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Applying the Risk Governance Framework Institutional Requirements for Dealing with Nuclear Waste

Applying the Risk Governance Framework Institutional Requirements for Dealing with Nuclear Waste. Managing Radioactive Waste Gothenburg , Dec . 16, 2009 Ortwin Renn University of Stuttgart and DIALOGIK Institute. Part 1. What is special about nuclear waste risks?.

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Applying the Risk Governance Framework Institutional Requirements for Dealing with Nuclear Waste

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  1. Applying the Risk Governance FrameworkInstitutional Requirements for Dealing with Nuclear Waste Managing RadioactiveWasteGothenburg, Dec. 16, 2009 Ortwin Renn University of Stuttgart andDIALOGIK Institute

  2. Part 1 What is special about nuclear waste risks?

  3. Common risk problemsThree challenges of risk governance • Complexity in assessing causal and temporal relationships • Uncertainty • variation among individual targets • measurement and inferential errors • genuine stochastic relationships • system boundaries and ignorance • Ambiguity in interpreting results

  4. NuclearWaste Repository • Complexity • Multitude of causal and intervening factors • Interdisciplinary approach necessary • However – not more complex than other technologies • Uncertainty • Modeling over very large time intervals • No historic precedent for such long time management • High relevance for system boundaries and non-knowledge • Ambiguity • Extremely high mobilization potential • Direct link with debate about future of nuclear power

  5. Nuclear wasteThree major challenges • Dissent among experts on most appropriate disposal method • High potential for social amplification • Long term threat • Stigma effect of “nuclear” • Typical “creeping danger” risk perception • High potential for social mobilization • Symbolic connotation for large centralized technologies

  6. Part II RiskPerception (NuclearWaste Repository)

  7. Principles of Risk Perception • Human behavior depends on perceptions, not on facts • Perceptions are a well-studied subject of social science research: they differ from expert assessments, but they follow consistent patterns and rationales • There are four genuine strategies to cope with threats: fight, flight, plying dead, experimentation

  8. Five dominant risk perception clusters • Emerging danger: randomness as threat • Creeping danger: confidence or zero-risk • Surpressed danger: myth of cycles • Weighing risks: only with betting • Desired risks: personal challenge

  9. Applicationtonuclearwaste • Emerging Danger • Fear of catastrophic potential (large scale contamination) • Randomness of occurrence as source of perceived threat • Inequity of distribution between risks and benefits • Creeping Danger • No possibility to sense and acknowledge exposure • Reliance on third parties (risks is communicated not experienced) • Central factor: trust in information and management

  10. Empiricalevidence • Almost all surveys worldwide demonstrate that a large majority of the population judges risk of nuclear waste repositories as highly serious and threatening while the majority of experts estimates the risks of being fairly low compared to other risks of daily life. • Surveys also reveal that opposition and mobilization potentials reach figures of above 80% when people are asked whether they would accept a nuclear waste repository in their back yard. • With respect to risk management, communication and siting procedures there are major differences between countries (Finland, USA, GB, Switzerland), which are good sources for institutional learning

  11. Part III RiskGovernance

  12. IRGC’s RISK GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK Understanding Deciding Getting a broad picture of the risk Who needs to know what, when? Pre-assessment Appraisal Communication Management Who needs to do what, when? The knowledge needed for judgements and decisions Characterisation and evaluation Is the risk tolerable, acceptable or unacceptable?

  13. Need for different risk management strategies • dealing with routine, mundane risks • dealing with complex and sophisticated risks (high degree of modeling necessary) • dealing with highly uncertain risks (high degree of unresolved uncertainty) • dealing with highly controversial, ambiguousrisks (high degree of ambiguity) • dealing with eminent dangers or crisis(need for fast responses)

  14. Applicationtowasterepository I • Routine risk management • Determining appropriate safety standards (thresholds) • Meeting technical construction and mining requirements • Applying classic instruments such as BACT (best available control technology) • Complex risk modeling • Geological behavior over long time periods • Exposure pathways modeling over long time periods • Modeling of events that are unlikely but still to be expected given the long time frame

  15. Applicationtowasterepository II • Precautionary and resilience-oriented management • Resilient measures: multi-barrier system, diversity of safety devices, redundant systems, increase of passive safety • Higher tolerance with respect to human errors and ignorance • Institutional safeguarding of long-term monitoring • Application of the deliberation principle • Consensus or arrangement about future nuclear policy options • Agreement on procedural mechanisms for conflict resolution and participation

