Executive Issues Seminar Series

1. Executive Issues Seminar Series Executive Issues Seminar Series 1998 1998 Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas Sam Houston State University

2. PATROL RESEARCH Dr. Larry Hoover Police Research Center Sam Houston State University

3. Last Year’s Program:Why the Drop in Crime? • Social-demographic Trends • Economic Conditions • Drug Use Prevalence • Incarceration Rates • Police Programs.

5. Myth: The Police Make No Difference • Borne first of the lack of clear relationship between staffing levels and crime rates • Reinforced by the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and the Rand Criminal Investigation Study.

6. Crime-Specific Policing • Clearly defined intervention strategies • Targeted at particular offenses • Committed by particular offenders • At specific places • At specific times.

7. Unfocused Strategies Non-Directed Patrol Simple Saturation Patrol Change in Style New York City COMSTAT Program Houston Proactive Effort in 1992 Crime-Specific Policing is NOT:

8. However, Crime-Specific Policing is Not Necessarily: • Focused upon only a single offense • Conducted solely by Patrol • Always a direct field based intervention • Antithetical to Community Oriented Approaches

9. We Will Examine: • Neighborhood Centered • Targeted Enforcement • Youth & Gang Programs • Problem-Oriented Strategies • Proactive Investigative Techniques

10. The 25 Year Research Legacy on PatrolA Brief Synopsis • Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (1973) • San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment (1975) • Directed Patrol in New Haven and Pontiac (1976) • Split Force Patrol in Wilmington (1976) • Newark and Flint Foot Patrol (1981) • Minneapolis Repeat Call Address (Recap) (1988) • Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment (1993)

11. Other Research(examined later) • Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News • Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and Its Replications • Investigative Effectiveness Research

12. Preventive Patrol Experiment

13. Preventive Patrol Experiment Beat Configuration R C P C R P C R C P P P R R C

14. Results No effect on crime No effect on citizen perceptions No effect on traffic accidents However Routine Preventive Patrol is Non-directive Activity varies by Dept./Shift/Officer Only about 2 hours of an 8 hour shift Results apply only to beat level perceptions Generalizing the Results

15. Three Areas Control Specially Trained Officers “No” Field Interrogations Time Pre - 7 months Experimental - 9 months Post - 5 months San Diego Field Interrogation

16. Measured Suppressible Street Crime • Part I offenses of robbery, burglary, auto theft, street rape, street theft • Other offenses included other sex crimes, vandalism, and disorderly conduct.

17. Effect on Crime in Experimental Areas

18. Other Results • No change in control or specially trained areas • About one month lag time in effect • No effect on community relations • In San Diego, 17% of all arrests attributed to FIs, but less than 2% of FIs result in an arrest • About 3% of all citizen complaints result from field interrogations.

19. Directed Patrol in New Haven & Pontiac • Use of crime analysis to direct non-committed patrol time to problem locations • Direction by dispatchers proved problematic • Reduction in criminal incidents (but lacked control areas)

20. Wilmington Split-Force Concept • Bifurcated patrol, 70% in Basic, 30% in Structured • Structured concentrated on problem areas and follow-up • Patrol’s arrest rate up 4%, clearances up 105% - however, detective division clearances down 61%, department as a whole down by 28% • Abandoned after one year.

21. Newark & Flint Foot Patrol • No impact on crime in Newark, 9% reduction in Flint • Decreases in fear of crime in both cities • Significantly improved satisfaction with police services in both - 33% of Flint residents knew officer by name, 50% of remainder could recognize the beat officer • Newark research beget the “Broken Windows” perspective • Flint research beget the community oriented perspective.

22. Minneapolis Recap Experiment • 3% of 115,000 addresses accounted for 50% of CFS • 5% of addresses generated 64% of all CFS • Special unit of 5 officers assigned 125 residential & 125 commercial addresses • After 6 months, target addresses had 15% fewer CFS, but erased after one year.

23. Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment • July 92 to Jan 93 two extra patrol units in Beat 144 during evening • Beat 144 is an 8 x 10 block area with homicide rate of 177/100,000 - 20 times national average • Beat is 92% nonwhite, but 66% home ownership • Gun seizures increased by 65%, gun crimes declined by 40%. No change in Control Beat, no displacement • Drive by shootings & homicides dropped significantly • Saturation generated 29 more guns seized, 83 fewer gun crimes, 55 patrol hours invested per gun crime prevented, traffic stops most productive - one gun seized for every 28 stops.

24. Efficacy of Crime-Specific Approaches • San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment • Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News • Flint Foot Patrol • Minneapolis Recap • Kansas City Gun Reduction

25. Crime-Specific Policing • Clearly defined intervention strategies • Targeted at particular offenses • Committed by particular offenders • At specific places • At specific times.

26. A Final Note • In 25 years we have learned a great deal • However, we still know relatively little about what works in policing.

27. TIME FOR THE RECEPTION