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Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA

Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA

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Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA

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  1. Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA

  2. Strategic Concepts – Supportability Tradecraft

  3. Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA 01 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)

  4. What is RCM? Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) is a process to ensure that systems continue to do what their users require in their present operating context. -- Wikipedia Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) is a logical, structured process used to determine the optimal failure management strategies for any system, based on system reliability characteristics and the intended operating context. -- DOD Manual 4151.22-M; Reliability Centered Maintenance

  5. How Do Things Fail? RCM helps us understand how our product tends to fail, so we can identify the optimal maintenance approach. If things follow these patterns, it may make sense to conduct preventative maintenance… …But what if they follow one of these patterns? Does it still make sense? Nowlan, F. S., & Heap, H. F. (1978). Reliability-centered maintenance. United Air Lines Inc San Francisco Ca.

  6. RCM process (JA1011) SAE JA1011 establishes a 7 step process for conducting an RCM analysis; What are its functions and performance standards, In what ways can it fail to provide those functions, What are the events that cause the failure (failure modes), What happens when that failure occurs (failure effects), How much does it matter if those failure effects occur (criticality/consequences)? What (if anything) should we do about that to prevent it? What should be done if there is no appropriate preventative task? FMECA

  7. Sustainment Tools in the Acquisition Process C A B IOC FOC Materiel Solution Analysis TechnologyMaturation & Risk Reduction Engineering & Manufacturing Development Production & Deployment Operations & Support FRP Decision Review Concept Decision CDR LRIP/IOT&E Pre-Systems Acquisition Systems Acquisition Sustainment (every 3 - 5 years) PDR (or as required) RCM/ Functional Analysis RCM Analysis/ Update RCM Analysis/ Update RCM Analysis/ Update RCM Analysis (DOD 5000 series) The point – it is iterative throughout the lifecycle Engineer-Focused With Logistics Support Logistics-Focused With Engineer Support

  8. HIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCES SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OPERATIONAL AND NON-OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES No Yes Will the loss of function caused by this failure mode (on its own) be evident to the crew under normal operating circumstances? Will the loss of function or secondary damage caused by this failure mode kill or injure anyone or breach an environmental standard or regulation? Will the loss of function or secondary damage caused by this failure mode have a direct adverse effect on operational capability? Yes (S or E) No Yes (O) No (N) Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? 1 1 1 E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of a multiple failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Are the direct and indirect costs of this task acceptable when compared to the direct and indirect costs and impact of the failure? Do the On-Condition Task. Do the On-Condition Task. Do the On-Condition Task. No No No Yes Yes Yes Is there a scheduled restoration task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled restoration task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled restoration task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 2A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 2A-2 What is it? 2A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 2A-4 Does the task restore the condition of the component to a level that is acceptable? 2A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 2A-2 What is it? 2A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 2A-4 Does the task restore the condition of the component to a level that is acceptable? 2A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 2A-2 What is it? 2A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 2A-4 Does the task restore the condition of the component to a level that is acceptable? 2 2 2 E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of a multiple failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Are the direct and indirect costs of this task acceptable when compared to the direct and indirect costs and impact of the failure? Do the Scheduled Restoration Task. Do the Scheduled Restoration Task. Do the Scheduled Restoration Task. No No No Yes Yes Yes Is there a scheduled discard task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled discard task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled discard task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 3A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 3A-2 What is it? 3A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 3A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 3A-2 What is it? 3A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 3A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 3A-2 What is it? 3A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 3 3 3 E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Are the direct and indirect costs of this task acceptable when compared to the direct and indirect costs and impact of the failure? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of a multiple failure to a tolerable level? Do the Scheduled Discard Task. Do the Scheduled Discard Task. No No Do the Scheduled Discard Task. Yes Yes No Yes Is a scheduled failure finding task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? No scheduled maintenance. Is there a combination of the above tasks that are technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 4 4 4A-1 Does the task confirm that the component is still working? 4A-2 Is it practical to do the task at the required interval? 4A-3 Is it certain that the task will not leave the hidden function in a failed state? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? Redesign may be desirable. Do the combination of tasks. Redesign is compulsory E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of multiple failures to a tolerable level? No Yes Do the Scheduled Failure-Finding Task No Redesign is compulsory Yes RCM Decision Diagram No scheduled maintenance. Redesign may be desirable. Could a multiple failure affect safety or the environment? Rev 2 5/8/2013 5 No Yes

