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Decision Making

Decision Making

Decision Making. Introduction. Basic concepts of Acts, Events and Outcomes and Payoffs Criteria for Decision Making Backward Induction Value of Information Summary. Basic Concepts in This chapter. Acts are decision maker’s choices.

By tamah
(94 views)

Stackelberg Model

Stackelberg Model

Stackelberg Model. Like Cournot, there are 2 firms that set quantity However, game is not simultaneous, it is sequential What does this mean? One firm, the leader, chooses quantity first The other firm, the follower, observes the leader’s quantity and then chooses quantity

By Ava
(653 views)

Topic 8:	Oligopoly and game theory

Topic 8: Oligopoly and game theory

A ntitrust Economics 2013. David S. Evans University of Chicago, Global Economics Group. Elisa Mariscal CIDE, ITAM, CPI. Topic 8: Oligopoly and game theory. Topic 8 | Part 2 6 June 2013. Date. Overview: . Oligopoly and Interdependent Behavior. Oligopoly and interdependent b ehavior.

By ham
(145 views)

Entry and exit

Entry and exit

Entry and exit. September 16, 2008. Some facts. Think of an industry with 100 firms doing a combined $100 million revenue in 2008 In the next 5 years, 30 to 40 new firms will enter Combined annual sales of $12 to $20 million Half will be diversified firms entering the market

By rossa
(86 views)

Unit III: The Evolution of Cooperation

Unit III: The Evolution of Cooperation

Unit III: The Evolution of Cooperation. Can Selfishness Save the Environment? Repeated Games: the Folk Theorem Evolutionary Games A Tournament How to Promote Cooperation/Unit Review. 7/28. 4 /6. 4/14. Repeated Games. Some Questions: What happens when a game is repeated?

By zelda
(124 views)

17. backward induction – ultimatums and bargaining

17. backward induction – ultimatums and bargaining

17. backward induction – ultimatums and bargaining. take it or leave it offers. Two players. Split a dollar. (s,1-s) offer to 2. if accepts get (s,1-s). Otherwise zero for both. Does backward induction permit (.99, .01), (100,0). IN splitting the dollar.

By payton
(71 views)

Defending against multiple different attackers Kjell Hausken, Vicki M. Bier

Defending against multiple different attackers Kjell Hausken, Vicki M. Bier

Defending against multiple different attackers Kjell Hausken, Vicki M. Bier . Advisor: Yeong -Sung Lin Presented by I- Ju Shih. Agenda. Introduction The model Analysis of the simultaneous game Two-period game when defender moves first Two-period game when attackers move first

By neveah
(118 views)

Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda. Game Theory – Chapter 9 “Strategery” – strategic interdependence Cartels: Cooperation and Cheating Auctions Fun and Games Sequential interactions Holland Sweetener versus Monsanto, p. 245. Basic Ideas of Game Theory.

By oksana
(94 views)

Game Theory: The Competitive Dynamics of Strategy

Game Theory: The Competitive Dynamics of Strategy

Game Theory: The Competitive Dynamics of Strategy. MANEC 387 Economics of Strategy. David J. Bryce. The Structure of Industries. Threat of new Entrants. Competitive Rivalry. Bargaining Power of Suppliers. Bargaining Power of Customers. Threat of Substitutes.

By nikkos
(122 views)

Algorithms for solving sequential (zero-sum) games Main case in these slides: chess

Algorithms for solving sequential (zero-sum) games Main case in these slides: chess

Algorithms for solving sequential (zero-sum) games Main case in these slides: chess. Slide pack by Tuomas Sandholm. Rich history of cumulative ideas. Game-theoretic perspective. Game of perfect information Finite game Finite action sets Finite length

By lael
(98 views)

Extensive Form Games With Perfect Information (Theory)

Extensive Form Games With Perfect Information (Theory)

Extensive Form Games With Perfect Information (Theory). Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information. Entry Game : An incumbent faces the possibility of entry by a challenger. The challenger may enter or not. If it enters, the incumbent may either accommodate or fight. Payoff:

By dorjan
(199 views)

Paper Schedule Reports

Paper Schedule Reports

Paper Schedule Reports. 指導老師:戴天時 老師 楊曉文 老師 學生: 謝昌宏. Outline. What’s Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit ( GMWB )? Pricing Method See Example. What’s Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit ( GMWB )?. 1.Roll-up( 複利增值 ) 2.Ratchet( 鎖高機制 ) 3. Break even( 保本 ).

By leena
(90 views)

Introduction

Introduction

Current temp = 15 o C. Adulticiding = 3. …. same tree structure as the “do nothing” branch. Current temp = 20 o C. Do Nothing = 0. Current temp = 30 o C. Larvaciding = 2. …. same tree structure as the “do nothing” branch. Current temp = 15 o C. Larvaciding = 2. Source Reduction = 1.

By penney
(80 views)

Common Knowledge of Rationality is Self-Contradictory

Common Knowledge of Rationality is Self-Contradictory

Common Knowledge of Rationality is Self-Contradictory. Herbert Gintis Santa Fe Institute Central European University Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET). Princeton University Press, 2009. Summary.

By manju
(102 views)

Dynamic Programming

Dynamic Programming

Dynamic Programming. A typical infinite horizon problem. (1). (2). (Intertemporal constraint.). (3). (Initial condition.). State. xt. Control. ut. Value function. Finite time horizon example. Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Solution Method. (1) Backward induction.

By shing
(142 views)

Economic Concepts for Strategy

Economic Concepts for Strategy

Economic Concepts for Strategy. Learning Objectives: Appreciate that much of Strategy is grounded in Economic principles Enhance your ability to apply Economic and Game Theory principles to strategy formulation. Economic Costs. Costs may be sunk or avoidable

By juro
(143 views)

Session 4: Topics

Session 4: Topics

Session 4: Topics. Strategy space, pure and mixed strategies Solution concepts Backward induction Dominance Nash equilibrium. Strategy Space. The product structure of strategies of all players S = S 1 * S 2 * S 3 * … * S k = ∏ S i S(-i) = Strategies of all player but player (i).

By ronda
(62 views)

Alternating-Offers Bargaining under One-Sided Uncertainty on Deadlines

Alternating-Offers Bargaining under One-Sided Uncertainty on Deadlines

Alternating-Offers Bargaining under One-Sided Uncertainty on Deadlines. Francesco Di Giunta and Nicola Gatti Dipartimento di Elettronica e Informazione Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy. Summary.

By pearl
(111 views)

Dynamic Games & The Extensive Form

Dynamic Games & The Extensive Form

Dynamic Games & The Extensive Form. In simultaneous move games, all players move at the same time once - no player observes the others’ moves before determining his own strategy In dynamic games - players may move sequentially or move many times

By kerryn
(177 views)

Common Knowledge of Rationality is Self-Contradictory

Common Knowledge of Rationality is Self-Contradictory

Common Knowledge of Rationality is Self-Contradictory. Herbert Gintis Santa Fe Institute Central European University Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET). Princeton University Press, 2009. Summary.

By hall-cobb
(181 views)

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