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Contextual, Flow-Based Access Control with Scalable Host-based SDN Techniques

Contextual, Flow-Based Access Control with Scalable Host-based SDN Techniques.

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Contextual, Flow-Based Access Control with Scalable Host-based SDN Techniques

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  1. Contextual, Flow-Based Access Control withScalable Host-based SDN Techniques [Taylor-INFOCOM16] Taylor, Curtis R., Douglas C. MacFarland, Doran R. Smestad, and Craig A. Shue. "Contextual, Flow-Based Access Control with Scalable Host-based SDN Techniques.", IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) 2016. Present by: WenzhiCai

  2. OUTLINE • Introduction • SDN • OpenFlow • Challenges of SDN Approach • Specific technical problems • Description • Threat Model • Approach • Contextual Policies • Evaluation • Criticism

  3. INTRODUCATION

  4. Travel to another country! Hello world!

  5. Traditional systems: Blind to intra-subnet traffic • Recent innovations: • OpenFlow (2010) • Software-defined networking (SDN) (2011)

  6. Overview: The SDN controller defines the data flows that occur in the SDN Data Plane. If the controller allows a flow, it compute a route for the flow to take, and adds an entry for that flow. Communication between the controller and the switches uses a standardized protocol and API. Requirements of practical implementation: A common logical architecture in all switches, routers, and other network devices managed by an SDN controller A standard, secure protocol between the SDN controller and the network devices

  7. OpenFlow Network • Controller • Manages one or more switch via OpenFlow channel • Uses OpenFlow protocol to communicate with a OpenFlow Switch • Responsible for programming various tables in the OpenFlow Switch • Single switch can be managed by more than on controller for load balancing or redundancy purpose • FlowVisor • Virtualize network • OpenFlow Switch • FlowTable • Secure Channel • OpenFlow Protocol

  8. OpenFlowProtocol (Southbound) • Allows control (controller) and data(switches) to be split up • Switches send information about flows to control plane • Control plane sends instructions for handling flows to switches • Enables the controller perform add, update, and delete actions in the flow table • Implemented on top of SLL or TLS • Secure OpenFlow channel • Support 3 types of messages • Asynchronous Messages • Packet-In Message • Flow Removed Message • Controller-to-Switch Messages • Multi-part, statistics gathering • Symmetric Messages • Hello messages • Echo request and reply messages • Experimenter message

  9. SDN & OpenFlow • SDNs, implemented using OpenFlow, provide a powerful, vendor-independent approach to managing complex networks with dynamic demands. • SDN with OpenFlowprotocol allows a centralized controller to learn each time a new flow is created • The software-defined network can continue to use many of the useful network technologies already in place, such as virtual LANs and an MPLS infrastructure. • SDNs and OpenFlow are likely to become commonplace in large carrier networks, cloud infrastructures, and other networks that support the use of big data

  10. Challenges of SDN APPROACH • Data Plane Scalability concerns • Limit Visibility contextual into end-host • Malware Approach • OpenFlowSwitch Limitation • Handling new flows • Varies into 150 and 750 new flows per second • Slow speed memory reduce new flow • Lead to performance bottleneck, Denial of Services and user-level adversaries

  11. specific TECHNICAL PROBELMS • How can we scalable obtain flow-level information for all network traffic? • How can we provide network operator with details context surrounding each network flow?

  12. APPROACH DESCRIPTION

  13. Contributions • Scalable, fine grained flow-base access control • Leveraging distribute computing power of the end host • Allow host to apply fine-grain rules • Hardware to apply coarse-grain rules • Take OpenFlowagent functionality into end-host • Host Context for all network flows • Allow operator to develop detail policies for flow authorisation

  14. Threat model: User-Level Adversary • Key assumptions: • Trusted Operating System • No physical attacks • Focus on devices can be modified by an IT staff • Full flow-management compatibility

  15. APPROACH overview • Host-Based Approach • Implementation: • Ubuntu Linux Operating System • Network layer and above • Features: • Flow-based controls and context • A capability to arbitrarily route traffic through proxies, IDSes, and other middleboxes • A modular design • Explicit notification to network controllers when a flow ends, allowing accurate real-time network flow insight • Optimal traffic filtering at the source host to avoid network overheads • Avoids the need for kernel or application modifications by using established kernel features

  16. Approach overview • Host Agent: Intercepting Packets • Marking Features • Mark or unmark packets • Drop mark • Host Agent: Extraction Operating Context • Module Design and Plug-ins • SDN Controller