  16. Part VI Institutional Arrangements for Public Involvement

  17. Whyisparticipationnecessary? • Increase of uncertainty and ambiguity with the widening of time horizons • Integration of systematic, analytic, interdisciplinary and experiential knowledge essential • Loss of trust and confidence in the problem solving capacity of the political sector, in the fairness and „common good“ orientation of the economic sector and in the impartiality of the scientific sector • Prevalence of new Governance structures (including governments, industry, science, civil society) • Improvement of procedural legitimization • Acceptance surplus with participation

  18. Participatoryrequirements • Complexity • Knowledge-oriented strategy (epistemic discourse) • State-of-the art characterization of risks (scenarios) • Uncertainty • Reflective discourse (weighing pros and cons) • Balancing too much precaution against too little precaution • Investment in resilience • Ambiguity • Participatory discourse • Evaluation of different options and locations • Risk-benefit packages (compensation)

  19. Participatory requirement for dealing with complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity(IRGC Model) Risk Trade-off Analysis & Delib- eration necessary • Risk Balancing • Probabilistic Risk Modelling • Risk Balancing • Necessary • Probabilistic Risk Modelling Remedy Remedy • Cognitive • Evaluative • Normative Probabilistic Risk Modelling • Cognitive • Evaluative Conflict Remedy Conflict • Agency Staff • External Experts • Stakeholders • Industry • Directly affected groups • General public Statistical Risk Analysis Cognitive • Agency Staff • External Experts • Stakeholders • Industry • Directly affected groups Remedy Conflict Agency Staff • Agency Staff • External Experts Actors Actors Actors Actors Participative Instrumental Epistemological Reflective Type ofDiscourse Type of Discourse TypeofDiscourse Type of Discourse Ambiguity induced Simple Complexity induced Uncertainty induced Risk Problem Risk Problem Risk Problem Risk Problem Function: Allocation of risks to one or several of the four routes Type of Discourse: Design discourse

  20. SitingDecision Making I • Complexity: • Objective: Scientific-technical agreement about suitability of potential sites (Technical, geologic, political, economic, social) • Procedures: Consensus-oriented procedures for scientific characterization of risks • Instruments: Meta-Analysis Consensus-conferences, Delphi, Group-Delphi • Institutional requirements: neutral platform, delegation right for stakeholders, professional moderation. Experts from national and international context

  21. SitingDecision Making II • Uncertainty: • Objective: fair (intra- and intergenerational) and robust solution of dealing with uncertainties • Procedures: Alternate conflict resolution mechanisms for finding fair and acceptable solutions • Instruments: Mediation, Round Table, Stakeholder Consensus Conferences • Institutionalrequirements: neutral platform, participants from affected populations, experts as sources of knowledge, then deliberation about acceptability, professional mediator, combination of national and regional stakeholders

  22. SitingDecision Making III • Ambiguity: • Objective: Common arrangement about energy future(s) and fair siting decisions • Procedures: deliberative methods for societal energy policy making and for site selection incl. risk-benefit packages • Instruments: Citizen juries, panels, public consensus conferences, Round Tables • Institutional requirements: neutral platforms: two levels: national (energy policies) and regional (siting, risk-benefit package). Participants: local populations (organized and not-organized), input from stakeholders and scientists

  23. SitingDecision Making IV • Integration • Objective: Combination and integration of the three discourse activities • Procedure: Hybrid constructions • Instruments: Analytic-deliberative approaches, cooperative discourse (Important: independent supervisory board) • Institutional requirements: Integration requires the establishment of a board of supervisors with high national esteem and reputation

  24. Operation andmonitoring • Establishment of a public (or private) non-profit foundation with sufficient funds to live from the interests • The foundation needs: a scientific-technical committee (complexity), a regional-political committee (uncertainty) and a citizen advisory committee (ambiguity) • The foundation should supervise , control and monitor operation and could also be the broker for the benefit package

  25. Part V Conclusions

  26. Conclusions I • Nuclear waste repositories are risk sources characterized by medium complexity, high uncertainty and extreme ambiguity • Worldwide high potential for negative risk perceptions and social mobilization • The procedures for siting that have been employed until today do not reflect the explosive situation and will not be able to resolve the conflicts • One procedure by itself will not be sufficient to deal with the difficult situation

  27. Conclusions II • New institutional and participatory forms of decision making are needed • Inclusion of a broad governance representation: Political economic, scientific and civil society actors • Three types of discourse procedures: • Complexity: Scientific modeling (epistemic discourse) • Uncertainty: Balance between precaution and innovativeness (reflective discourse) • Ambiguity: Building trust and consensus (participatory discourse) • Necessity of a neutral platform for designing, organizing and moderating these discourses under the umbrella of a impartial and highly esteemed supervisory board.

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