THE CRITICAL INTERFACE

1. THE CRITICAL INTERFACE Lloyd Griffiths Ex Operations Director British Airways. Frank Turner President IFA

2. Accidents and Near Misses • Are rarely the result of one failure or defect • They are more often the result of a systemic failure coupled to other issues or failures often the result of human error However we live in a world of instant communication and although our industry has an enviable track record our accidents and near misses make front page stories

3. Safety Management Systems • Are designed to minimise such systemic failures • Developing the safety cases as part of the Safety Management System often reveals human factors risks, cultural issues, inappropriate attitudes, stove pipe thinking and training short comings

4. Interfaces The cultural and human factors risks are greatest where the is an interface in the chain of command, responsibility or communication such as: • Cabin crew to flight deck • Flight deck to line engineer • Line engineer to flight deck • Line engineer to flight operations • Highly automated flight control system to flight crew • Engineer to engineer at shift change • Ground services to flight operations and flight deck

5. The Modern Aircraft • Is highly reliable • Relies on complex integrated systems • But presents even greater issues when something goes wrong • Surprise- not been here before • Error messages/ warnings in volume

6. The Critical Interface Flight crew to line engineer and line engineer to flight crew

7. Heard on the Flight Deck • What the h_ _ _ is it doing to us ? • It being the computer • Look at these warnings are they real? • How the h_ _ _ do we react to this?

8. Heard On Line Maintenance • The error messages do not make sense • I wish the crew could demonstrate the problem • Change the unit • No fault found • Put back into service

9. Problem Solved? • Yes • No • ? • Or is it masked and will it return again

10. Will a Safety Management SystemFix It? • Does the airline have a truly integrated SMS with appropriate departmental interfaces? • Do the safety cases cross the departmental interfaces? • It depends on the answer to the above, immaculate communication between flight deck and line maintenance and the adequacy of the training each have received

11. The flight Deck Training Issue PILOT SELECTION • There are 3 ways to finance Pilot Training  • Hard work and save the cash • The Bank of Mum and Dad • Sponsorship by Airline/University/Military • Only the last of these routes imposes an academic criteria for Selection

12. The Flight Deck Training Issue • Common sense and ambition are insufficient qualifications for the ab initio pilot • If the Pilot to Engineer Interface is going to improve the Regulators must insure that the pilot has the intellect to understand complex technical issues and the analytical skills to describe them in a common language.

13. PILOT AB INITIO TRAINING • The mandatory syllabus has not kept pace with technical progress  • Only 3 significant changes in the last 50 years  • The mandating of Crew Resource Management (CRM) • The use of generic simulators • The introduction of the Multi Pilot Licence (MPL)Course

14. TYPE CONVERSION TRAININGGround School • “Cost” has been the key driver of the length and Depth of Type Conversion Courses. • Ground School Technical Courses are taught on a “need to know” basis. • Exams are frequently modular. • Content is still “cockpit” orientated

15. TYPE CONVERSION TRAININGSIMULATOR • Courses are frequently Zero Flight Time and are focussed on learning to “fly” the aircraft. • Most of the flying is at low altitude practising the Approach/Landing/Go Around phases of flight. • Pilots are tested on their ability to overcome a problem and not on their understanding of that problem.

16. RECURRENT TESTING AND TRAINING • The reliability of modern aircraft denies the pilots opportunities to increase their understanding of the aircraft and its systems. • Over many years of flying a pilot’s skills may atrophy • 16 hours per year of simulator time has not changed in 50 years. • Line Oriented Flying Training has not universally replaced box ticking exercises. • Pilots experience multiple system failures in the Simulator and learn the actions to overcome them but analysis of those failures and the training to describe them is often lacking.

17. The Line Maintenance Training Issue • The problem is fundamentally the same as on the flight deck • The lack of training on the fundamentals of the integrated system, both initial and recurrent. • The element of surprise • The challenge of recurrent training for every unexpected error • The pressure to get the aircraft back into service • Moving onto the next aircraft without adequate understanding of and communication of the reasons of the previous failure

18. Recomendations • Ensure that Safety Management Systems are seamless and integrated across the company operations. • Check them with demanding Safety Cases • Lobby the Regulators to mandate training of flight crew and line maintenance on the understanding of the integrated systems. Not just how to react when they fail. • Ensure that the communication across the critical interface is immaculate and audit it.

19. Summary • Our industry has an enviable record on safety • Modern aircraft are highly integrated and highly reliable • But our training of Pilots and Engineers has not kept pace with the complexity of the integrated systems that deliver that reliability • The element of surprise has increased the risk of a Human Factors failure • The ability of our Pilots and Engineers to cope with the complexity and surprise of warnings and volume of error messages is not dealt with adequately in current training programmes • Unless this is corrected and integrated Safety Management Systems are introduced there is increasing risk of accident • The communication across the critical interface of flight operations and maintenance is vital but it requires much improved understanding of the integrated system • IFA will continue to lobby this point at every opportunity, we look to you to play your part also