the presidency • 70-80 per year • MS representatives, COM, Council Secretariat, presidency => 150-200 persons in the room • procedure: intro by Presidency, COM on the proposal, mini-tour de table, discussion • breaks for informal deals Voting in the Council • types: simple majority, QMV, unanimity – QMV now dominant mode – weighted votes http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/calculette/def ault.aspx?lang=en&cmsid=1690 (voting calculator) • but QMV not often actually applied: – consensus orientation (super-majorities) – explicit voting was rare (about 14%, half in AGFISH) – expected to increase • past obstacles to the use of QMV: – Luxembourg Compromise (1966) (most important ) • what happens if a state refuses to obey the rules?

14. Negotiation in the Council • recurrent forum – interdependence, shared norms • restricted multilateralism – a degree of intimacy, mutual familiarity – but: recent enlargements -> extended multilateralism? • multi-issue forum – issue linkage possible, but restricted due to separate negotiating forums – gains in one issue may offset losses in others • multiple layers of negotiation – national, sub-national & transnational players involved Accountability Problems • Accountability – national ministers/officials – domestic control? – EP? – other mechanisms? • Transparency – agendas and minutes of Sessions available, but not informative – parts of Sessions televised, but not the bargaining – access to documents • Legislative decisions – taken by executives; effectively by non-elected officials

15. The European Parliament Parliamentary and presidential democracy Position of parties towards the EU • two-dimensional: left-right and proanti-EU • huge variation of position towards EU between MS even within same political camp, shifts over time •consequence: coalitions = difficult (but necessary due need to achieve absolute majority) result: centrist coalition of SPE, EPP and ELDR • but: depends on outcome of elections Parliamentary democracy – parties are elected on the basis of programs – parties rather coherent – parties control government Presidential democracy – direct elections of president => high degree of presonalization – relative independence of president from parties – parties often rather heterogeneous

16. Party organization at EU level Voting patterns in the EP • Increasingly coherent but no rigid party discipline (possible) • coherence better in larger groups (EPP, SPE-ELDR) – but EPP has problems of integration (conservative parties) – coherence of smaller parties also increasing but anti-EU groups increasingly incoherent – overall: better than in US, not as good as in most MS • important for absolute majority and ability to have clear position against Council parliamentary groups (factions) • EPP-ED, SPE, ELDR, ... • trend towards integration of smaller groups • highly formalized and organized transnational parties • heterogeneous, weak formalization, consolidation post-Maastricht • relationship factions-parties weaker than in MS • membership extends beyond EU

17. EP organization Role in legislative process • long fight for right of legislative initiative – ‘own initiative reports’, influence COM annual work programme, pressure via budget, support by ECJ rulings (e.g. ‘Isoglucose’), • no formal right to legislative initiative! • increasingly important as co-player in legislative process– EP has become a veto player (George Tsebelis)->Council incentive for accepting EP amendments – absolute majority required in second reading (relative majority in 1st and 3rd reading-> tendency to EPP-PES alliance – no stable coalition (no government support) but issuespecific alliances (EPP, PES, ALDE) • legislation adopted either by Council alone or by Council and EP – never by EP alone max 750 members (now 736), smaller states overrepresented, 3 seats: Strasbourg, Brussels, Luxembourg • parliamentary leadership (President, Vice-Presidents, Presidents of Political Groups) • political groups (relatively fluid and heterogeneous; concentration) • committees (very important for legislation;esp. committee chairs) • MEP recruited from national parties; problem: career pattern

18. Committee work • most of the work is done in committees – standing (40-60 members) and ad hoc committees – most MEPs are member of one standing committee ->specialization – examine legislative proposals – absolute majority of plenary needed to make amendments in second reading or reject proposal • structure – committee chairs = important – rapporteurs deal with individual proposals; strong influence, flexible organization. – shadow rapporteurs are from a different political group but follow the same dossier.

19. Problems of EP influence • no formal right of initiative. • no full grip on legislation (Council still adopts legislation without EP • no full budgetary control. • no control of COM (only indirectly via vote on Commissioners) • what is the appropriate measure? – presidential or parliamentary systems? – new type – strong role of territorial interests (Council) Trends and issues • from consultation to co-operation to co-decision I and II -> increasing EP influence. • highly complex (but more complex than national legislation?) • comparable to US-system, checks and balances instead of majoritarian democracy (no parliamentary support of government). • huge impact of procedural rules • system of checks and balances without strong executive -> no precedence in MS • strong territorial dimension: consociational System. • weak integration across levels through political Parties. • slow-moving process (half-century) of polity building