Siting of Hazardous Industries – Role of Risk Analysis

1. Capacity Building Programme on “New Techniques and Strategies in Prevention and Management of Industrial Disasters” to the Karnataka Factory Inspectorate23-24 Oct 2010 Siting of Hazardous Industries – Role of Risk Analysis ORGANIZERS Karnataka State Safety Institute® Department of Factories, Boilers, Industrial Safety & Health, Bengaluru SPONSORS Dr. A. Koshy23 Oct 2010, Bengaluru, Karnataka

2. Concerns and issues in Siting/ Layout • Strategic Principles in the determination of safe location and layout for a new or a expansion project • Key information to be considered before selecting a site location • How are siting issues managed when limited space is available? • How are security concerns in a new site addressed ?

3. An Ideal Situation • A site location and layout that will minimize risk to the surrounding and community/ personnel and property while maximizing the ease of safe operation and maintenance. • Appropriate siting and layout establishes a foundation for a safe and secure operation.

4. Hazard Management in Life Cycle of an Engineering Project Site Lay-out of installation

5. Hazard Techniques for Site evaluation Techniques of Fire Explosion Index and Toxicity Index • Dow’s Index • Mond’s Index • Codes ( OISD) Allowing objective spacing distances to be taken into account at all stages

6. Major Accident Hazard Group “Major accident” means an incident involving loss of life inside or outside the site or 10 or more injuries inside and / or one or more injuries outside or release of toxic chemical or explosion or fire or spillage of hazardous chemicals resulting in ‘on-site’ or ‘off-site’ emergencies or damage to equipment leading to stoppage of process or adverse effects to the environment. • THE MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD CONTROL RULES, 1997

7. Features of Well Laid out Site • The potential for toxic impacts, fire escalation, and explosion damage will be low. • The risk to personnel and the surrounding community will be reduced. • Maintenance will be easier and safer to perform. However, these benefits do not come without associated costs. • Separation distances translate to real estate that costs money.

8. Some key industrial accidents • Flixborough (6/74) 28 fatalities - $167MM • Seveso (7/76) Contaminated countryside • Mex. City (11/84) 550+ fatalities - $26MM • Bhopal (12/84) 3M+ fatalities - 200M affected • Chernob. Nuc. Plt. (4/86) 31 fatalities - 300 mi2 evacuated • Piper Alpha Plat. (7/88) 165 fatalities • Pasadena, Tx. (11/89) 23 fatalities - $797MM • Channelview, Tx. (7/90) 17 fatalities - $14MM • Pemex, Mexico (7/96) Multiple fatalities - $253MM, $8MMM loss to economy • Petrobras, Brasil (6/2001) 10 fatalities - $300MM • Toulouse, France (9/01) 29 fatalities, 20,000 homes damaged * Large property damage losses (17th edition); M&M Protection Consultants; 1166 Avenue of the Americas, NY, NY 10036

9. Explosion at Chemical facility Flixborough, England, 1974

10. Explosion at Chemical facility Flixborough, England, 1974 A largequantity of cyclohexane vapor wasreleasedwhen a 20” “makeshift” bypass pipe ruptured The cyclohexane formed a flammable mixture and subsequently found a source of ignition. Theresultingmassive vapor cloudexplosionkilled 28 workers, injured 36. (Minimized as the office block wasunoccupied)

11. Damages ( Onsite and Offsite) • 18 fatalities occurred in the control room as a result of the windows shattering and the collapse of the roof. • No one escaped from the control room. • Fires burned for several days and after ten days those that still raged were hampering the rescue work. • Offsite consequences -- 53 reported injuries. • Property in the surrounding area was damaged to a varying degree.

12. Contributing Factors • Notfollowingcodes & operatingprocedureswhileintroducingmodifications • designcodes, management of changeprocedures, maintenanceproceduresduringrecommissioning • Plantlayout - position of occupiedbuildings • Control Roomnotdesignedforwithstandingmajorhazards • Emergency plan notupdatedfollowingmodifications • UK COMAH regulationwasintroduced

14. Explosion at Refinery, Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989

15. Explosion at Refinery, Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989 Duringmaintenanceworkon a reactor settlingleg, a largerelease of flammable vapor occurred at the Phillips 66 chemicalcomplex. Theresult -- a massive vapor cloudexplosion, followedby a series of furtherexplosions and fires. 23 fatalities and 300 people injured. Extensive damage to the plant facilities Metal & Debris as far as 4 Km

