Mozambique Floods and Cyclone Real Time Evaluation

1. Mozambique Floods and Cyclone Real Time Evaluation Cosgrave J, Gonçalves, G, Martyris D, Polastro R, and M Sikumba-Dils

2. The Context: Mozambique • On of the poorest counties in the world (ranked only 168th out of 177 in the Human Development Index.) • Attracts a lot of donor support (20% of GDP) • Disproportionate government spending – five times higher per capita for the capital than for rural areas in the centre of the country • HIV/Aids a growing problem • Prone to flooding and to Indian Ocean cyclones

3. The context: Previous natural disasters • In 2000 Cyclone Eline caused 700 deaths and extensive flooding in the southern half of Mozambique and Baby Rosita was born in a tree. • This was followed by flooding in the Zambezi valley in 2001, the worst since 1978. Floods in the lower Zambezi cause displacement every 5 to 10 years.

4. The context: The floods and cyclone • The lower Zambezi flooded early this year, with flood levels peaking on the 12th of the month. 285,000 were affected and about half of these were displaced. • Cyclone Favio gained made landfall at Vilanculos on February 22nd. Winds of over 200km/hr ripped off roofs, destroyed infrastructure, and the accompanying rain destroyed house contents and caused flooding.

5. The context: Clusters • The country team decided to form a HCT, form clusters and make a CERF application on Feb 8th. Installing the cluster approach was complicated as it was done in the middle of the emergency response. • There had been only limited discussion on the cluster approach prior to its implementation. • There was a great deal of confusion about the cluster approach especially, but not exclusively among NGOs.

6. The clusters: objectives ranked by fulfilment • Coordination with national/local authorities etc • Improve field level coordination and prioritisation • Well identified and predictable leadership • Strengthen the accountability of cluster leads

7. The cluster: national coordination • The national disaster management institute (INGC) performed very well both in preparedness and in the coordination of the response. • Pre-flood work by INGC helped reduce the scale of the emergency. • The INGC’s coordination added value to the cluster coordination and vice versa.

8. The cluster: field level coordination • Only two clusters effectively had a field-level coordination structure. Some cluster lead had no representation at the field level. • The IASC should consider changing cluster ToRs so that field presence is a requirement for all cluster leads, or alternatively of introducing an ‘omnibus’ cluster for coordination of several smaller sectors together.

9. The clusters: strong leadership • Some cluster leads offered strong inclusive leadership of their clusters. Others did not. • Cluster leadership is quite demanding on agencies, no only in terms of the demands on funding, but also on resources, and the willingness to priorities short-term humanitarian goals over longer term ones. • The two strongest clusters were seen as being: • The WASH cluster under a Unicef lead • The Logistics cluster under a WFP lead • Between them WFP and Unicef led or co-led 7 clusters

10. Factors contributing to strong leadership • WFP was cash-strapped but was still able to play an effective role due to its large investment in preparedness – this was seen by WFP’s large surge capacity. • Unicef was able to base its cluster leadership not only on surge capacity but also on its very extensive programme base in Mozambique. • Both agencies had invested in their own disaster preparedness and had supported the development of local DRR capacity.

11. The clusters: weak leadership • Clusters leads were perceived as weaker where: • The cluster leads had no presence in the field. • The lead role was delegated to staff without significant budget authority • Cluster leads were unwilling to discuss difficult issues. • Cluster leads had no funds to begin operations, much less become the provider of last resort • The IASC needs to establish a set of minimum criteria for agencies to act as cluster leads. These should including funding, and the willingness to commit resources to the cluster lead role.

12. The clusters: accountability • The clusters were not seen as increasing accountability as there seems to be no mechanism for taking effective sanctions against either: • cluster leads that don’t live up to their responsibilities • cluster members that do not honour commitments they have made

13. The clusters: Lead responsibilities ranked • Establishment and maintenance of coordination • Inclusion of key humanitarian partners • Coordination with national/local authorities etc • Provision of assistance or services as a last resort • Planning and strategy development • Advocacy and resource mobilization • Monitoring and reporting • Training and capacity building • Needs assessment and analysis • Application of standards • Emergency preparedness • Participatory and community-based approaches • Attention to priority cross-cutting issues

14. The clusters: inter-cluster coordination • Clusters were somewhat isolated at national level. Coordination was better between clusters at field level • Common working space in Caia encouraged inter-cluster coordination of those present. • OCHA should consider mounting or reinforcing cluster secretariats at national level during emergency responses.

15. The clusters: leadership • The Resident Coordinator played a key role in the response. • He served as a liaison with government and helped to resolved disputes within clusters. • OCHA should develop a more formal dispute resolution mechanism for intra-cluster disputes.

16. The clusters: OCHA’s surge capacity • OCHA responded very quickly with someone on the ground on Saturday after a request on Thursday. • However OCHA had three team leaders here in two months. Some OCHA staff lacked Portuguese language skills, limiting their ability to coordinate. • OCHA should broaden its roster to include people who can stay in place for at least six weeks who have appropriate language skills.

17. The clusters: OCHA’s role • The cluster structure takes over some of OCHA’s role. However there are still three key tasks where OCHA has a coordination role. • Common information services • Inter-cluster coordination. • Leading ‘omnibus’ clusters that cover a range of sectors.

