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Breakdowns of Democracy. How Democracy is Lost & How the Loss of Democracy Can be Prevented. The Global Expansion of Democracy, 1974-2011. Expansion of Liberal Democracy. About two-thirds of the world ’ s democracies (77) are reasonably high-quality or “ liberal ” :
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Breakdowns of Democracy How Democracy is Lost & How the Loss of Democracy Can be Prevented
Expansion of Liberal Democracy About two-thirds of the world’s democracies (77) are reasonably high-quality or “liberal”: • electoral competition is institutionalized, fair, and open, • civil liberties are better protected, • there is a rule of law • there are low levels of political violence and abuses or impunity by state security services.
The Democratic Recession • The expansion of democracy peaked in 2006 at 62.7% of all states. Since then it has declined from 121 to 113 democracies. • Five consecutive years of declining freedom scores, losses outpacing gains.
Democratic Recession cont. • The rate of democratic breakdown since 1999 has been nearly twice the pace of the preceding 12 years. • 26 breakdowns or reversals of democracy since 1999. • These have come in some large strategic states: • Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Thailand, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kenya.
The Democratic Recession • Since 1999, there has been a rising tide of democratic breakdowns. • Of the 34 democratic breakdowns since 1974, 23 of them, (2/3) have occurred since 1999. • These have come in some very strategic states: Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela. In 2007: Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kenya.
Two Approaches to Analyzing Democratic Breakdowns • The Structural Approach (Deterministic) • Inhospitable structural conditions for democracy • Inappropriate institutional designs • The Actor-Centered Approach (Voluntaristic) • Mass Actors: Extreme pressures and demands political polarization • Elites: Betrayal of democracy, apathy, misrule, miscalculation • The Military: organizational, factional, and ethnic interests
Structure vs. Agency When democracy breaks down in a low-income, deeply divided country, is it because • political leaders made choices that undermined or destabilized it? or • the structural conditions (poverty, illiteracy, polarized ethnic cleavage, weak political institutions) made breakdown inevitable?
Juan Linz’s Actor-Centered Approach • Linz’s focus is on individual and institutional actors, how they respond to crisis situations, and how they shape the political agenda to avoid crisis situations • A key variable is their commitment to democratic institutional norms and procedures (See Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, top page 40)
Democratic Loyalty • For Linz, key condition for averting democratic breakdown is “loyalty” to democracy on the part of elites: • Public commitment to legal, democratic means for gaining and exercising power, rejection of the use of force • “rejection of any ‘knocking at the barracks’ for armed forces support” in a political dispute
Democratic Disloyalty, examplesLinz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, pp. 30-31 • Use of force, fraud, intimidation against opponents • Denial of legitimacy to political opponents who claim and evince democratic loyalty • “Readiness to curtail the civil liberties of the leaders and supporters of parties attempting to exercise” constitutional rights • Mass pressure to disrupt the functioning of government • Blanket attacks on the whole political system rather than specific actors of institutions
Semiloyal Behavior Walks the line between loyal and disloyal, opportunistically in pursuit of power or political advantage “The intermittent presence, in attenuated or ambivalent form, of some” elements of disloyalty Willing to ally with blatantly disloyal forces, or to negotiate in secret with them “Willingness to encourage, tolerate, cover up, treat leniently, excuse or justify actions” that violate democratic principles and norms (Linz, p. 32)
Factors Affecting Breakdown • Regime Performance: Effectiveness in addressing social and economic problems. Don’t let problems fester and become acute, “unsolvable” • Defining a reasonable agenda: new regimes must not raise unreasonable expectations that will overtax limited budgetary and political resources: Conserve political capital, score some early successes, defer some difficult problems
Factors Affecting Breakdown, 2 • Political performance: controlling corruption; maintaining order; respecting constitution, rights, rule of law • Treating the old (authoritarian) order: How to avoid a legitimacy crisis? How to manage the tension between stigmatizing, punishing the crimes of the past, and giving the old elites a stake in the new system?