  17. Application Layer Travel to another country! Control Plane Hello world! A flow SDN Agent Packets

  18. 1. Host agent: intercepting packets • The iptables firewall: mark or unmark feature • netfilter queue: intercept unmarked packets • Upadateiptables: create a ”drop mark” used to discard a flow • SDN Agent: analyzes the intercepted packet and determines the context (step 3-4) • SDN Agent: transmits a message to the SDN controller and requests instructions (step 5) • SDN Controller: issue rules (step 6) • SDN Agent: install appropriate NAT, firewall, routing, forwarding rules; (step 7) • iptables: update the marking to indicate the flow is authorized • SDN Agent: signal netfilter_queue for transmission • netfilter_queue: release the packet (step 8) • Routing Policy DB: select routing table • Two communication parties • The initial packet will not match any existing approval kernel flow

  19. 2. Host AGENT: EXTRATING OPERATINg CONTEXT • Plugins: provide context • Netfilter_queue: allows the Agent to determine user name and group associated with the extracted packet • Socket: gather data (Isof: process ID) • /proc: executable path associated with the process and the command line arguments • Examine the executable path • Collect similar information about the process’s ancestors

  20. 3. SDN CONTROLLER Northbound • “BRAINS” of the network • Manage flow control to the switches ‘below’ • Manage the applications and business logical ‘above’ • Implementation: a Python Controller • Future: make implementation enhancements Southbound

  21. contextual POLICIES Policies: Allow Administrative Process Deny All User-Installed Programs Default Allow Specify the high-level policies: • Contextual languages • POL-EH • Flow-based security Language (FSL) • Flow-based Management Language • Summary: • Allow administrative background and daemon processes. • Ensure that only process from administrator-installed sources can use the network. • Act as a template for additional organization constraints

  22. evaluation

  23. Evaluation overview • Implementation: In a small network of virtual machines (VMs) • Preparations • VMs: Runs on a single server with 16 cores operating at 2.8 GHz and 64 GBytes running with a KVM hypervisor • Network Controller: Allocated two cores and 2048 MBytes of RAM • Each Client system: Allocated a single core & 512 Mbytes of RAM • All machines: Ubuntu 14.04 Server as Operating Systems • Each host: Preinstalled iptables; Load the conntrackkernel module to allow fine-grained manipulation • Three aspects • The agent instrumentation • The data plane and controller scalability • The effectiveness of the security policy

  24. Evaluation - HOST AGENT performance • Timing experiment: • The latency overhead with elevating a new flow to the controller • Record the clock timestamp for: • A~B: Initial Interception • B~C: Obtain Host Context • C~F: Evaluation to Controller • D~E: Controller Decision • F~G: Marking • G~H: Re-queuing • Overall End-to-end: A~H • 1000 TCP connections

  25. Overall SDN Agent: a median under 17ms • Minimal time • Communication between kernel and agent via netfilter_queue • > 100ms delay • Gathering of host context • Roundtrip to the controller • Packet marking approach

  26. Optimizations for delay: • Host context collection can be parallelized • Communication protocol can be greatly simplified • Packet marking can use a more efficient netfilter-conntrackcall • The use of a compiled language would greatly improve performance

  27. Evaluation- data PALNE & CONTROLLER scalability Scalability experiment • Number of hosts: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 & 28 hosts • Each host sequentially creates 1,000 new TCP flows to another host • Sender calculated the RTT ( Round trip times) • Record the number of new created flows per second for each host

  28. Median RRT: Approximately double the Overall End-to-end result which is 16.7ms • 350 flows per second (25 *14) • All the data plane flow state is stored at the hosts • From the timing results: The controller can handle around 200,000 new flows per second by spending 0.005 ms on each packet

  29. EVALUATION- POLICY ENHANCEMENT ON SECURITY Simulated Linux Malware (n00bRAT) experiment: • Test a case where a user on a host receives and runs the malware • Perform a browser-based attack using Metasploit and launch the malware using the compromised browser Results: The malware is denied network access Conclusion: • The policy will allow the adversary to establish a connection to download the malware to the user’s machine • If the adversary launch the malware, the policy denies the malware any network access.

  30. CRITICISM

  31. Criticism • Approach can interact with legacy devices (BYOD). • Connecting Embedded devices like printer. • Isolate VLAN with physical proxy to avoid bottlenecks. • Approach are compatible with non Linux hosts. • Apple’s Mac OS X and Microsoft’s Windows OS • OS X’s firewall, pf, is based upon OpenBSD firewall implementation. • Devices or OS unable to support a native host agent: • A “bump-in-the-wire” solution • Fine grained policies and host context enable by default. • Allow organisation to flexibility in respond to a compromised • Provides Robust control include intra-subnet traffic with less disrupt to network

  32. THANKS!

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