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ROLL RPL Security IETF 77 status

ROLL RPL Security IETF 77 status. draft-sdt-roll-rpl-security Kris Pister, pister@eecs.berkeley.edu Security Design Team. Status. Drafts: draft-tsao-roll-security-framework-02 draft-sdt-roll-rpl-security-00 draft-struik-roll-rpl-security-design-00 Related:

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ROLL RPL Security IETF 77 status

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  1. ROLL RPL SecurityIETF 77 status draft-sdt-roll-rpl-security Kris Pister, pister@eecs.berkeley.edu Security Design Team IETF 77 – Roll WG – March 2010

  2. Status • Drafts: • draft-tsao-roll-security-framework-02 • draft-sdt-roll-rpl-security-00 • draft-struik-roll-rpl-security-design-00 • Related: • Draft-oflynn-6lowapp-bootstrapping-00 IETF 77 – Roll WG – March 2010

  3. Scope Routing Security Provide mechanisms to protect RPL {DIS, DIO, DAO, “flow label”} from outsider attack Later or out of scope Policy Key distribution Insider attack Relationship to other security (L2, L4, …)

  4. Range of RPL Applications Toys No security ok? Consumer/commercial Perception of risk varies widely Enterprise-critical Appropriate paranoia • Need to satisfy “enterprise-critical” without driving away “consumer/commercial”

  5. “Protect” DIO, DIS, DAO, flow label Packets are not modified during transport Participant IDs are authentic Retransmissions are detected Content optionally encrypted

  6. Mechanisms AES128 CCM* Where to draw the “MUST support” line? 1) no security 2) shared instance-wide key 3) shared pair-wise keys 4) digital signatures

  7. Authentication Proposed 4 levels No authentication Pre-configured, instance-wide join key Pre-configured join key(s) with access control list at LBR Public key certificate

  8. Implementation Still several options for where to put security material DIS, DIO, DAO Sub-option “security-field-present” bit Flow label Hop-by-hop option (hui-6man-rpl-option) TLV or “security present” bit 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Option Type | Opt Data Len | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | (sub-TLVs) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

  9. March 22, 2010 Example Packet format (1) RPL Control Message Security bit indicates whether packet is secured, and auxiliary security header is present. Slide 9

  10. March 22, 2010 Example packet format (2) • Auxiliary Security Header (cont’d) • - Only present if security field set • Security control field: indication as to which security services enabled • Granularity: specific combinations of data confidentiality & data integrity • Counter field: indication of non-repeating value used in crypto construct • Compression option provided (if devices have clock on board and timeliness possible) • Key Identifier field: indication as to which key was used to secure packet • Granularity: peer-to-peer key, group key, network-wide key, {signature key} MIC: message integrity code Slide 10

  11. Summary Can provide simple, standard, lightweight mechanisms to protect routing information Min 2B? per data packet (flow label) Typ 5B? per DIS/DIO/DAO Still lots of detail work to do Open issues Insider attack: LBR consistency checking? Error/alarm messages

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