European integration (1948-1989)

1. Europeanintegration (1948-1989)

2. From the outbreak of the cold war to the Rome Treaties 1947-48 : to solve Germanproblem June 1948 currencyreformbrought the market economy to life in Germany. International Rhur Authority and French control of Saar area. Shuman Plan (Shuman- Monnet) Monnet: intermediate between Usa-Europe Peace: restoredemocratic regime, political and economicorganization of a european community Summit among USA-URSS-FRANCE–GB strengthenbipolarcontext

3. Germanproblemshould be solvedwithineuropeanbounderies. USA: is in favour of Germanreunification URSS: is in favourGermanneutralism Monnetplan: Franco- Germanreapprochement Coal and steel community building based on competition (againstprotectionism)

4. 3. control activity over German production 4. Relaunch of diplomaticsector on the ground of europeanorganization 5. ProtectionagainstGemannationalism Economicconvivencebetweeninterventionist and liberalistmeasures The approvalscheme: Shuman – French council of minister US Secretary of State Dean Acheson Europeancountries (Germany, Italy)

5. AfterAdenauerapproval the officialannnouncement on a coal and steel community: common basis for economicdevelopment and first step of a europeanfederation Europe: solidarity and convergence of sectorialinterests End of the Intent Cordiale and new basis for the formation of a new Franco-Germanaxis

6. Brithishattitude: in between Europe Britishmarginalization Preferentialrelationship with Commonwealth countries Emphasis on nationalsovereignty on coal and steelsector Fear of soviet expansionism: ( mediterranean-neareastareas)

7. Atlantismand defence of western civilization Atlantism versus europeanism Attlee’sgovernmentguidelines

8. Welfare State versus continentalliberalism; facilitate German entry into North Atlantic Treaty Organization Eu integrationpercievedas a loosersproject

9. US: in favour of a Europeanorganizationwhich set the pace for an internationalorderbased on freedom of exchange and monetarystabilityalreadyimplemented from the Bretton Woods agreements. Coal and Steel community as incentive for the europeanproductivesystems and as an instrumentagainstleftwing parties (welfare- democracy)

10. French approach: PCF and RPF against ECSC consideredsuchas an attempt to nationalsovereignty. RPF feardirigisticaspect of the plan and the frenchindustrysubordination to the Germanone. Germany as a “ US horse of Troy “. RPF fears the uncertaintiesraised by a contact with his major historicenemy. PCF interpretsitsuchas an aggression to URSS, suchus an attempt to favour a US hegemony.

11. Germanapproach: Adenauerwasenthusiasticbut he wasskepticaboutreaching a realequalconditionbetween the winners and the loosers of the IIWW. Relationshipbetweensupranationalintegration and germanriunification Atlantismisnot a threat to europeanindipendence, on the contraryitis a source of stability, richness and security

12. Heritage of nazism and nationalism Difference in comparison with Weimar Republic: Left wing parties embracenationalism Right wing parties embrace a supranationalintegration. The unifyingelement of CDU isanticomunism

13. Italianapproach De Gasperi and Sforza are veryenthusiastic. Rebuilding of nation state after the war. Europeanismas a peacefulmyth and suchasinstrument to overcomenationalismheritage Runmigrationflux Reduce politicalconsensus to leftwing parties Transfer catholicsolidarism on an internationallevel

14. Veryrapidnegotiation: from june 1950 to april 1951 Executive body: High Authority, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Ministers Court of Justice

15. The goal of the treatywas to create equalconditionsbetween the winner and the loosers of the Second World War ECSC iseven the first step of the franco-germanreconciliation

16. EuropeanDefence Community June 1950 Korean War incentives the area of Europeanintegration possibility of a new war wasperceivedboth in Europe and Asia Severalconsequences for the western defensive policy both in US and Europe end of the project to cope with the enemythrough the supremacy of the economicsphere.

17. 15 september 1950 Acheson in NY at the Council of Atlantic Allianceproposed the creation of an integratedarmy. Usa approach Theywanted the Federal Republic to be consideredsuchas the othereuropeanstates Itsintegration in the Atlantic sphere The end of the occupation status

18. 1950 the integration of the ancientenemywithin the western atlanticallianceiscompleted: Europe and Asia through Germany and Japan the financing funds devoted to defencesectorincrease On the European front the need to rearm Germany cannot be delayedanymore

19. France launch a new plan. The President of Council Pleven proposed to the National Assembly the integration of the army of the europeanmemberstates with a participation of some germanbattalions the armyshould be driven by a europeanminister of defence The Pleven plandesignedeven a common budject

20. GermanApproach: Adenauershares thisproject. The rearmamentisnotsustained by the party as a whole Some fears the US interference, some makes an overlappingbetweenmilitarism and nationalism

21. The protestantswereagainst the Pleven Plan SPD wasagainst the Pleven Plan US approach From September 1950 to July 1951 the UsAdministration wasagaist the Pleven Plan. Thenitchangeditsmind and afterMonnet- Eisenhower meeting itsustainedprofoundly the French plan Italianapproach Itwas in favour of Pleven Plan. The army part of the building of a political community. Starting from 1951 De Gasperi made severaldeclarationagainstany chance of neutralism for Germany

22. June 1951 Adenauermet De Gasperi. Theyboth share the project of a federal Europe Theybothbelong to the catholic area and they share german cultural roots and boththeircountriesexperimented the process of delegitimation of the State-institutionscaused by the war. EDC wasinterpretedsuchas the basis of the future political community. Italyperceive EDC suchas a the followingstepafter ECSC.

