1 / 6

Auditing concepts

Auditing concepts. David Flater National Institute of Standards and Technology http://vote.nist.gov. Auditing vs. auditing. Auditability from the Software Independence perspective Establish high confidence in the authenticity and completeness of vote records

qiana
Télécharger la présentation

Auditing concepts

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Auditing concepts David Flater National Institute of Standards and Technology http://vote.nist.gov

  2. Auditing vs. auditing Auditability from the Software Independence perspective Establish high confidence in the authenticity and completeness of vote records Verifiability of each and every vote Seeking alternatives that preserve these properties without VVPAT Vs. general external auditing concepts Statistical sampling Material error Audit risk Now discussing the latter 12/9-10/2009 TGDC Meeting Page 2

  3. Goals of election audits As identified by participants in an ASA-hosted working meeting, 2009-10: "To verify that the election outcomes implied by the reported vote totals are correct" "To provide data for process improvement: specifically, to identify and quantify various causes of discrepancies between voter intentions and the originally reported vote totals" Note careful wording An audit will not necessarily demonstrate that the reported vote totals are correct It may suffice to estimate the uncertainty of the "measurement" No impact on outcome, no "material effect" 12/9-10/2009 TGDC Meeting Page 3

  4. Auditability made simple Keep good records Complete (everything you will need) Identifiable Readable (usable for audits) Authenticated Archival Secure Conformant with U.S. generally accepted principles & standards Don't throw away information Redundant information isn't (auditors check for consistency) Cannot predict what might turn out to be critically relevant Better to have and not need than to need and not have Unfortunate conflicts with privacy, secrecy, election laws—this is what makes it complicated 12/9-10/2009 TGDC Meeting Page 4

  5. Auditability and Software Independence Discrepancies may be attributable to software, firmware, hardware, people, processes, configuration, calibration, documentation, … A system can be software-independent without being auditable E.g., software-free system that reports totals but does not create records for cross-checking A system can be auditable without being software-independent By definition, not software-independent → possible to have undetectable change in election outcome Possible does not mean probable, or practically doable Concept of audit risk Internal controls 12/9-10/2009 TGDC Meeting Page 5

  6. Auditing and election administration Management is responsible for: Presenting results fairly Adopting sound policies Establishing and maintaining internal control Preventing and detecting fraud An auditor's ability to compensate for inadequate internal control is limited 12/9-10/2009 TGDC Meeting Page 6

More Related