  9. HIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCES SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OPERATIONAL AND NON-OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES Will the loss of function caused by this failure mode (on its own) be evident to the crew under normal operating circumstances? Will the loss of function or secondary damage caused by this failure mode kill or injure anyone or breach an environmental standard or regulation? Will the loss of function or secondary damage caused by this failure mode have a direct adverse effect on operational capability? No No (N) Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? 1 1 1 E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of a multiple failure to a tolerable level? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? Do the On-Condition Task. Yes Do the On-Condition Task. Yes E-1 Are the direct and indirect costs of this task acceptable when compared to the direct and indirect costs and impact of the failure? Do the On-Condition Task.

  10. HIDDEN FAILURE CONSEQUENCES SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OPERATIONAL AND NON-OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES No Yes Will the loss of function caused by this failure mode (on its own) be evident to the crew under normal operating circumstances? Will the loss of function or secondary damage caused by this failure mode kill or injure anyone or breach an environmental standard or regulation? Will the loss of function or secondary damage caused by this failure mode have a direct adverse effect on operational capability? Yes (S or E) No Yes (O) No (N) Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is an on-condition task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? 1A-1 Is there a warning that failure is occurring (Potential failure)? 1A-2 What is the P-F interval? 1A-3 Is it relatively consistent? 1A-4 Can the intended task be done at intervals less than the P-F interval? 1 1 1 E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of a multiple failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Are the direct and indirect costs of this task acceptable when compared to the direct and indirect costs and impact of the failure? Do the On-Condition Task. Do the On-Condition Task. Do the On-Condition Task. No No No Yes Yes Yes Is there a scheduled restoration task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled restoration task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled restoration task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 2A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 2A-2 What is it? 2A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 2A-4 Does the task restore the condition of the component to a level that is acceptable? 2A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 2A-2 What is it? 2A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 2A-4 Does the task restore the condition of the component to a level that is acceptable? 2A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 2A-2 What is it? 2A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 2A-4 Does the task restore the condition of the component to a level that is acceptable? 2 2 2 E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of a multiple failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Are the direct and indirect costs of this task acceptable when compared to the direct and indirect costs and impact of the failure? Do the Scheduled Restoration Task. Do the Scheduled Restoration Task. Do the Scheduled Restoration Task. No No No Yes Yes Yes Is there a scheduled discard task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled discard task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? Is there a scheduled discard task that is technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 3A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 3A-2 What is it? 3A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 3A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 3A-2 What is it? 3A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 3A-1 Is there an age at which there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure? 3A-2 What is it? 3A-3 Is the probability of this failure mode occurring before this age acceptable? 3 3 3 E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? E-1 Are the direct and indirect costs of this task acceptable when compared to the direct and indirect costs and impact of the failure? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of a multiple failure to a tolerable level? Do the Scheduled Discard Task. Do the Scheduled Discard Task. No No Do the Scheduled Discard Task. Yes Yes No Yes Is a scheduled failure finding task technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? No scheduled maintenance. Is there a combination of the above tasks that are technically feasible (applicable) and worth doing (effective)? 4 4 4A-1 Does the task confirm that the component is still working? 4A-2 Is it practical to do the task at the required interval? 4A-3 Is it certain that the task will not leave the hidden function in a failed state? E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of failure to a tolerable level? Redesign may be desirable. Do the combination of tasks. Redesign is compulsory E-1 Does the task reduce the risk of multiple failures to a tolerable level? No Yes Do the Scheduled Failure-Finding Task No Redesign is compulsory Yes RCM Decision Diagram No scheduled maintenance. Redesign may be desirable. Could a multiple failure affect safety or the environment? Rev 2 5/8/2013 5 No Yes