23. De Gasperi sees the EDC as an instrument: To obtain the merger of a differentnationalarmy under a common leadership Non-descriminationbetweenwinners and loosers Complementaritybetween EDC and NATO

24. USSR approach: March 1952 Stalin proposes a peacetreaty with Germany based on reunification and neutralism. Adenauerinterpretesitas the Soviet attempt to separate Germany from itsallies, to stop the europeanintegrationprocess and to diminish the role of US in Europe. In the long runrenounce to East Germany was a Soviet instrument to gain hegemony in Western Europe

25. Adenauerrefuses the soviet offer, in spite of the SPD position. Italy, France sustains Federal Republic solution. Stalin gotonly a weaksustain of French communists. 26 May 1952 the ministers of Foreignaffairs of USA, GB, France, signedthe treaty of put to an end the occupation regime

26. 27 May 1952 the six ECSC signedEDC treatyand the Parliamenary Assembly is in charge of drafting a EuropeanConstitution The Commissionisleaded bySpaak. 1953 Italianpoliticaldebate round on the electoral law to pe approved, and the stillunsolved Trieste problem.

27. 1953 Adenauer and De Gasperi do notfollow the samepath. Adenauerwonpoliticalelection, De Gasperi left the government. In 1954 president of the High Authority. Relationshipbetween EDC and the solution of Trieste problem Wasitnational or internationalproblem? Twodifferentapproachwithin the Christian Democratic Party

28. September 1953 Pella declareshiswillingness to sacrifice the future of the EDC in case of major sustain on the Trieste question His speechhasbeenconsideredtoomuchnationalistic Crisis of De Gasperi heritage March 1954 Adenauerwent to Roma in order to increase the chances of obtaining a ratification

29. In France the debateinvests the concept of identity US pressions on the approval (july 1954) Comunists, gaullistsand nationalistsenlarge the anti EDC front. The anti Germanresistencevalueswerebeingrestored Antiamericanismincrease EDC doesnot match with the need of controlling the frenchcolonies. French emendamentsproposed by Mendez France make the French- Germanrelationship to crumble 30 of August 1954 the treatyisnotratified in France

30. Launch of WEU(september 1954) Eden’s Plan Advantages: britishparticipation, atlanticsustain, germanrearment, a system of controllingrearment Disadvantages: no economicproject France interpretesitas a step of european building process Italyunderlines the importance of the “economiccommitte” Between 1954-55 the treatyisratified Italianembassiessustain the importance of the britishinvolvment in Europeanproject and underlines the impossibility to promoteanyfederalistproject

31. Quaroni: WEU as a solution de rechangeto answer to the stall of Europeanproject Babuscio Rizzo: in favour of WEU becauseitwill help Italy to get some advantages to increaseitspoliticalrole in the international arena. Tarchiani: refers the US promotion of the Italiansustain to the British formula.

32. WEU can help Italy to strengthen the relationship of the Scelbagovernment with the USA after the crisesoccurred under Pella government It put the basis for the the request of american economicaid and for a new italianrolewithin NATO. ItalianForeignMinister Martino underlines the convergencebetween WEU ad NATO

33. 1955 Messina Conference 2 hypotesis: sectoralproject on ECSC model, or the creation of a common market France(Monnet) bet on atomicenergy Belgiumproposes the merger of national market and a common authority for transport and conventionalenergy

34. Great Britain apply for a solutionwithin the EOEC framework EOEC was the first to liberalize the market and promotetradeamong western countries Italyis in favour of a common authority for transport and electricenergy. Italian report: undelines the importance of balancing the manifacturesector and the agricolturalone. Everybodyagreed for a gradualcreation of a European Common Market

35. Itimplyes: A monetaryconversionproject A fund for investments Nuclearenergydevelopment Messina conference doesnotraiseparticularexpectations Dutchminister of Foreign Affairs: Beyenunderlines the importance of the creation of a European Common Market: custom union with no tradediscrimination

36. The finalresolutionestablished: An organization for the pacificdevelopment of atomicenergy. A ECM 1956 the ministers of ForeignAffairs alreadydrafted the project for the EEC and EURATOM Everybodyis in favour of EURATOM and describeditsuchas an updated ECSC aboveallas far oilfornituresisconcernedafter Suez crises As for common market Benelux and West Germany wer in favour, France wasprotectionist, Italywas in between

