1 / 17

Power without glory? Competition and Australian supermarkets

Power without glory? Competition and Australian supermarkets. Presentation by Graeme Samuel and Stephen P. King Monash Business Policy Forum Monash University. O verview. Is there power (and if so where are the excessive profits)? T he 2008 ACCC grocery report (with some updates)

rhian
Télécharger la présentation

Power without glory? Competition and Australian supermarkets

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Power without glory? Competition and Australian supermarkets Presentation by Graeme Samuel and Stephen P. King Monash Business Policy Forum Monash University

  2. Overview • Is there power (and if so where are the excessive profits)? • The 2008 ACCC grocery report (with some updates) • Issues for the Competition laws

  3. Are we concentrated? (Yes we are!) 2004/5 approximate grocery market share of three largest retailers (various countries) Australia 94% Canada 65% Sweden 65% Switzerland 62% Norway 51% UK 50% Austria 50% Germany 38% Source: ACCC 2008 Grocery inquiry, OFT 2006 grocery inquiry

  4. Are we concentrated? (Yes we are!) 2004/5 approximate grocery market share of three largest retailers (various countries) Australia 94% Canada 65% Sweden 65% Switzerland 62% Norway 51% UK 50% Austria 50% Germany 38% But be wary of local market shares as these can be higher Source: ACCC 2008 Grocery inquiry, OFT 2006 grocery inquiry

  5. The vertical chains – Coles and Woolworths • In packaged groceries, have about 80% of all sales in Australia • But about 55-60% in terms of grocery items

  6. The independent wholesaler • Around 15% of market for packaged groceries as at 2008 • Operates through IGA, Foodland, Foodworks and other retail outlets • Has expanded retail operations over past decade (e.g. acquisition of Franklins in NSW) • ACCC 2008 report had concerns about Metcash supplied retailers ability to compete on price

  7. The entrants But where are the specialists? (e.g. Whole Foods)

  8. EBIT margins 2006/07 • Tesco (UK) approximately 6% • Sainsbury (UK) approximately 2.5% • Walmart (USA) approximately 7% • Kroger (USA) approximately 3.5% • Carrefours (France) approximately 4% • Woolworths approximately 6% • Coles approximately 3.5% • Metcash 2007/08 EBITA margin approximately 4.5%

  9. EBIT margins 2006/07 • Tesco (UK) approximately 6% • Sainsbury (UK) approximately 2.5% • Walmart (USA) approximately 7% • Kroger (USA) approximately 3.5% • Carrefours (France) approximately 4% • Woolworths approximately 6% • Coles approximately 3.5% • Metcash 2007/08 EBITA margin approximately 4.5% Not out of line with less concentrated markets.

  10. EBIT margins 2006/07 • Tesco (UK) approximately 6% • Sainsbury (UK) approximately 2.5% • Walmart (USA) approximately 7% • Kroger (USA) approximately 3.5% • Carrefours (France) approximately 4% • Woolworths approximately 6% • Coles approximately 3.5% • Metcash 2007/08 EBITA margin approximately 4.5% Power without the (excessive) profits? Why do Coles and Woolworths compete as hard as they do? Not out of line with less concentrated markets.

  11. The 2008 ACCC grocery inquiry • Grocery retailing is ‘workably competitive’ but: • Barriers to entry • Limited incentives for Coles and Woolworths to compete aggressively on price • Little price competition from independent sector • Aldi’s entry has had a dynamic impact • Nothing ‘fundamentally wrong’ with the grocery supply chain • But significant buyer power for Coles, Woolworths and Metcash

  12. The 2008 ACCC grocery inquiry • Grocery retailing is ‘workably competitive’ but: • Barriers to entry • Limited incentives for Coles and Woolworths to compete aggressively on price • Little price competition from independent sector • Aldi’s entry has had a dynamic impact • Nothing ‘fundamentally wrong’ with the grocery supply chain • But significant buyer power for Coles, Woolworths and Metcash

  13. The 2008 ACCC grocery inquiry • Grocery retailing is ‘workably competitive’ but: • Barriers to entry • Limited incentives for Coles and Woolworths to compete aggressively on price • Little price competition from independent sector • Aldi’s entry has had a dynamic impact • Nothing ‘fundamentally wrong’ with the grocery supply chain • But significant buyer power for Coles, Woolworths and Metcash

  14. The 2008 ACCC grocery inquiry • Grocery retailing is ‘workably competitive’ but: • Barriers to entry • Limited incentives for Coles and Woolworths to compete aggressively on price • Little price competition from independent sector • Aldi’s entry has had a dynamic impact • Nothing ‘fundamentally wrong’ with the grocery supply chain • But significant buyer power for Coles, Woolworths and Metcash

  15. Issues for the Competition laws “Part IV (of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010) seeks to prevent conduct that may lessen competition, not to protect less competitive businesses. The distinction is an important one.” Dawson inquiry p.29.

  16. Issues for the Competition laws • Mergers • Are creeping acquisitions a problem? • Abuse of market power • Should we have an effects test? • Buyer power and unconscionable conduct • Do we need the law clarified?

  17. Takeaways • Given market structure, our supermarket sector is surprisingly ‘workably’ competitive • The key findings of the 2008 ACCC inquiry still hold • Key legal issues is clarifying unconscionable conduct

More Related