The Barbary Wars: Madison and Jefferson

1. The Barbary Wars: Madison and Jefferson

2. The Barbary Wars • Islamic polities or regencies (kingdoms) in North Africa: Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, Tripoli (in Libya) • “Corsairs” (really pirates) acting under protection of rulers in each regency would capture European merchant ships, demand ransom and annual tribute • 1780s: Problems with Barbary regencies: • British encouragement of piracy • Barbary regencies had no practice in the law of nations, had their own code of “honor upon the seas” • How to deal with Barbary regencies? • “Accommodate” or just pay (John Adams) • “Change behavior” or intimidate (Thomas Jefferson)

3. 1785-1800: The Treaty Structure • 1785-1787: Congress under Articles of Confederation • Morocco “prompts negotiations” with capture and release (1785) • Algiers captures 21 Americans; demands $60,000 • Problem is “asymmetry” – U.S. had no navy, no money, no support from Europe, and nothing to use as leverage • What to do? • Adams: pay tribute until we have an adequate naval force • Jefferson: dishonorable to pay; create a league of second-tier naval powers (Sweden, Portugal, Venice, etc.) for a blockade of Barbary coast – but there is no support from Congress or Europe for this.

4. 1785-1800: The Treaty Structure • 1790s: Washington’s Administration • War breaks out in Europe, Barbary pirates are unleashed • Washington’s plan: create a navy to “change behavior” • Congress: A U.S. navy in the Mediterranean might entangle us in the European war. Accommodate instead. Authorizes $800,000 for tribute and ransom (1794) • Treaty Approach: • Negotiate annual tribute and set terms for ransom • Pay higher rates to Algiers, and use the authority of the Dey to leverage lower rates with other regencies • Get other regencies to recognize authority of Dey of Algiers to act as intermediary on behalf of the U.S. • Treaty with Algiers (1795) – nearly $1,000,000 and promise of “good offices” by Dey of Algiers • Treaty with Tunis (1797) – $107,000 and agreement to negotiate through Algiers • Treaty with Tripoli (1797) – $57,000 and agreement to negotiate through Algiers

5. 1785-1800: The Treaty Structure • 1800-1801: Jefferson’s administration • Problems: • 1800 - Dey of Algiers gets bold, orders U.S.S. George Washington to sail to Turkey • 1800 - Pasha Yusuf in Tripoli receives several ships from Sultan, threatens war with U.S. and demands a new treaty removing the influence of Algiers • With end of Quasi-War with France, naval forces now available for Mediterranean operations. • Consuls urge TJ to drop treaty approach and attempt “change of behavior” through “The Consular Plan”: • Get tough with Tripoli first (the weakest of the Barbary regencies) • Be willing to use force to change Barbary opinion of American character • Seek cooperation of European powers • Seek treaty with Ottoman Sultan • TJ agrees in part…

6. 1801: First attempt to “change behavior” • Deployment of “Commodore Dale’s Squadron” • Limited (only 124 guns total) “fleet of observation” to the coast of Tripoli • Fleet would make a show to act as a deterrent, combined with diplomatic negotiations to eliminate annual tribute from treaty • Successes: • Caught Tripoli off guard • Blockaded 2 Tripolitan cruisers at Gibralter • U.S.S. Enterprise defeated a Tripolitan gunship • Sweden offered limited cooperation in a brief blockade of Tripoli • Setbacks: • No other European powers willing to join coalition • Algiers was not fulfilling its promise of using “good offices” on behalf of U.S. • Early 1802: the U.S. merchant ship Franklin is captured by Tripoli • This causes TJ to re-evaluate strategy and degree of naval power necessary…

7. 1802-1803: Commodore Morris’ failed campaign • Slightly larger naval force deployed with orders to blockade • Commodore Morris focuses instead on convoy duty • This emboldens Algiers and Tunis, who begin to make outrageous demands for gifts (including ships) and tribute • Other events: • Napoleon comes to power in France, impending war between France and GB • TJ realizes we must find a speedy way to get control of the situation in the Mediterranean • Congress authorizes a significant expansion of the navy designated for the Mediterranean

8. 1803: Commodore Preble’s First Campaign • Preble blockades Tripoli and “distresses the coast” • Operation delayed when Morocco declares war and captures several U.S. merchant ships and imprisons U.S. consul • Moroccan Emperor agrees to all of Preble’s demands – no more tribute, no ransom – only “gifts” upon the arrival of a new consul. • DISASTER: While Preble is dealing with Morocco, the frigate U.S.S. Philadelphia runs aground and is captured in Tripoli harbor, along with 300 men. Pasha Yusuf demands $3,000,000.