16. Contributing Factors • Site and industry standards for maintenance not followed • Training and competence • Work permit system - contractors • Positioning of occupied buildings

17. Risk Factors in Site Selection • Risk to Population density around the site • ( from choice hazardous material, equipment , activites) • Risk from Natural disaster occurrence (earthquake, flood, etc.) • Risk of non-availability of power, steam and water

19. Plant Siting Safety Considerations • Buffer zone • Location of other hazardous installations in vicinity • Inventory of toxic and hazardous materials • Adequacy of firefighting water supply • Access to Emergency equipment • Availability of emergency response support from adjacent industries and the community • Weather extremes and prevailing winds • Location of highways, waterways, railroad and airplane corridors • Environmental and waste disposal restrictions during emergencies • Draining and grade slope • Maintenance and inspection

20. Layers of Safety in Industrial Project

21. Critical Radiation Levels

22. Damage Criteria for Explosion

23. Damage Contours from Pool fire at manifold

24. Radiation Level Ellipse @ 4 kW/m2 Effect Zone @ 4 kW/m2 Ellipse @ 12.5 kW/m2 Effect Zone @ 12.5 kW/m2 Damage Contours from Jetfire at tank farm

25. Damage Contours from VCE

26. Toxic Dispersion & Effects • Vapor clouds may give rise to large fires, explosions or toxic effects. • Other things being equal, toxic gas clouds are likely to be dangerous at much greater distances from the point of release than their flammable counterparts. • Dispersion is the process through which gases can travel long distances. • Two types of dispersion occur in industrial situations.

27. Types of Dispersion A distinction between different types of dispersion is made for the use of suitable models. It is based on the type of material Dispersions Dense Neutral

28. Consequences from Toxic Gas Dispersion • A large toxic release may give rise to the following effects on human beings: • lethal injury • non-lethal injury • Irritation • Toxic gas releases may cause domino effects by rendering adjacent plants inoperable and injuring operators. • Prevention/mitigation by provision of automatic control systems using inherently safer principles and a suitable control room

29. Large Toxic Release • The main mode of exposure is inhalation • The effects of a toxic release are estimated knowing the relationship between the concentration-time profile and the degree of injury • The product C of concentration and the time of exposure t, is called dosage and is directly calculated from the dispersion equation

30. Exposure Limits • Three agencies provide information regarding exposure limits, specifying safe levels of air borne contaminants • OSHA • The National Institute of Occupational Safety (NIOSH) and • The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) • These 3 agencies have established guidelines and specific exposure levels of various contaminants

31. Protection from Domino/ Cascade Effects • Arranging separation distances such that damage to adjacent plants will not occur even in the worst case; • Provision of barriers e.g. blast walls, location in strong buildings; • Protecting plant against damage; e.g. provision of thicker walls on vessels; • Directing explosion relief vents away from vulnerable areas; e.g. other plants or buildings, roadways near site boundaries. However, these measures may not provide practical solutions against missiles, and risk analysis may be required to prove adequate safety.

32. LPG TerminalMexico City, Mexico 1984 A majorfire and a series of catastrophicexplosionsoccurred at the PEMEX LPG Terminal. Aftertheintialrelease, thefirst BLEVE occurred. Forthenext 90 minutes, a series of BLEVEsfollowed as other LPG vesselsviolentlyexploded. Approximetly 500 peoplewerekilled and thefacilitywasdestroyed.

33. Contributing Factors • Plant layout - the positioning of vessels • Emergency isolation • Survivability of critical systems • Emergency plan and site access

34. Guidance values for safe separation distances For prevention of Domino Effects • Thermal radiation from fire (Jet/ Flash/ Pool/ Fireball) • 12.5 kW/m2 1% Fatality level • 4.5 kW/m2 Safe for firefighters • Overpressure from Explosion (UVCE/ VCE/ BLEVE) • 0.1 bar 1% Fatality level

35. Site Factors to be considered where Risks of release of flammable/ toxic materials exists • Plants/Flammable storages should be sited in the open air • Locating all high-volume storage of flammable / toxic material well outside process areas; • Hazardous area classification (HAC) to designate areas for elimination of ignition sources . • Locating hazardous plant away from main roadways through the site; • Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves where high inventories of hazardous materials may be released into vulnerable areas; • Provision of ditches, dykes, embankments, sloping terrain to contain and control releases & limit safety & environmental effects;

