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Cold War Review # 1 Origins

Explore the origins of the Cold War and the clash of competing interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. Delve into topics such as the Second Front, Katyn massacre, and the Teheran and Yalta Conferences.

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Cold War Review # 1 Origins

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  1. Cold War Review # 1Origins Daniel W. Blackmon Coral Gables Sr. High

  2. Question of the Day • "It is evident that the conflict after 1947 between the United States and the Soviet Union was not simply a clash of ideologies but a struggle of competing interests . . . .

  3. Question of the Day • the forces bringing the two countries into collision as world powers would have operated in much the same way if the Bolshevik revolution had never occurred." • How far do you agree with this claim? (1985) (HL/SL)

  4. Thesis • This is a good question in that it may easily and convincingly be argued both pro and con.

  5. Thesis • “Although some kind of clash of competing interests between the United States and the Soviet Union was inevitable, the nature and length of that conflict was determined more by ideological considerations than by any other factor.”

  6. War Time Issues • Second Front • Stalin always feared that the US and Great Britain would delay a Second Front until Germany and the USSR had destroyed each other, and then would step in and pick up the pieces

  7. Stalin’s (and Molotov’s) attitude during these delays became increasingly hostile and paranoid. • The actual difficulties of raising an army of 11,000,000, equipping it, transporting it to Europe and then crossing the English Channel in the teeth of German opposition were never really understood by Stalin.

  8. Katyn • Katyn • Stalin arrested some 14,000 Polish officers when he occupied eastern Poland in 1939 • The Germans discovered the bodies in 1943 and brought in the Red Cross to prove Soviet atrocities

  9. Katyn • The London Polish government-in-exile accused Stalin of the crime. • Stalin used this as a pretext to establish his puppet Lublin Government as the “government” of Poland on July 2, 1944.

  10. Katyn • The issue for Stalin was really Soviet control of a post war Poland. • Any government in Poland which represented the wishes of the Polish people would be adamantly anti-Soviet. Stalin could not permit this.

  11. Polish Home Army • When the Polish Home Army rose in revolt (August 1, 1944) as the Red Army approached Warsaw, Stalin halted his offensive and sat idly while the Germans systematically massacred the defenders.

  12. Teheran Conference11-12/1943 Churchill accepts the Curzon line in Poland and Soviet territorial gains 1939-41

  13. Teheran Conference • Churchill proposes in 10/44 “spheres of influence” in the southeastern Europe • Romania USSR 90% Britain 10% • Bulgaria USSR 75% Britain 25% • Hungary USSR 50% Britain 50% • Yugoslavia USSR 50% Britain 50% • Greece USSR 10% Britain 90%

  14. Yalta 2/1945 • Big Three • FDR for US • Churchill for Great Britain • Stalin for USSR

  15. Yalta 2/1945 • Agreements regarding Europe • USSR receives part of eastern Poland • Poland compensated by moving western border to the Oder

  16. Yalta 2/1945 • Agreements regarding Europe • USSR would receive largest share of the reparations from Germany • Germany to be divided into US, British, French, and Soviet zones of occupation (ZOC) • Berlin to be jointly governed by the Four Powers

  17. Yalta 2/1945 • Agreements regarding Europe • Democratic interim governments were to hold free elections in the liberated states.

  18. Yalta 2/1945 • Agreements regarding Asia • USSR would receive Sakhalin island and the Kurile Islands, plus rights in Manchuria • in other words, a return to the status quo ante 1905 (before the Russo-Japanese War)

  19. Yalta 2/1945 • Agreements regarding Asia • Stalin promised to declare war on Japan between 60 and 90 days after Germany’s surrender.

  20. Yalta 2/1945 • A “Declaration on Liberated Europe” was issued

  21. Truman Meets Molotov 4/23/45 • Truman told Molotov that the Soviets would from henceforth have to keep their agreements [specifically, on the subject of free elections in Poland], that relations could no longer be on the basis of ‘one way street.’