The Problem of the Old OrderLinz’s Pragmatic Advice • Don’t waste energy on the politics of resentment • Don’t gratuitously create a new disloyal opposition • Try to incorporate ambivalent groups into the new regime • Define the truly disloyal opposition early and clearly, and isolate it politically • Seek maximum continuity in the symbols of the nation-state • Widen legitimacy as much as possible
Huntington’s approach • Go after a limited number of authoritarian offenders • Avoid extremely divisive struggles over the past that could trigger a coup attempt or provoke other disloyal or semiloyal forces • Reassure the military officer corps • Achieve “a full and dispassionate public accounting” of what happened • Assess realistically the relative power of democrats vs. surviving autocratic forces
5. Civilian Control of the Military:Another Early Priority • Begin by depoliticizing the military, removing it from active involvement in government and politics • Professionalize the military around its essential mission of national defense/international security • Withdraw the military from internal security & domestic intelligence • Retire senior officers associated with old order • Accord the military professional respect and status (including good pay and benefits)
Civilian control of military cont. • Gradually advance a new generation of military officers socialized into an ethos of civilian control • Remove the military from control of corporations • Establish civilian control of intelligence • Gradually subject military budgets, acquisitions, and strategic decisions to civilian oversight
Political Leadershipin Managing the Military • Need for a combination of pragmatism and principle • Need for a deft sense of timing • Timing depends on the relative power of democrats vs. the old order • The more negotiated or imposed the transition, the greater the need for incrementalism
6. Political Institutions Sometimes political institutions are so flawed that the survival of democracy may depend on their reform • Avoid conditions of protracted or recurrent political stalemate • Avoid conditions that permit or foster the personal concentration of power • Avoid “polarized pluralism”
Polarized Pluralism (elements) • Polarization (extreme distance) on an ideological axis • Many (5 or more) “relevant” parties • Incompatible oppositions • Centrifugal, rather than “centripetal” drives • Antisystem parties, irresponsible oppositions • Politics of outbidding
Correlates of Democratic Breakdown • Unsolvable problems, low system efficacy • Setting impossible goals, for which government lacks the means • Political paralysis (inability to form govt or of govt to make decisions) • Severe political polarization (ideological, ethnic) • Electoral fraud &/or intense disputes • Inability to change bad government • …or succession of bad governments from different parties and leaders
Correlates of Democratic Breakdown, cont • Political violence, threats to public order loss of legitimacy and power, army is drawn into maintaining domestic order • Political Parties fail to condemn and contain violence (absence of “strong” democratic parties—Bermeo) • Inefficacy or subversion of democratic institutions, including police and judiciary
Example, Pakistan Oct 1999 • “Unsolvable” economic problems Poverty, anemic growth in per capita income, inability to collect taxes huge public debt, massive corruption, capital flight • Collapsing rule of law, public order Mounting political, sectarian, & criminal violence; corrupt and abusive police; corrupt & politicized judiciary; executive abuse of power (both Bhutto & Sharif); constitutional abuse by president • Ethnic/religious polarization & strife Regional rivalry between Punjab and Sindh; tension with minority regions and muhajirs; sectarian strife between Sunni and Shiite Muslims
Example, Nigeria, 1966, 1979 • Economic Mismanagement & Disarray Pervasive, staggering corruption; squandering of 1979-83 oil boom revenues; inflation; shortages of commodities; lack of services • Severe ethnic polarization(coinciding cleavages: N vs. S, Muslim vs. Christian, Hausa vs. Yoruba) • Massive electoral fraud (1965, 1983) • Extensive political, electoral, & post-election violence • Public disillusionment with parties and politicians (1983 post-election student demonstrations calling for military to return to power)
How Democracy Ends • Atmosphere of crisis, intense politicization • Loss of public confidence in the country’s democratic institutions • Feeling that “something must be done” • May be real or partly manufactured by leader • Transfer of democratic authority via • Executive coup (autogolpe) • Military coup • Installation of antidemocratic party
Antidotes toDemocratic Breakdown • Strong institutions of horizontal accountability to control corruption, protect rights, generate rule of law, check power • Effective neutral administration of free and fair elections • Effective democratic political parties with • Firm commitment to peaceful, democratic methods • Broad and robust support in society • Moral authority & discipline to punish violence
Antidotes toDemocratic Breakdown, cont. • Neutral, depoliticized, professional military under civilian constitutional control • Effective, professional, impartial police • Reasonably appropriate political institutions(in terms of managing conflict, balancing fairness & governability) • State structures and policies capable of generating economic growth • Targeted policies to reduce inequality and extreme poverty
Antidotes toDemocratic Breakdown, part 3 • International assistance to aid economic development of emerging democracies • International assistance to strengthen emerging democratic institutions and civil societies • International pressure to constrain, deter, and reverse the potential undemocratic actions of key civilian and military elites
