'Vcg mechanism' diaporamas de présentation

Automated Mechanism Design EC-08 tutorial

Automated Mechanism Design EC-08 tutorial. Vincent (Vince) Conitzer & Yevgeniy (Eugene) Vorobeychik. First half (Vince): overview. Part I: Mechanism design review Part II: Automated mechanism design: the basic approach Part III: Some variants and applications.

900 views • 71 slides

SECOND PART: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

SECOND PART: Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Mechanism Design. MD is a subfield of economic theory It has a engineering perspective Designs economic mechanisms like computer scientists design algorithms, protocols, systems Goal : to implement desired social choices in a strategic setting

343 views • 32 slides

The Shortest-Path problem in graphs with selfish-edges

The Shortest-Path problem in graphs with selfish-edges. Review. VCG- mechanism : pair M=< g,p > where g( r ) = arg max y ? X ? i v i ( r i ,y ) p i (g( r )) = - ? j ? i v j ( r j ,g ( r - i )) + ? j ? i v j ( r j ,g ( r ))

325 views • 32 slides

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: an Introduction

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: an Introduction VCG-mechanisms for some basic network optimization problems: The Minimum Spanning Tree problem Guido Proietti Dipartimento di Ingegneria e Scienze dell'Informazione e Matematica University of L'Aquila guido.proietti@univaq.it. Review.

415 views • 29 slides

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: an Introduction

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: an Introduction VCG-mechanisms for some basic network optimization problems: The Minimum Spanning Tree problem Guido Proietti Dipartimento di Ingegneria e Scienze dell'Informazione e Matematica University of L'Aquila guido.proietti@univaq.it. Review.

294 views • 29 slides

Mechanism Design and the VCG mechanism

561 views • 23 slides

Mechanisms for a Spatially Distributed Market

Mechanisms for a Spatially Distributed Market. Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan and Elan Pavlov School of Computer Science and Engineering Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'04) May 17-20, 2004, New York City. Spatially Distributed Market (SDM).

321 views • 22 slides

Combinatorial Auction

Combinatorial Auction. Social-choice function: the winner should be the guy having in mind the highest value for the painting. A single item auction. t 1 =10. r 1 =11. r i : is the amount of money player i bids (in a sealed envelope) for the painting. t 2 =12. r 2 =10. t 3 =7.

283 views • 22 slides

A BGP-based Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing

A BGP-based Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing. Rahul Sami Yale University. http://www.cs.yale.edu/~sami. Joint work with:. Joan Feigenbaum Yale Christos Papadimitriou U. C. Berkeley Scott Shenker ICSI. Lowest-Cost Routing Mechanism-design Problem.

188 views • 18 slides

Communication Networks

343 views • 15 slides

Communication Networks

209 views • 15 slides