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Más vale bueno por conocer (Better good later)

Un modelo sobre el dilema del prisionero iterado (A model about the iterated prisoners' dilemma) Victoria Gradín Alfonso Pérez. Más vale bueno por conocer (Better good later). A. Rapoport – M. Chammah. Model overview. Inputs Payments matrix History Parameters

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Más vale bueno por conocer (Better good later)

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  1. Un modelo sobre el dilema del prisionero iterado (A model about the iterated prisoners' dilemma) Victoria Gradín Alfonso Pérez Más vale bueno por conocer(Better good later)

  2. A. Rapoport – M. Chammah

  3. Model overview • Inputs • Payments matrix • History • Parameters • History Memory Opponent + Payments Future Choice • Outputs • Strategies

  4. Constrains • Choice Future Opponent+Payments Memory • Choice: Maximum profit • Future: Decision tree • Opponent: Statistical distributions • Memory: Counters

  5. Memory • Count: Add 1 • sum(n) = • sum(n+1) =

  6. Opponent • Beta distribution: • Beta(1,1) = Uniform • Dispersion gets lower as information grows • In the long run, Beta's mean value approaches the frequency

  7. Future • Bifurcations • Tree of possible futures

  8. Choice • Calculate cooperation profits, and defection profits • Chose the option that maximizes profits

  9. Current state • Software: Python implementation • Verification of some reasonable properties (adaptive, non-exploitable) against fixed strategies (alld, allc, cooperative-tft) • Parameter estimation for one kind of behavior

  10. Cooperation in matrix V • Why cooperate in the less favorable case?

  11. Future tree detail

  12. Preliminary conclusions • Sometimes, it's better good to know • Cooperation is possible, even under adverse circumstances, with selfish behaviour (no need for altruism).

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