  11. RCM / Modeling & Simulation Integration • - AAV Analysis completed in September 2013 • - Objectives: • Evaluate the current impact of the RCM recommendations • Evaluate reliability changes due to RCM implementation • Construct and evaluate a high-resolution simulation to assess the • long-term impact of RCM PMCS modifications. • Recommend possible modifications to RCM PMCS recommendations • - Metrics • Performance of each alternative is evaluated with five primary metrics • - Cost • - Corrective Maintenance • - Operational Availability (AO) • - Mean Down Time (MDT) • - Materiel Availability (AM) SOE DST RCM M&S

  12. RCM Five Year Comparison Pre-RCM • 11 checklists • 64:03:12 hours total if each checklist performed once • Many redundant tasks • Limited compliance • “Rainbow” Sheets: daily check of 68 pages of tasks broken into groups, performed over 4-week period Post-RCM 15 checklists 19:37:53 hours total if each checklist performed once Greatly reduced redundancy Greater compliance Eliminate unnecessary tasks Deadline criteria clearly defined

  13. 26 8 3 18 Yes 21 Analysis Approved 23 16 19 17 20 15 10 25 27 25 Assignment to Logistics (PMCS, Tech manual, Training, process), Engineer (Design) IPT 4 13 2 11 12 14 22 5 1 7 9 24 Record Disapproval Rationale Orientation / Group Training Submission of OpFor Support Requirements Phase 2: Decision Phase Phase 1: Information Phase Provide Feedback to R2A Technical Audit Implement Recommendations Analysis Complete Publish Updated Analysis 6 RCM Review Group Requirements / Responsibilities Requirement Identified Detailed Documentation Analysis Assessment of Requirement Confirmation brief Failure Mode Estimate Development of Operating Context Delivery of Technical Documentation Review Group Read Ahead Management Audit Technical Documentation Review Recommendations Approved No Establish Objectives & Boundary Provide Exemption Documentation A I- Analysis Determination II- Analysis Requirements LEGEND Technically Correct Requirement Validated Consensus on Decisions A B Program Office Lead 120-180 Days prior to IV III- Analysis Planning ALPS & Program Office Yes B D ALPS Lead No RCM FMECA C C OpFor Support IV- RCM Analysis Yes Marine Corps Systems Command Organic RCM Process D E No C V- Audit Phase SUSTAIN - Emergent Issues - Age Exploration - Hardware Changes - Trend/degrader analysis - Document Reviews Etc… Yes E A Living Program No 180-240 Days VI- Implementation Phase V.6.2 05/15/15

  14. 16 3 5 11 15 14 Marine Corps Systems Command External RCM Support Process 10 Assignment to Logistics (PMCS, Tech manual, Training, process), Engineer (Design) IPT 2 1 9 4 Provide Contract / MOA Language 13 Record Disapproval Rationale Technical Audit Implement Recommendations External Analysis Recommended / Approved Assessment of Requirement Receipt of Deliverables Requirement Identified Recommendations Approved 6 7 8 Yes Assistance with Selection of RCM Provider Analysis Contracted External Analysis A Requirement Validated Technically Correct No Provide Exemption Documentation C I- Analysis Determination II- External Support Coordination 12 LEGEND Yes Recommend Acceptance of Deliverables A B Program Office Lead No Recommend Revision of Deliverables C ALPS & Program Office III- Audit Phase ALPS Lead SUSTAIN - Emergent Issues - Age Exploration - Hardware Changes - Trend/degrader analysis - Document Reviews Etc… Yes B A Living Program No IV- Implementation Phase V.6.2 05/15/15

