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Botnets

Usman Jafarey Including slides from The Zombie Roundup by Cooke, Jahanian, McPherson of the University of Michigan. Botnets. BotSniffer. Slides made by Andrew Tjang.

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Botnets

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  1. Usman Jafarey Including slides from The Zombie Roundup by Cooke, Jahanian, McPherson of the University of Michigan Botnets

  2. BotSniffer Slides made by Andrew Tjang Paper: BotSniffer: Detecting Botnet Command and Control Channels in Network Traffic by Guofei Gu, Junjie Zhang, and Wenke Lee (NDSS 08)

  3. Motivation • Botnets serious security threats • Realtime Command+Control from centralized source • Use characteristics of this Command+Control to detect botnets in sstems

  4. Contributions • Identify characteristics of C&C in Botnets • Capture spatial-temporal correlation of network traffic to detect botnets • Implement anomaly based detection algorithms as Snort plugins • Evaluation of BotSniffer on real world traces • Show botnets can be detected with high accuracy and low false positive rate

  5. Command & Control • Centralized control of bots in botnets • Can be push (i.e. IRC) or pull (i.e. HTTP) • Difficult to detect because protocol usage similar to normal traffic, low traffic volume, few bots, encryption

  6. Spatial-Temporal correlation • Invariants to all botnets • 1. need to connect to central server to get commands • 2. respond to commands • perform tasks and report back (keeping long connection, or making frequent connections) • Responses: message/activity response • Multiple bots in channel likely to respond in similar fashion • Leverage “response crowd” • Bots have stronger/consistent synchronization and correlation in responses than humans do.

  7. BotSniffer Architecture • Monitor Engine • Examines network traffic, detects activity response behavior, suspicious C&C protocols • Correlation Engine • Group analysis of spatial-temporal correlation, similarity of activity or message responses connected to same IRC/HTTP server

  8. BotSniffer Architecture Illustrated

  9. Group Analysis • Intuition: • P(botnet | 100 clients send similar messages) > P(botnet | 10 clients send similar messages) • IF botnet, THEN more clients more likely to form homogeneous cluster • IF not botnet, THEN unlikely to send similar messages

  10. Evaluation • Datasets • University wide network IRC traffic 2005-2007 (189 days) • All network wide traffic (10min/1-5h) • Botnet traces (synthetic) • Honeypot (8hr) • IRC server logs • Modified bot software in virtual environment • Implemented 2 botnets using HTTP

  11. Results – Normal Trace

  12. Detection

  13. Attacks on Botsniffer and Their Defenses • Misuse of whitelist • Whitelists not necessary • Can use soft whitelists • Encryption • Doesn’t affect activity response • Long & random response delays • ? • Random noise packets • Activity response unaffected

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