18. The clusters: Partnership • NGOs welcomed the advent of the cluster structure but complained that: • Early press releases from OCHA and the cluster leads ignored or minimised their role. • Some cluster leads behaved as if NGOs were implementing partners rather than full partners. • Cluster leads were unwilling to take on difficult issues, but left the NGOs on their own. • NGO participation in clusters is conditional on full partnership, and their participation is essential for the success of the cluster approach.

19. The clusters: co-leads • The presence of co-lead raised questions about ultimate responsibility. • NGO co-leads made some clusters more accessible to other NGOs, and similarly for UN co-leads in NGO led clusters. • The IASC should consider introducing a requirement for all clusters to have a deputy lead, to improve access by agencies from their sector.

20. The clusters: Inclusion • National NGOs and civil society got left out. For many of these participation is dependant on funding. • The one exception was the Mozambique Red Cross which play a key role in the response. The Red Cross demonstrate how effective local organisations can be when they have resources. • The IASC should consider establishing, in each CERF funded response the possibility of having an umbrella fund for NGO response to be managed by the HCT.

21. The clusters: information management • Information management worked well – information sharing was one of the biggest gains from the cluster approach. • The logistics cluster web site was a good initiative. • OCHA should establish a web framework that can be used for cluster coordination in future emergencies.

22. Clusters: involvement of the population • Beneficiary participation quite low – although local government structures were involved. • Aid was supply driven to some extent – communities are still receiving goods that are not needed while critical needs are not being addressed. • Donated aid was not managed by the community. • Community did play a large role in managing the assistance that they provided themselves, such as temporary sites.

23. The clusters: quality of needs assessments • Assessment of needs was questionable – it was often based on interviews with community leaders. • Assessments were rudimentary, but the needs of the population are fairly obvious. • However many needs here flowed from poverty rather than from disaster.

24. The clusters: monitoring and quality control • Monitoring was a quite a basic level – dealt with coverage and inputs rather than with quality. • Agencies focused on delivery (often as provider of first and not last resort) rather than on monitoring. • There are no agreed standards for clusters. • The IASC needs to agree benchmarks for each cluster. • The IASC should consider formalising responsibility for quality control, with an appropriate budget, within each cluster rather than allocating it to the lead as a default.

25. The clusters: cross-cutting themes • Cross cutting themes were poorly served at the beginning. • This is particularly the case for HIV/Aids, which is more prevalent in the central region than in the northern or southern region. • Clusters encourage a focus on the cluster topic. • Cross cutting issues may be better served by integration than by a separate cluster • The IASC should consider having a thematic structure for cross cutting issues across clusters

26. The clusters: costs and benefits • The cluster approach has an overhead cost that is not present when agencies plug into existing government coordination structures, or where coordination is multi-sectoral. • The floods in Mozambique are at the bottom end of the scale of disasters at which using a cluster approach is justified in a country with a functioning government. • Even is small emergencies, use of the cluster approach may be justified in terms of preparing humanitarian actors to response to large-scale emergencies.

27. The clusters in summary • While clusters have had some initial “teething” problems, many of these were global cluster issues rather than Mozambique specific ones. • The use of the cluster approach was a success in Mozambique. It: • improved the coordination of the international response • encouraged a cooperative ethos between agencies • added to the government’s response by “clustering” the operational assistance offered by international agencies • This success was due to the hard work of all of those associated with the cluster initiative in Mozambique.

28. Financing: Without a CERF • The government never declared an emergency, nor appealed for funds, but merely stated its needs • This lack of an appeal was a problem for some agencies and donors. • The IFRC appeal was the largest other appeal – this has been poorly supported (appeal for $6.0mn on 16 Feb – upped to $16.9mn on 14 Mar – 12% funded by mid April.

29. Financing: The CERF permitted the response • With out the CERF, UN agencies would have had great difficulty in responding, and the response would have been smaller. • The CERF facilitated a faster response.

30. Financing: the CERF • The CERF first draft was prepared relatively rapidly • It took five days to go from draft to final • Some organisations were not clear about the CERF • The CERF secretariat turned around the appeal very quickly. • NGO’s indirect access to CERF funds was problematic • The IASC should develop clearer guidelines for NGO access to CERF funds.

31. Financing: the CERF supported by self-financing • Agencies drew on their own emergency financing mechanisms (reprogramming, emergency response funds, contingency funds) prior to the CERF). • WFP made clever use of unspent logistics funds to start air ops. • Unicef made good use of emergency funds • Agencies without reserves found it difficult to lead clusters while waiting for CERF

32. Financing: the flash appeal • The Flash Appeal was issued more than a month after the decision to make a CERF request. This was too slow. • The Flash Appeal has not been a success as a resource mobilisation tool. Of the $21.5mn funded or pledged by April 22nd, at most $1.5mn can be directly related to the flash appeal. • OCHA should consider introducing recovery appeals as an alternative to flash appeals.

33. Financing: CERF quality control • The speed required for CERF funding means that projects cannot be thoroughly vetted before funding is granted. The CERF needs a mechanism for ensuring that these high quality unearmarked funds are used in the best way possible. • The IASC should introduce the requirement for automatic independent external published accountability evaluation of each use of CERF funds to encourage their careful use.

34. Conclusion • The response to the 2007 floods in Mozambique was more coordinated than previous similar emergency responses. • Humanitarian reforms including both the cluster approach and the CERF contributed to the quality of the response. • However further work is needed at global level to improve both of these. • The strong performance of the INGC was also a critical factor. • The HCT did a good job.