'Voting rule' diaporamas de présentation

An Integrative Principled Approach to Network Science for Autonomic Networks John S. Baras

An Integrative Principled Approach to Network Science for Autonomic Networks John S. Baras Institute for Systems Research University of Maryland 301-405-6606 baras@isr.umd.edu Network Science Workshop August 31-September 1, 2006 Athens, Greece. Autonomous Swarms. Networks

1.2k views • 107 slides

An Integrative Principled Approach to Network Science for Autonomic Networks John S. Baras

An Integrative Principled Approach to Network Science for Autonomic Networks John S. Baras Institute for Systems Research University of Maryland 301-405-6606 baras@isr.umd.edu Network Science Workshop August 31-September 1, 2006 Athens, Greece. Autonomous Swarms. Networks

1.19k views • 107 slides

Tutorial: Computational Voting Theory

Tutorial: Computational Voting Theory. Vincent Conitzer & Ariel D. Procaccia. Outline. 1. Introduction to voting theory 2. Hard-to-compute rules 3. Using computational hardness to prevent manipulation and other undesirable behavior in elections 4. Selected topics (time permitting).

917 views • 79 slides

European Union Expansion: A Constitutional Perspective Dennis C. Mueller University of Vienna

European Union Expansion: A Constitutional Perspective Dennis C. Mueller University of Vienna.

581 views • 49 slides

Vincent Conitzer, Duke University

Mingyu Guo. Josh Letchford. Liad Wagman. Lirong Xia. Troels Sorensen. Taiki Todo. Joe Farfel. Dima Korzhyk. COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE A Journey from Basic Complexity Results to a Brave New World for Social Choice. Matt Rognlie. Melissa Dalis. Vincent Conitzer, Duke University.

657 views • 49 slides

Procedural rules of the climate negotiations

509 views • 44 slides

CPS 296.3 Social Choice & Mechanism Design

CPS 296.3 Social Choice & Mechanism Design. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Voting over outcomes. voting rule (mechanism) determines winner based on votes. >. >. >. >. Voting (rank aggregation). Set of m candidates (aka. alternatives , outcomes )

504 views • 39 slides

How Should Presidents Be Elected?

371 views • 30 slides

Dynamic Electoral Competition and Constitutional Design

Dynamic Electoral Competition and Constitutional Design. Marco Battaglini Princeton University, CEPR and NBER. Introduction Consider the comparison between proportional vs. majoritarian electoral systems . A robust finding: PS lead to higher g and lower r than MS .

423 views • 29 slides

345 views • 27 slides

391 views • 26 slides

Algorithmic Game Theory Uri Feige Robi Krauthgamer Moni Naor Lecture 9: Social Choice

Algorithmic Game Theory Uri Feige Robi Krauthgamer Moni Naor Lecture 9: Social Choice. Lecturer: Moni Naor. Announcements. January: course will be 1300:-15:00 The meetings on Jan 7th, 14th and 21st 2009. Regret Minimization Summary.

436 views • 26 slides

CPS 196.2 Voting and social choice

CPS 196.2 Voting and social choice. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. Voting over outcomes. voting rule (mechanism) determines winner based on votes. >. >. >. >. Voting (rank aggregation). Set of m candidates (aka. alternatives , outcomes )

322 views • 22 slides

An Algorithm for the Coalitional Manipulation Problem under Maximin

339 views • 22 slides

An Algorithm for the Coalitional Manipulation Problem under Maximin

262 views • 18 slides

Social choice (voting)

Social choice (voting). >. >. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. >. >. Voting/rank aggregation. Set of m candidates (aka. alternatives , outcomes ) n voters ; each voter ranks all the candidates E.g. if set of candidates {a, b, c, d}, one possible vote is b > a > d > c

288 views • 16 slides

Social choice (voting)

Social choice (voting). >. >. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. >. >. Voting/rank aggregation. Set of m candidates (aka. alternatives , outcomes ) n voters ; each voter ranks all the candidates E.g. if set of candidates {a, b, c, d}, one possible vote is b > a > d > c

273 views • 16 slides

Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules

Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules. Lirong Xia. Vincent Conitzer. Ariel D. Procaccia. Jeff S. Rosenschein. COMSOC08, Sep. 3-5, 2008. TexPoint fonts used in EMF. Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: A A A. Voting.

303 views • 15 slides

Automated Design of Voting Rules by Learning From Examples

Automated Design of Voting Rules by Learning From Examples. Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Outline. Scoring rules. Learning. Limitations. Conclusions. Scoring rules: Definition Advantages Our approach Learning voting rules in the PAC model Main theorem

219 views • 11 slides

Automated Design of Voting Rules by Learning From Examples

Automated Design of Voting Rules by Learning From Examples. Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Outline. Scoring rules. Learning. Limitations. Conclusions. Scoring rules: Definition Advantages Our approach Learning voting rules in the PAC model Main theorem

230 views • 11 slides