9. 1804: Preble’s Second Campaign • Unsuccessful bombardment campaign by Preble. • 1 success in 1804: Marines, led by Stephen Decatur, capture a Tripolitanketch, sneak aboard the Philadelphia and destroy it. 1804-1805: Barron’s Campaign • Late 1804, larger fleet deployed, consuls instructed to refuse any future demands for tribute. • Barron blockades Tripoli coast with some success.

10. 1804-1805: Barron’s Campaign • TJ authorizes Madison’s idea of possible “regime change” and a “second front.” • General William Eaton & Marines head west from Cairo. The plan: • Hamet Pasha will gather troops and supporters along the way. • Eventually topple Yusuf Pasha’s regime. • 1805: Joint naval and land operation, Eaton’s forces capture the port city of Derne. • Yusuf Pasha reaches an agreement with Barron.

11. The Western Hemisphere in the 1800s’: Monroe and JQ Adams

12. 1821: A Critical Year What to do about independence movements in South America? • Still recovering from War of 1812 • Proclamation of neutrality in colonial revolutions since 1815 • Missouri Compromise and slavery (1820) • Legality of Spanish cession of Floridas (1820) • Setbacks in revolutionary movements (military defeats and civil unrest) • Privateers sailing out of newly independent states The great danger – if the U.S. seemed to side too strongly with revolutionary movements and governments, European powers might side with Spain to achieve symmetry.

13. How to handle deal with both European powers and the peoples fighting for their independence, in a way that combines our “interest guided by justice”? • Recognize independence immediately (Henry Clay, “Doctrine of Lexington,” including an American hemispheric alliance against Russia/“The Holy Alliance” and European colonization) • Join an Anglo-American alliance to promote republican revolution in Europe (“Edinburgh Doctrine”) for counter-pressure • Use the possibility of recognition as a foreign policy tool in consideration of U.S. long-term strategic security interests (John Quincy Adams)

14. Clay’s “Lexington Doctrine” (1820) • The U.S. should support “by all means short of actual war” the cause of South American independence • Immediate recognition of states that had won or were fighting for their independence • Revoke neutrality laws of Madison and Monroe • Develop relations with South American leaders • What Clay did NOT want: • military intervention • fomenting of revolution or promoting civil unrest in colonies • forcing American principles or government upon South American states

15. Adams’ Independence Day Address, 1821 • Purposes: • To remind Americans of founding principles and explain our foreign policy positions squarely in the framework of those principles. • To establish the justice of revolutionary causes in SA (and to provide justification for futurerecognition) • To suggest(through focus on principles of liberty) that colonial systems are unjust and should in time be abolished

16. JQA’a criteria for use of force abroad • Must be within U.S. means • Must not result in wider war (especially with Europe) • Should contribute to the long term general peace of mankind • Should enhance America’s moral standing • Should result in an improvement of America’s defensive military capabilities

17. JQA’s conditions for recognition • SA states must: • demonstrate effective control over a specific territory • demonstrate willingness to abide by law of nations • agree to most favored nation status for U.S. (and vice versa) • be willing and able to maintain political independence from other European powers • not harbor colonial expansionist aims of their own • Meeting all of these criteria does not mean automatic recognition by the U.S.

18. Events of 1823 • France (supported by continental allies) invades Spain to restore monarch to throne • Rumors of European alliance to restore Spanish dominions in western hemisphere. • British proposal: joint Anglo-American opposition • Emperor Alexander (Holy Alliance) implies threat that the U.S. should remain neutral in the restoration campaign

19. “Monroe Doctrine” (Annual Message 1823) • A declaration of rights on behalf of the U.S and the American states • Terms of relations between the U.S. and Europe • No new colonization by European nations in the Western Hemisphere • No attempts to expand or restore former European colonies that have declared and achieved independence • The U.S. will not intervene in existing and future colonial revolutions…unless… • The U.S. will not interfere in the internal affairs of European nations

20. The Spanish-American War and its Consequences in the Western Hemisphere: McKinley and Roosevelt

21. McKinley’s War Message 1898 • Why should we get involved? • In “the cause of humanity” • Protection of American citizens and property in Cuba • Injury to American commerce • Cuban instability is “a constant menace to our peace” • How should we get involved? • Recognize insurgents as belligerents -- NO • Recognize Cuban independence – NO • Intervene on one side or the other -- NO • “neutral intervention” to “impose a rational compromise”

22. McKinley’s War Message 1898 • Is intervention compatible with the tradition of “neutrality”? • “strict neutrality” vs. “neutral intervention” (impartial use of force) • Congress authorizes use of force “for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba” • Teller Amendment (no permanent annexation of Cuba to U.S.)

