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Collaboration in Vehicle Routing (joint work with Margaretha Gansterer )

Collaboration in Vehicle Routing (joint work with Margaretha Gansterer )

Collaboration in Vehicle Routing (joint work with Margaretha Gansterer ). Richard F. Hartl Chair of Production and Operations Management Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 A-1090 Vienna, Austria. Outline. Collaborative Logistics - Motivation Collaborative Vehicle Routing

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430 views • 41 slides
Practical Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions

Practical Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions

Practical Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions. S. Raghavan University of Maryland (joint work with Robert Day, University of Connecticut) Full paper

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310 views • 30 slides
On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions. Ryan Kastner , Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, Majid Sarrafzadeh kastner@cs.ucla.edu Computer Science Department, UCLA WECWIS June 27, 2002. Outline. Basics Combinatorial Auctions (CA)

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409 views • 25 slides
On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions. Ryan Kastner , Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, Majid Sarrafzadeh kastner@cs.ucla.edu Computer Science Department, UCLA WECWIS June 27, 2002. Outline. Basics Combinatorial Auctions (CA)

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254 views • 25 slides
Combinatorial auctions

Combinatorial auctions

Combinatorial auctions. v(. ) = $500. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. v(. ) = $700. Complementarity and substitutability. How valuable one item is to a bidder may depend on whether the bidder possesses another item Items a and b are complementary if v({a, b}) > v({a}) + v({b})

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258 views • 16 slides
Combinatorial auctions

Combinatorial auctions

Combinatorial auctions. v(. ) = $500. Vincent Conitzer conitzer@cs.duke.edu. v(. ) = $700. Complementarity and substitutability. How valuable one item is to a bidder may depend on whether the bidder possesses another item Items a and b are complementary if v({a, b}) > v({a}) + v({b})

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185 views • 16 slides

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