  22. Truman Meets Molotov 4/23/45 • Molotov replied ‘I have never been talked to like this in my life.’ Truman replied ‘Carry out your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that.’” (McCauley Origins 61)

  23. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Stalin’s shopping list • Decide on German reparations • Liquidate the London Polish government

  24. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Stalin’s shopping list • Internationalization of the Ruhr • Soviet trusteeship over Libya • Rupture diplomatic relations with Spain

  25. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Stalin’s shopping list • Replace the Montreaux Convention on the Straits with Russian control • Return to the Soviet Union of land lost to Soviet Georgia and Soviet Armenia in 1921

  26. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Agreements regarding Europe • Truman recognizes the Lublin government in Poland, bowing to Stalin’s fait accompli.

  27. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Agreements regarding Europe • Truman refused to acknowledge the governments of Bulgaria and Romania, with James MacGregor Byrnes citing violations of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. • this position was later softened and we accepted the governments in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

  28. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Agreements regarding Europe • The US accepts changes to the Polish-German border placing it on the Oder-Neisse Line (shifted westwards)

  29. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Agreements regarding Europe • Byrnes offers Stalin not only reparations from his zone of Germany, but 25% of the Western zone as well. • Truman agrees in recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence

  30. Potsdam 7-8/ 45 • Agreements regarding Asia • Korea was to be occupied by the Soviets north of the 39th parallel, and by the US south of that line.

  31. The Bomb • Truman always insisted that the US dropped the Bomb in order to save American lives which would have been lost in an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands

  32. This is the “Orthodox” view

  33. The Bomb • Gar Alperowitz argued in Atomic Diplomacy in 1965 that Truman dropped the bomb not to defeat Japan but to intimidate the Russians. • This view has obtained wide credence.

  34. The Bomb • I regard Alperovitz’ position as pure nonsense.

  35. The US estimated that the invasion of Kyushu would cost 1,000,000 US casualties • This is an extrapolation from US losses on Okinawa.

  36. Post-war inspection revealed that Kyushu’s defenses were twice as strong as predicted.

  37. The US has not manufactured a Purple Heart (the medal given for combat wounds) since 1945.

  38. Estimated US casualties does not include any estimate of casualties to Japanese civilians. • 25 % of all Okinawan civilians died in the fighting on Okinawa

  39. The Bomb • There is no evidence that the US ever actually attempted “nuclear blackmail” against the Soviets

  40. The Baruch Plan 3/1946 • The US did propose that nuclear capabilities to be turned over to the UN • UN given authority to inspect raw materials, production facilities • The USSR refused to accept such a plan

  41. Creation of the Soviet Sphere

  42. Creation of the Soviet Sphere • Stalin, 1945, “This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army has power to do so. It cannot be otherwise.” (Qtd. In Dunbabin 61)

  43. Creation of the Soviet Sphere • Restrictions of personal freedom • Trade treaties that restricted or prohibited trade with the West

  44. Fears on the Periphery • Stalin’s pressure outside of Eastern Europe is a very important element in the Cold War

  45. Stalin had a clear security interest in controlling east Europe. We needn’t like it to recognize it. In fact, neither FDR nor Truman actually did anything concrete to prevent unilateral Soviet action--a de facto sphere of influence was accepted.

  46. Pressure beyond that region could not be described as defensive in nature, only offensive, or at least, reasonably interpreted as offensive. The Truman Doctrine is provoked on the periphery.

  47. Fears on the Periphery • Turkey • Stalin demanded a revision of the 1936 Montreaux Convention, on control of the Black Sea Straits, • In August 1946 Stalin demanded a role in controlling the Straits\

  48. Fears on the Periphery • Iran • Iran was a very important entry point for Lend Lease for the USSR • In 1941, the British and the Soviets jointly occupied Iran • In 1943, the US reached an agreement that all forces would be evacuated within 6 months of the end of the war. • Late in 1945, the Soviets had not left.

  49. They created and supported a communist Tudeh Party, massed troops, and created a Kurdish and an Azerbaijani republic • Truman viewed the Soviet refusal to evacuate very seriousl

  50. Fears on the Periphery

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