'Equilibrium strategies' diaporamas de présentation

General Opponent* Modeling for Improving Agent-Human Interaction

General Opponent* Modeling for Improving Agent-Human Interaction. Sarit Kraus Dept . of Computer Science Bar Ilan University AMEC May 2010. Motivation. Negotiation is an extremely important form of people interaction. Computers interacting with people. Computer has the control.

696 views • 62 slides

General Opponent* Modeling for Improving Agent-Human Interaction

General Opponent* Modeling for Improving Agent-Human Interaction. Sarit Kraus Dept . of Computer Science Bar Ilan University AMEC May 2010. Motivation. Negotiation is an extremely important form of people interaction. Computers interacting with people. Computer has the control.

674 views • 62 slides

General Opponent* Modeling for Improving Agent-Human Interaction

General Opponent* Modeling for Improving Agent-Human Interaction. Sarit Kraus Dept . of Computer Science Bar Ilan University AMEC May 2010. Motivation. Negotiation is an extremely important form of people interaction. Computers interacting with people. Computer has the control.

627 views • 62 slides

A Game Theoretic Investigation of Deception in Network Security

A Game Theoretic Investigation of Deception in Network Security. Thomas E. Carroll, Daniel Grosu. Advisor : Professor Frank Y.S. Lin Presented by Yu-Pu Wu. About. Authors Thomas E. Carroll, Daniel Grosu Title A Game Theoretic Investigation of Deception in Network Security Provenance

782 views • 52 slides

Bargaining and Signaling

Bargaining and Signaling. Basic Set-Up. Two parties, A and B , bargain over the division of something of value. Division of territory Distribution of economic gains Policy (e.g., taxes) We often normalize this range of possible deals to [0,1]. A settlement is x ? [0,1]. Basic Set-Up.

621 views • 48 slides

Opponent Modeling In Interesting Adversarial Environments

Opponent Modeling In Interesting Adversarial Environments. Brett Borghetti 22 Jul 2008. Opponent Modeling in Interesting Adversarial Environments. Opponent: An entity known to be attempting to maximize his own well being in an environment where that usually implies he is minimizing ours.

564 views • 48 slides

513 views • 38 slides

Internet Economics ????? ????????

265 views • 18 slides

Towards Automated Bargaining in Electronic Markets: a Partially Two-Sided Competition Model

Towards Automated Bargaining in Electronic Markets: a Partially Two-Sided Competition Model N. Gatti, A. Lazaric, M. Restelli {ngatti, lazaric, restelli}@elet.polimi.it DEI, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, Milano, 20133, Italy. Aim and Outline. Aim

296 views • 18 slides

Towards Automated Bargaining in Electronic Markets: a Partially Two-Sided Competition Model

Towards Automated Bargaining in Electronic Markets: a Partially Two-Sided Competition Model N. Gatti, A. Lazaric, M. Restelli {ngatti, lazaric, restelli}@elet.polimi.it DEI, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, Milano, 20133, Italy. Aim and Outline. Aim

309 views • 18 slides

Kin selection and Evolution of Sympathy

Kin selection and Evolution of Sympathy. Ted Bergstrom. Games between relatives. Symmetric two-player game Payoff function M(x1,x2) Degree of relatedness r. Probability that if you are a mutant, your opponent is like you.

255 views • 12 slides

Codeville

229 views • 7 slides