37. GB remainskeptikal. Itinterpretes the EEC projectas a copy of the EOEC. France believesthat the joint participation of French and Britishgovernment in the Suez criseswouldhave led Britishcloser to the Europeanintegrationprocess. After the Suez crises: Adenauertold to Mollet: Europa should be your positive reaction

38. March 1957 signature of the Treaties of Rome France and Italyobtained a goodresults from theirnegotiation: long transitoryperiod for the elimination of obstaclesconcerningagriculturalexchange. Germany for the manifacture production

39. De Gaulle and Adenauervisions of Euroatlanticrelationship DE Gaulle and Europe of Nations: a means of challenging the UnitedStates and breaking down global bipolarity State is an instrument of nation Primacy of foreign policy on the internalone. 1958 relationship with MacMillan and Eisenhower as for a directorate De Gaulle devoloped the strategy of France as the leading country of Europe as a third force

40. Intergovernamentalapproach for European building Commonforeign and defence policy 1960-63: Agriculturalnegotiation Politicalnegotiation Franco-germanreapproachment britishnegotiation

41. De Gaulle obtains the admission of agriculturewithin ECM 1961 Plan Fouchet: Council, Assembly and PoliticalCommission Plan Fouchetwasincompatible with supranationalintegrationasenvisioned by the EC’sfounders. The Netherlands opposed and the Fouchetplancollapsed. Kennedy Grand Design: Atlantic community under NATO umbrella

42. 1962 exchange of officialvisitsbetween De Gaulle and Adenauer. France is the key of Adenauerforeignaffairs In Germany thereis a pro gaullistgroup (antiatlantic, anti british and in favour of the confederal model) An antigaullistgroup December 1962 Nassau agreements on nuclearmissiles January 1963 ElyseeTreaty

43. 1964 Germany obtains the establishment of a common externaltariff for industrial products, France obtainsit for agricultureproducts synchronizationmethod. In 1960s the CAP was a symbol of Community solidarity and helpedresctruturedeclining Western Europeanagriculture (subsidies and modernization) The PAC implementationwas a precondition for completing the customs union French internal policy: financialmonetaryreformwere design in light of EEC for reaching the frenchtransition to a custom union.

44. Withoutdrastic De Gaulle devaluation the french economy couldnothavesurvived the transition to a custom union. The Sixties the Council of Ministershad regular meeting. Itgaveraise to the Committee of PermanentResident (Coreper) The Court of Justicebegan to produce many EC case law The mostinmediate task was to establish a customs union. Itcameintobeing in 1968, 18 monthsbefore the schedule

45. During the Sixties the Sixgrew by 50% EC initiativespointed out multilateraltradenegotiations and global development De Gaulle dismissedCommissionofficialasstateless and denationalized He did’ntlikeHallstein the president of Commissionwhotried to enhance the CommissionPower and push the ECC pathtowardsfederallines.

46. The Commissionproposed a new budgetaryarrangementsincreasing the power of Commissionitself and those of the EP. 1965 the EuropeanCommissionPresidentHallsteinlaunch an institutionalreform to reach the goal of a federationdevelopment: Commissionshouldhaveplayed the executive role Implementation of qualifiedmajorityvotingsystem for the Council of Ministers

47. June 1965 De Gaulle withdraw the frenchpermanentrepresentant from the Council of Ministercausing the so calledemptychaircrisis Farmers’ organization and business interestsfeared the consequences of a protractedcrises. Itisshown in the electoralpresidentialelectionhold in December 1965.(De Gaulle won in the second round) January1966: Luxemburg Compromise. Commissionautonomyremainsunchanged Disagreement on voting procedure remainsunchanged

48. The crisisunderminedbothHallstein ‘scredibility and the Commission ‘sconfidence The Commissionwasunassertive for over a decade. De Gaulle rejectbritishadhesionboth under the conservative government of MacMillan in 1963 and the labourgovernment of Wilson in 1967.

49. 1968 the event of Mayhadlead to a lessdevelopedeconomicstructure and lowered the country international standing Czechoslovakiaoccupationenhance De Gaulle to modifyitsvision of bipolarrelationship Itwas the end of a dialoguebetweenMoscow and Paris April 1969 De Gaulle resigned 1969 Brandt is the new cancellor and Pompidou is the new French president

50. Germany had a greateconomicdevelopment And launch a foreign policy towardEastern Europe The Hague Summit December1969: end of the Gaullist model of Europe building. Pompidou statesthatwithout GB, Irland and Denmark, EEC wouldnothavesurvived Brandt saw the Britishaccessioninto the EC as a positive measure, becauseitreassuresthosecountriesthatfear Germany eccessive power in Europe