  15. Product Support Planning Impact on Readiness (must watch in presentation mode due to animations) Uptime (MTBF) Uptime (MTBF) MLDT MLDT MLDT MLDT MLDT MLDT (not to scale) Downtime (MTTR) Corrective Maint Downtime (MTTR) Corrective Maint Down PMCS (MPM) Down PMCS (MPM) 1) This is Inherent Availability (Ai) – the reliability and maintainability inherent to the design (focused solely on Corrective Maintenance upon failure). This assumes you have the right part, the right person, with the right skills and special tools immediately available to correct the problem at the time and place of failure (unlimited spares, no delays). This is typically the only availability measured during system development (pre- MS C) since the training and supportability package are not yet in place. This will be the highest availability measure (e.g 90%) 2) But, based on supportability analysis (RCM), we have an optimized PMCS approach to prevent failures that have unacceptable consequences. Therefore we have some planned and scheduled maintenance at various intervals (time, miles, etc.) This is Achieved Availability (Aa). By having a larger denominator, this will be lower (e.g. 80%). Can’t be accurately measured until AFTER maintenance planning has occurred. 3) However, there are other delays related to maintenance (supply support, training of maintainers, accuracy of manuals, availability of maintainers, presence (and need) of special tools or diagnostic equipment, delays related to trouble reporting, etc (the 12 IPSEs)). This additional Administrative and Logistics Delay combine to produce Operational Availability (Ao), lower than Aa (e.g.60%). This represents the mandatory KPP and what the OpFors experience. Can’t be accurately measured until the entire product support package is in place, typically AFTER fielding (OT&E to a limited extent). MLDT and MPM is the result of how well we plan these during acquisition and manage them throughout O&S This is what Acquisition Logisticians do. LOGISTICIANS MANAGE (REDUCE) DOWN TIME TO INCREASE READINESS (Availability). We optimize this through iterative Supportability Analyses (FMECA, FTA, RCM, LORA, MTA, SORA). In design, this helps support sustainment planning. Post fielding, this uses actual data to refine execution (increased readiness, reduced cost). Ai = MTBF/MTBF + MTTR (MTTR = Fault detection + CM + verify) Aa = MTBM/MTBM + MTTR + MPM (MPM = Avg of maint cycle time for PM) Ao= MTBM/MTBM+MDT (MDT = MLDT + MTTR + MPM) (MLDT = Supply + … (essentially the 12 IPSEs) Proof: AAV RCM Analysis reduced PMCS (MPM) by 70%, thereby reducing MDT by 32%, thereby increasing Availability (Aa) by 6.4%

  16. Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA 02 Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+)

  17. 02 Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) Maintenance based on the evidence of need Mechanical Brakes Water Pumps Materials Engine Oil Lubricants Tires Analytics Wear out Curve Accelerated Testing Criteria Cost / Safety Reliability

  18. Bath Tub Curve CBM+ architectures are used to determine the system’s failure rate as the system transitions through the life cycle.

  19. CBM+ IMPLEMENTATION

  20. The DoD Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) Guidebook indicates that CBM+ includes, but is not limited to, the following examples: CBM+ Infrastructure

  21. CBM+ AND performance based logistics • Performance-driven outcomes means the performance of all provider activities is measured against clearly defined outcomes at the weapon system level. Within that context, PBL is an approach for weapon system and equipment support that employs the acquisition of support from “best value” sources as an integrated, affordable performance package designed to optimize system readiness. • As CBM+ helps focus the maintenance process on maximizing weapons and equipment readiness with optimum resource allocation, it fully complements the PBL concept. • CBM+ becomes an essential factor in attaining the performance-based objectives in the area of maintenance. DoD policy prescribes PBL as the preferred product support strategy.[30] CBM+ tools, technologies, and processes achieve desired outcomes through continuous improvement of weapon system performance and availability, along with a reduction in ownership costs.

  22. CBM+ AND systems engineering • PMs, systems engineers and life-cycle logisticians should consider the effect system development decisions, to include CBM+ will have on the long-term operational effectiveness, suitability and affordability of the system. • The life-cycle logistician must ensure CBM+ implementation is addressed in the early in system’s design and also ensure the maintenance support concept and plans will be flexible and responsive enough to support the design and resultant or evolving system. • Affordable support is dependent upon whether reliability and maintainability and the necessary tools and information, such as prognostics and diagnostics, are built in during system design and procurement. It is essential that CBM+ managers actively participate in the system engineering IPTs to ensure maintenance approaches are balanced with program schedule, technical performance, and cost objectives.