36. Incident at POL Depot, Jaipur, 29th Oct 2009, 6:10 pm • Liquid Motor Spirit had gushed out, when the tank was being lined up (made ready for pumping to BPCL) because MOV connecting to the tank was also open when the Hammer Blind was in the changeover position • Product leaked for 75 minutes- 1000 tons of MS= 20 tons TNT before explosion took • After explosion, fire occurred in 9 of the 11 tanks and the fire continued till the fuel contents were totally burnt. • 60000KL product burned out in 11 day • 11 fatalities, many injured and 280 cr loss

37. LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT • Open condition of dyke valve in tank dyke • drainage system is connected to storm water drain also which is open to atmosphere, Hydrocarbon entering this allows vapor to spread throughout installation. INADEQUATE MITIGATION MEASURES • MOV closure from control room was malfunction • Non availability of SCBA • No emergency plan for the scenario • No emergency responder

38. Critical factors to be considered in plant layout • Location of control room /Protection • Fire water tank and fire water pump house • Congestion in the plant site because of buildings, structures, pipelines, trees etc. • The emergency exit gate shall be away from the main gate and always be available for use for personnel evacuation during emergency. • Evacuation routes should not be blocked by poor plant layout Extract from IOC Fire Accident Report 10.5 Plant Layout

40. Positioning of occupied buildings • The distance between occupied buildings and plant buildings( w.r.t dangers of explosion, fire and toxicity). • Locate buildings and structures in the upwind direction • Congestion in the plant site because of buildings, structures, pipelines, trees etc. • All buildings which are not related to terminal operation shall be located outside the plant area. (eg. canteen, ignition sources) • Personnel with more general site responsibilities should usually be housed in buildings sited in a non-hazard area near the main entrance. • In all cases occupied buildings should not be sited downwind of hazardous plant areas.

41. HPCL-Vizag refinery explosion 14th September 1997 • Fire broke out at 6:15 am, following a suspected leak in the LPG pipeline from the Vizag port to the storage farm. • It caused a series of explosions, and soon spread to at least six other naphtha and petrol tanks.

42. Damages ( HPCL Refinery Fire ) • Affected the entire product terminal area, including 11 storage tanks containing naptha, petrol, diesel, kerosene and furnace oil, besides the six ''Horton spheres'' containing LPG. • The refinery's administrative building, its canteen and some other buildings came crashing down like a pack of cards • Even an earthquake measuring eight on the Richter scale would not have caused so much damage.

43. What to do in case of Restricted Space-Case study of Fire at IOC filling station (petrol bunk) • Gas tanker filling underground tanks of the LPG outlet suddenly caught fire, Caused by leakage of LPG from a nozzle of a gas tanker • 3 persons were killed and a dozen others injured • The fire engulfed a gas tanker, an electricity transformer and three cars and spread to a nearby multi-storey apartment building. • Ignition followed by Fire - spread to nearby houses and burnt trees and damaged electricity poles and wires. • Estimate about 12 to 15 tonnes of fuel went up in flames with the fire raging for six hours

44. IOC LPG Explosion Jaipur - Oct 12 ,2008 • Entire gas station was engulfed in flames • Explosion took place in the tanker itself, destroying it completely. , the impact of which was felt in the entire Shastri Nagar residential area up to a distance of three kilometres • After 15 minutes of the gas that had leaked , the tanker blew off. • The rear shell of the tanker had been thrown 250 feet and made a big hole into an building • tanker exploded at that time and huge flames that were thrown out of it 350 feet away

45. Risk Analysis Need to Be Applied • Helps in • Forecasting any unwanted situation • Estimating damage potential of such situation • Decision making to assess the suitability of sites • Evaluating effectiveness of control measures

46. IOC LPG Explosion Jaipur - Oct 12 ,2008

47. Risk • The probability of suffering a harm or loss. • A combination of hazard and Probability • Risk = Probability of occurrence of hazard X magnitude of hazard • Measurement of Risk • Individual Risk • Societal Risk

48. 1.0E-04 2.0E-05 5.0E-06 Risk Representation • Individual Risk Contour

49. ALARP – As Low As Reasonable Practicable Tolerable only if risk reduction Is impracticable or cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained

50. Summary & Conclusion • Poorly laid out site increases risk of an accident especially in MAH group of Industries • Site layout factors should be considered during Plant Layout design phase • Risk and Damage contours (based on consequence Analysis) helps to demarcate hazardous areas • Risk analysis may be required to decide the project when there is restriction of space. • Risk levels criteria as stipulated in IS 15646 2006 should be employed to decide the case