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India’s Policy towards REDD+: Dense Forest Ahead!

India’s Policy towards REDD+: Dense Forest Ahead!. Sharachchandra Lele Senior Fellow Centre for Environment & Development ATREE. India’s official attraction to REDD+. REDD+ will be a just reward for India’s forest conservation efforts that benefit the globe

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India’s Policy towards REDD+: Dense Forest Ahead!

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  1. India’s Policy towards REDD+:Dense Forest Ahead! Sharachchandra Lele Senior Fellow Centre for Environment & Development ATREE

  2. India’s official attraction to REDD+ • REDD+ will be a just reward for India’s forest conservation efforts that benefit the globe • REDD+ will generate large economic benefits (3 billion USD over 3 decades) • These benefits will be passed on to forest protecting communities (leading to poverty alleviation)

  3. How should we evaluate REDD+? • Climate effectiveness • Poverty alleviation • Benefits must exceed opportunity costs • Fairness (international, internal) • Biodiversity conservation • Impact on democratic processes

  4. Should we engage with REDD+ at all? • REDD+ in the absence of a global climate agreement only makes sense if it is based on ‘free’ funds, not on selling CERs • But only pilot phase funding is coming from public funds, rest from the carbon market • Carbon market can only emerge post-agreement • In any likely agreement, India will need forest carbon to offset its own emissions!

  5. Climate effectiveness • Climate can be saved without REDD+ • Large uncertainties about below ground biomass, about rates of regrowth in natural forest, about baselines (additionality) • Overestimated potential: • “wastelands” of 75 Mha are “available” (for CDM) • “degraded” forests are “available” at no opportunity cost • Leakage: • Allocating net national gain/loss to a location • Cross-sectoral leakage (LPG replacing fuelwood)

  6. Poverty alleviation requirements: non-market scenario • Gross returns must be high • Opportunity costs must be low • Transaction costs must be low • Returns must go preferentially into the hands of the poor

  7. Gross poverty alleviation • Quantum of returns from carbon forestry (not counting transaction costs or opp costs): • $5/tC amounts to only Rs 6000-Rs12000/ha over 25 yrs! • If a village of 100 hhs has 100 ha (!), each hh gets 12,000 over 25 years?! • Transaction costs will be high: more than 50% by any estimate • Negotiating • Contracting • MONITORING! • Payments

  8. Opportunity costs • “Degraded” forest lands are under heavy use • CPRs contributing ~30% of livelihoods in dryland regions (FES, 2011) • large fraction from grazing & firewood collection • “Reforestation” involves substantial opportunity costs for local users • Indiscriminate “reforestation” can also impose environmental opportunity costs (hydrology, biodiversity)

  9. Compare incentives for reducing deforestation (source: Chetan) Carbon - 1- 5 tons @ $1-20 = $1 - $,100 / ha / yr • Deforest and divert land use - Rs 500,000 to Rs 9,00,000/- per ha to the CAMPA • 12th Finance commission – Rs 1000 crores by forest area pro rata basis – Rs Rs 29/ha/yr • Neither CAMPA nor 12 Fin Commission money is shared with communities • CAMPA not additional in state budgets…

  10. Conditions for “To the hands of the poor” • Villagers must control forest carbon resource and its marketing • Marginalised groups must have strong say within village • Poor must have capacity to make long-term investments, absorb opp.costs, engage with technicalities • CDM on private lands must not swamp REDD+ on community lands

  11. Indian situation • Rights of village community not legallly defined/granted (vis-à-vis state, vis-à-vis neighbouring community) • JFM does not provide for autonomous decision-making • Elite capture is a very real, exacerbated by JFM • Paternalistic state control => no local capacity (e.g., NTFP) • Rich farmers will always out-compete through CDM (e.g., biofuels)

  12. Democratic governance • Current state of forest governance highly undemocratic • State-managed (non-market) REDD+  only strengthens centralisation • Market-based REDD+, in absence of community-level autonomy, does not work • Either way: governance reform is strong pre-condition

  13. Impact of biodiversity conservation and other environmental benefits • Carbon forestry is not intrinsically biodiversity friendly: fast growing tree plantations are best for carbon • Carbon forestry can also have mixed effects on hydrological cycle • If one adopts mixed forestry or native species, biodiv increases, but sequestration rates go down, $$ go down

  14. Recommendations • Enormous caution required • Engagement in REDD+ itself is questionable • Forest rights and governance reform should be absolute pre-condition (for non-market or market-based) • Local capacities for democratic decision-making and market engagement need strengthening first

  15. Elite capture in JFM: Thondal village, Kolar • back

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