23. Platt Amendment 1901 • Cuba shall make no treaties with foreign nations “which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba.” • Cuba shall not authorize any foreign power (other than the United States) to inhabit any portion of the island for military or naval purposes. • The Cuban government shall contract no foreign debt beyond what could be paid by “the ordinary revenues of the island.” • Cuba must sell or lease to the United States “lands necessary for coaling or naval stations” in order to “enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense.” • The United States reserved “the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence [and] the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.”

24. ThePlatt Amendment • Morgan’s objections • Violates right to political independence • Goes too far in imposing political ideas, forms and terms • Will require intervention for altruistic purposes • Will invite rebellion and lead to permanent involvement in Cuba • Ratified by Cuban Legislature in 1903 • See TR’s 1906 Annual Message to Congress

25. TR’s Corollary to Monroe Doctrine (1904 Message to Congress) • Our pledge to uphold and enforce that doctrine “may force the United States, however reluctantly . . . to the exercise of an international police power.” • West. Hem. nations have the right to freedom and independence so long as they do not by their actions (political or economic) provoke or invite intervention in the western hemisphere by European nations. • The United States as the “police force” of the western hemisphere will judge whether circumstances or actions by other nations warrant military or administrative intervention. (TR 1905 Message to Congress) • Introduces the idea of “preventive” action in foreign policy

26. American Imperialism in the Philippines

27. What to do with the Philippines? Problems: • Aguinaldo had fought with U.S. against Spain and had declared independence • European interests in the Philippines • Must take all or nothing (but only really needed Manila Bay and Luzon) • Annexation only constitutional if future statehood planned (Puerto Rico annexed on possible future statehood; Guam annexed out of security/economic interests)

28. What to do with the Philippines? Option #1: Leave as if nothing had happened (isolationists) (ISMD pp. 377-78) • Arguments against: • colonial power vacuum • moral duty (see Senator Albert Beveridge, “The March of the Flag”) Option #2: Recognize independence, negotiate treaty based U.S. security arrangements (Senators George Hoar and John Morgan) (ISMD pp. 378 and 396)

29. What to do with the Philippines? Option #3: Occupy and establish protectorate (Senators Orville Platt and Albert Beveridge) (ISMDp. 378, 416-420) • Arguments for: • Moral duty (See Platt and Beveridge in 1899 & 1900 Senate debates) • Arguments against: • Explicitly colonial • Affect on American moral character (“Imperialist”) • Unconstitutional (no authority to establish protectorates or colonies)(Senator Hoar) • It would commit U.S. to defense without adequate control over Filipino government (no Platt Amendment for Philippines)(President McKinley/Theodore Roosevelt)

30. What to do with the Philippines? Option #4: Annex permanently as territory • Arguments for (McKinley, T. Roosevelt) (ISMD pp. 393): • Prevents colonial power vacuum • Economic interests in Far East • No “Filipino” people (claims of independence do not apply) • Moral duty • Arguments against (Hoar) (ISMD pp. 372-76, 379): • Abandons tradition of “neutrality”/entanglement in world affairs • Involvement in colonial race/conflicts • Undermines Monroe Doctrine • No intention of adding as a future state • Unconstitutional

31. What to do with the Philippines? Compromise: Temporary annexation (ISMD p. 422) • Arguments for (McKinley, Roosevelt): • Cannot fall into hands of another colonial power • Security/economic interests (Morgan) • Moral duty (Platt, Beveridge) • Arguments against (See Hoar’s arguments in 1899 Senate debate)(ISMD pp. 381-385): • Unnecessary • Contrary to stated purposes in Constitution’s Preamble • Contrary to principles of Declaration of Independence • See Beveridge & Hoar exchange in 1900 Senate debate • Result: U.S. Filipino War (1899-1902)(ISMD p. 423)

32. Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and the League of Nations

33. Woodrow Wilson’s post-war vision, 1916-1917 • International relations must be based on “a new and more wholesome diplomacy” • Complete transparency in treaties, alliances and diplomatic relations • Cooperation among nations in pursuit of common interests • Must unite to defend the rights of mankind • Free navigation of the seas • Territorial adjustments only to promote future security and liberty of those peoples • No excessive/punitive indemnities • Association of nations to act as lawgiver, court, and enforcer of law

34. Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, 1918 • Complete openness and transparency in diplomacy. • Absolute freedom of seas • Free and equal trade worldwide • Multilateral arms reductions • Adjustment of colonial claims based on interests of populations 6-13. Territorial adjustments in Europe along cultural lines based on right to self-determination or “autonomous development” 14. “General association of nations” to guarantee political independence and territorial integrity of all nations against aggression

35. Republican Amendments to the Paris Peace Covenant (1919) • U.S. must be sole and final judge of its international obligations • U.S. may withdraw from League by Congressional resolution • U.S. will not intervene abroad or employ military without Congressional resolution • The U.S. will accept no mandate without Congressional approval. • League has no authority over U.S. domestic affairs • No monetary contributions except by act of Congress • League has no authority over U.S. armaments levels

36. Founding vs. Wilsonian Foreign Policy Wilson: • Rights best secured through collective security/delegation of sovereignty to international legal bodies • Highest (absolute) moral duty is to promote welfare of other peoples and the world as a whole • Use of force justifiable only for primary purpose of promoting world democracy or civilization of others • Enemies are selected based on regime type (autocratic) according to historical events • Not all peoples/nations have the right to political independence equally (no natural right) • Must engage in wars of liberation for collective world security • No more “neutrality” in old sense – must intervene in foreign wars as a “neutral” (not selfish) as dictated by history Founding: • U.S. has natural right to political independence in order to decide how best to defend rights and sovereignty • Highest moral duty is to secure rights of own citizens • Use of force justifiable only for primary purpose of self-security • Statesmen select enemies based on level of threat and capability, as dictated by prudence • Must respect the equal natural right of other peoples/nations to political independence • Should refrain from wars of liberation unless necessary for our security • Remain neutral in foreign wars that do not critically affect our interests or security, as dictated by prudence

37. The Origins of Containment: Kennan and Truman

38. FDR and WWII • The problem: Allies need the Soviets to defeat Germany and Japan; but also need to start thinking about role of USSR in the post war world. • FDR rejects suggestion to use military to initiate Soviet roll back before end of the war: • Need to prevent a renewed German-Soviet pact • Needs continued Soviet non-intervention in PTO • Possible public backlash against prolonged war/casualties would renew isolationism • Plan to “contain by integration” as a full partner in shaping post-war peace. This would alleviate perceptions of external sources of insecurity. FDR, 1944: “They haven’t got any crazy ideas of conquest.; and now that they have got to know us, they are much more willing to accept us.” (SC p. 9) • Foreign aggression would be checked by new international organization (UNO), and Soviet aggression would be undermined by full participation in that organization.

39. 3 views on U.S.-Russian relations and policy toward the USSR • Former VP Henry Wallace: • Peaceful co-existence possible on ideological plane • W. Averill Harriman (Amb. To Russia), General John Deane (Military Advisor on Russian Policy) and President Truman (initially): • Ideological differences less important; appeal to reasonable common interests • The Soviets can be trusted to behave like rational actors in response to U.S. aid and concessions. • Use a diplomatic quid pro quo system (a.k.a. “carrot and stick” policy) to promote cooperation and reach compromise. Types of leverage: • Post-war loans • Threat of publicity of Russian unilateralism/non-cooperation • U.S. atomic capability • George Kennan (Minister-counselor at Moscow Embassy): • The U.S. does not really understand the Russian mind. • The USSR expects to dominate its sphere of influence. • We must patiently change Soviet perceptions (of western weakness, inconsistency, vulnerability) and modify external behavior.

40. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946) • Part 1: The Soviet world view and long term strategic objectives (“Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook”): • Soviet world view: • Capitalist nations are a permanent threat • “there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence” • Strategic objectives: • Soviets must dominate a communist world sphere • Must prevent capitalist wars of intervention, promote war between capitalist nations • Utilize “progressive” and “democratic” elements in capitalist societies to promote Soviet objectives through internal pressure on governments • Promote “revolutionary upheavals” in capitalist countries

41. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946) • Part 2: The effects of Russian history on the Soviet mind (“Background of this outlook”)(see packet pp. 71-72): • Long history of external invasions and threats = strong defensive isolationist posture + view that there can be no peaceful coexistence with potential threats (all enemies must destroyed). • Bolshevist system plays on these fears of insecurity to strengthen control over Russia and justify its absolute rule of the regime

42. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946) • Part 3: Official (open) Soviet methods to obtain strategic goals (“Its projection in practical policy on official level”): • Maximum development of armed forces and military-industrial capabilities • Absolute secretiveness of internal affairs • Projection of political influence over immediate neighbors (e.g. Iran, Turkey, Scandinavia) • Participation in UNO (only to extent useful) • Establish economic and diplomatic ties in “colonial” or “backward” areas

43. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946) • Part 4: Unofficial (secret or “subterranean) Soviet methods to obtain strategic goals (“Its projection on unofficial level”): • In capitalist countries: • Support communist parties in capitalist countries through the Comintern “tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow” • Infiltrate and domestic and international groups (such as “labor unions, youth leagues, women’s organizations, racial societies, religious societies, cultural groups, liberal magazines, etc.) for purposes of propaganda • Disrupt national self-confidence • Hamstring measures of national defense • Increase social and industrial unrest • “stimulate all forms of disunity,” especially urging disgruntled groups to engage in “defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society.” • Promote economic dependence on the state • Demonize those who are “financially independent” • Foment distrust of other democratic nations • Summary: tear down from within

44. Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946) • Part 5: U.S. strategic response (“Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy”): • no need for recourse to military conflict • Soviets will withdraw or back off when “strong resistance” is offered in response to Soviet actions (because they can be patient and will not risk everything on one short-term objective) • The West must remain firm, united and strong • We must have an objective assessment of Soviet mind and objectives, and educate the American public on Soviet goals and methods • “improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit” of American people • Provide political, economic, and military “guidance” to Europe • Remain true to American traditions and principles

45. Effects of Kennan’s Long Telegram • Lessons learned: • The Soviets do not think or behave like other “western” nations, especially the U.S. Therefore we must learn to adjust our foreign policy to the character of the Soviet regime(just as we did with the Barbary polities) • Never count on the Soviets to behave “reasonably” (as the US understands “reasonably”) • The Soviets will never stop viewing the United States as a threat, because the Soviet regime “relied on the fiction of external threat to maintain its internal legitimacy” (SC p. 20)

46. Effects of Kennan’s Long Telegram • Truman’s new “draw the line” policy (SC p. 21): 1. Disagreements with USSR would be made public (not concealed on diplomatic level) 2. No “concessions” on Soviet attempts at expansion 3. U.S. will consider requests for economic and military aid from nations threatened by Soviet expansion 4. Diplomatic negotiations with USSR only to officially record and publicize Soviet non-cooperation with western nations • See also Truman’s Inaugural Address, 1949

47. The Truman Doctrine • Address to Congress, 12 March 1947: • “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures” • Immediately applied to Greece and Turkey. • Questions: • Is this compatible with the Founding “rule” regarding interventions in foreign revolutions or domestic problems? • Is this an open-ended commitment to assist peoples at risk to Soviet influence and dominance? If so we need a coherent strategy that will make ends and means proportionate to available resources…

48. Kennan’s policy of “Containment” • 1947: “Long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies” (SC p.4) • Reasoning behind “containment”: • Internally the Soviet Union was a closed society under strict ideological control, impervious to Western views and ideas. • The USSR will be economically self-sustaining for decades (Kennan predicted 30 years). • To survive, all Stalin had to do was be patient and when necessary withdraw within its borders. • The goal of Kennan’s containment was to get the Soviets to do just this, thus “containing” the USSR to its present territory and sphere of influence.

49. Kennan’s policy of “Containment” • Kennan’s “corollaries” to the general strategy of containment: • Not all countries/regions are equal in strategic importance (see list SC p. 29) • Intervention in the internal affairs of other nations must be justified strictly on lines of national security interests (SC p. 30) • Demands of principle and security are compatible (but latter must always trump former) (SC p. 31)

50. Kennan’s policy of “Containment” • The means of applying “counter pressure” to contain Soviet expansion are largely economic, political and psychological – not military: • Economic: rebuild Europe and Japan economically (primary means) • Psychological: restore self-confidence and will to self-determination in countries bordering USSR • Political: promote “Titoism” (exploit tensions between USSR and autonomous communist states) • Military: • Strategic deployment of conventional military forces only as a show of strength (and the willingness to use it). • More reliance on small special forces in local situations • NO commitment to defend Europe militarily, nor to maintain current U.S. military presence in Europe and Japan • Reasoning: • Very little chance of Soviet military attack or invasion • Military supply (FDR’s “arsenal of democracy” concept) more effective than boots on the ground. • Unrestrained military spending would raise taxes , cause inflation, grow budget deficits and undermine morale at home