Defense Needs for Future Information Assurance Standards

1. Defense Needs for FutureInformation Assurance Standards “Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total”* “We need improved information assurance standards to enable joint interoperability”** John James John-James@usma.edu * The Art of War by Sun Tzu , Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Page 129 ** GEN Paul Kern, CG, AMC, plenary speaker, IEEE Information Assurance Workshop, West Point, NY, 18 June 2003

2. Contents • Complex system representation • Static models of dynamic systems • Adaptive models of dynamic systems • Trustworthiness of military information systems • If you are on the net, you are trusted • Accreditation is done at the lowest level of the network • Future military information systems requirements • The implications of autonomous combat vehicles • Military networks will change even more rapidly than today • Characteristics of standards for future military systems • Adaptive accreditation of networks of devices

3. Complex System Representation • Static models of dynamic systems • Discrete components • Continuous components • Multiple time and spatial scales • Presence of at least one equilibrium at each model level • Adaptive models of dynamic systems • Discrete components • Continuous components • Multiple time and spatial scales • Presence of at least one equilibrium at each model level • Models adapt (evolve) as system dynamics change

4. Trustworthiness of Military Information Systems • If you are on the net, you are trusted • Networks operate at different levels of security • Building gateways (guards) between networks operating at different security levels is difficult • Accreditation is done at the lowest level of the network • Network components (vehicles, workstations, servers, switches, routers …) are accredited • Detecting if a network has been compromised remains problematic

5. Future Military Information Systems Requirements • The implications of autonomous combat vehicles • How does a machine “understand” commander’s intent? • As elements of the situation (constraints) change, how will the machine adapt a current plan to meet the commander’s intent? • Military networks will change even more rapidly than today • Military networks “move” with the force • As the tempo of operations increase, the rate at which the network architecture must adapt will increase • Insufficient to look only at Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authentication, and Non-repudiation

6. Characteristics of standards for future military systems • Standard for accreditation of complex adaptive systems • Multiple time scales • Multiple spatial scales • Representation of system architecture (ADL) • Representation of system interfaces (IDL) • Consideration of standards attributes for accreditation of military information systems (next 7 slides consider accrediting a feedback process)

7. State estimation and reactive control

8. “The Joint Operations Concepts … builds on the goal of Full Spectrum Dominance: the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations. Full Spectrum Dominance is based on the ability to sense, understand, decide and act faster than an adversary in any situation”* Current to Future Force * The Way Ahead , http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/foreword.html , Pages 5-6

9. The higher levels of the joint force system architecture

10. The tactical level of the system architecture

11. Accreditation processes occur over time DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE DISCRETE MODEL UPDATE CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE CONTINUOUS MODEL UPDATE SYSTEM OPTIMALITY SYSTEM OPTIMALITY SYSTEM OPTIMALITY SYSTEM OPTIMALITY SYSTEM STATE SYSTEM STATE SYSTEM STATE SYSTEM STATE OFF OFF - - LINE VALIDATION LINE VALIDATION ON ON - - LINE VERIFICATION LINE VERIFICATION TRANSMISSION TRANSMISSION INFORMATION INFORMATION STATES STATES STORAGE STORAGE SERVICES PROCESSING PROCESSING CONFIDENTIALITY CONFIDENTIALITY INTEGRITY INTEGRITY SECURITY SECURITY SERVICES SERVICES AVAILABILITY AVAILABILITY TECHNICAL TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE AUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE NON NON - - REPUDIATION REPUDIATION Information Assurance services whose values (states) change over time PROTECTION PROTECTION SECURITY SECURITY DETECTION DETECTION MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE SERVICES REACTION REACTION TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY SECURITY SECURITY Architecture components and parameter values change over time COUNTER COUNTER POLICIES AND PRACTICES POLICIES AND PRACTICES MEASURES MEASURES SERVICES PEOPLE PEOPLE SITUATION SITUATION - - ASSESSMENT SUPPORT ASSESSMENT SUPPORT INFORMATION INFORMATION DOMINANCE DOMINANCE MILITARY MILITARY - - DECISION DECISION - - MAKING MAKING - - PROCESS SUPPORT PROCESS SUPPORT SERVICES SERVICES TRUTH TRUTH - - MAINTENANCE SUPPORT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT Information Assurance Processes

12. The Technical Architecture

13. Joint Forces Information Architecture

14. Summary • Critical infrastructure processes (such as military operations) have discrete and continuous components • Understanding complex dynamical processes requires modeling both discrete and continuous components • Future standards should support adaptive accreditation of systems that enable meeting enterprise process goals (such as commander’s intent)