  23. CBM+ AND Reliability centered Maintenance • RCM is an analytical process that assists maintenance managers in determining appropriate methods of maintenance when considering costs, accuracy, and availability of required data, and the specific failure mechanism being analyzed. Opting for condition based maintenance strategies is one possible outcome of an RCM analysis. • The synergy between RCM and CBM+ relates to the use of applicable CBM+ technologies and methods to support management decisions for selecting and executing maintenance tasks. By linking RCM and CBM+ as complementary management tools, maintainers can significantly strengthen the rationale for choosing the most technically appropriate and effective maintenance task for a component or end item. In particular, the availability of timely and accurate condition assessment data made available through CBM+ capabilities will inevitably improve the RCM analytical determination of failure management strategies

  24. Cbm+ acquipedia article https://www.dau.mil/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!503 CBM+ Guidebook https://www.dau.mil/guidebooks/Shared%20Documents%20HTML/Condition%20Based%20Maintenance%20Plus%20(CBM+)%20Guidebook.aspx#toc155

  25. Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA • 03 Maintenance Task Analysis

  26. Maintenance task analysis mta– purpose & output

  27. The role of the mta in the supportability analysis process

  28. Maintenance task analysis (MTA) process steps

  29. Maintenance task analysis mta– purpose & output

  30. Maintenance task data and GEIA-STD-0007 LPD

  31. Maintenance resources and policy

  32. Maintenance concept alignment

  33. Logistics product data

  34. populating logistics product database

  35. Supporting analyses / maintenance concept guidelines

  36. Sources of Maintenance task information

  37. Determining the Maintenance level

  38. Maintenance task and skill specialty codes This information is used to develop the technical manuals, as well as system-specific training.

  39. Evaluating the maintainability of the design Maintainability’s attributes of Accessibility, Modularity and Testability combine to decrease maintenance time by enabling the rapid fault detection, isolation, removal, repair and check-out of all preventive and corrective events..

  40. Maintenance task evaluations Are Tasks balanced from the perspective of their complexity and the assigned level of repair? Are design changes appropriate? Have those tasks been validated against the maintenance concept and the maintenance planning to date? How does the Maintenance Summary Report aid in establishing maintenance planning?

  41. Maintenance task analysis summary

  42. Lesson 8 RCM CBM MTA LORA 04 Level of Repair Analysis (LORA)

  43. Level of repair analysis LORA – purpose & output The LORA’s output is recommended Source, Maintenance, and Recovery (SM&R) codes representing the most economical outcome for the maintenance level at which components are restored to an operational status.

  44. The role of LORA in supportability analysis • System Definition describes the support environment by setting boundaries such as: • The number of maintenance levels/responsibilities at each level • The number of shops at each maintenance level • Diagnostic capabilities/equipment at each shop (org/intermediate/depot) • Extent of contractor repair System Definition

  45. Types of Level of repair analysis

  46. Level of repair analysis LORA Inputs / SOURCES

  47. ECONOMIC LORA PROCESSES The LORA’s output is recommended Source, Maintenance, and Recovery (SM&R) codes representing the most economical outcome for the maintenance level at which components are restored to an operational status.

  48. ECONOMIC LORA PROCESS

  49. LORA outcomes include • Recommendations for the most economic maintenance level in terms of adjusted SM&R codes, task codes, and assigned manpower • Refinements to the Logistics Product Data (LPD) • Refinements to subsequent MTAs • Updated Supportability Planning, that influences: • The Product Support Analysis (PSA) • Evaluates the performance of the Supportability Analysis to ensure all the appropriate analyses were conducted, including the LORA • The Product Support Package (PSP) • Documents the analyses and recommendations that drive optimal repair alternatives, which are then designated and approved as the Product Support Strategy and incorporated into the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP)