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REO Investor Activity In Distressed Neighborhoods in Cleveland, Ohio

REO Investor Activity In Distressed Neighborhoods in Cleveland, Ohio. Frank Ford, Senior Policy Advisor Thriving Communities Institute Cleveland, Ohio April Hirsh, Research Assistant Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development November 1, 2013. Harvard REO Study. Case studies of:

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REO Investor Activity In Distressed Neighborhoods in Cleveland, Ohio

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  1. REO Investor Activity In Distressed Neighborhoodsin Cleveland, Ohio Frank Ford, Senior Policy Advisor Thriving Communities Institute Cleveland, Ohio April Hirsh, Research Assistant Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development November 1, 2013

  2. Harvard REO Study • Case studies of: • Atlanta • Boston • Cleveland • Las Vegas

  3. Overview • Data Analysis • Interviews with Investors • Rehab Modeling

  4. Reasons for the Study • Understand the impact of investors buying REO property. • Slow or stop the “churning” of distressed property between investors and increase the flow of distressed property to beneficial owners. • Identify a cost effective rehab model as an alternative to demolition.

  5. Data Research Question • To what extent does the type of investor drive negative outcome? • Local versus out-of-state? • Investor volume (large, medium, small) • For-profit versus non-profit, government and land banks

  6. Data Analysis Scope • 13 years of data: 2000 – 2012 foreclosure sales (2000 – March 2013 property transactions) • Standardized buyers • 42,565 sheriff sales • 38,931 unduplicated properties • 72,954 subsequent post-REO transfers through March 2013

  7. Foreclosure Filing Included in Study Case dismissed Successful Foreclosure Judgment No Foreclosure Sale Successful Foreclosure Sale Purchased by individual or investor Sale to Bank/GSE/Financial Institution (into REO) Not sold out of REO Subsequent Sale (Out of REO) NOT Included in Study

  8. Who’s buying REO property?

  9. How much are they buying?

  10. Investors vs. Non-Investors • Most large purchases are investors (esp. before 2010)

  11. Outcomes by Investor Size • Largest investors generally higher rates of vacancy than other investors (especially in 2005-2010) • Much higher rates of board-up than other investors • 64% in 2005-2008 • 63% in 2009-2012 • Generally higher rates of certified delinquent taxes

  12. Outcomes by Investor Size • More rigorous examination of outcomes- Survival analysis • Watches a property until failure • Failure = condemnation, demolition, or transfer of ownership to ‘rescuing’ entity (nonprofit, government, land bank) • Properties touched by large investors (50+) in 2010 are nearly 5 times more likely to fail than properties purchased by other investors

  13. Survival Analysis (50+)

  14. Outcome By Investor Type • Properties acquired by non-profits, land banks or government were three times more likely to succeed than those acquired by all private investors.

  15. Outcomes by Purchaser Location • Examined location for investors with 25+ purchases • High percent of investors in later years are out-of-state

  16. Outcomes by Purchaser Location • The number of out-of-state investors was small from 2000 to 2004. • The number increased 4-5 fold between 2005 to 2010; decreased between 2011 and 2013. • Cross-tabs: • Out-of-state investors have generally higher rates of vacancy • Similar rates of housing code violations • Generally higher rates of board up • Out-of-state investors show consistently higher rates of tax delinquency (2005 on) • The failure rate for properties acquired by out-of-state investors was double that for Ohio investors.

  17. Interviews • 5 out-of-state investors • 7 local investors • 2 realtors • 4 staff from community development corporations

  18. Business Models Out-of-State • Buy in bulk • Buy sight unseen • Little or no renovation • Sell on website postings, Ebay, etc. • Not interested in long-term holding “If we have to bring these properties up to code, our business model won’t work”.

  19. Business Models…. Local Investors • No bulk buying • Property more likely to be inspected before buying (at minimum a drive-by) • More likely to do some renovation and may do substantial renovation (depending on market conditions) • Generally for-sale, but some rental

  20. View of the Cleveland Market • Local: • More likely to appreciate market realities. • Out-of-State: • Admitted they misjudged the Cleveland market • Seemed shocked to be held accountable for code violations • Resentment toward Cleveland Housing Court “The word is out among our colleagues – stay out of Cleveland.”

  21. Financing • All investors said bank credit is impossible to obtain. • All use “hard money” private capital • Responsible local investor/rehabbers used NSP$ when it was available, doing substantial “gut” rehab. • Responsible rehabbers moved out of distressed neighborhoods now that NSP is gone.

  22. Rehab Modeling Challenge: • In present market conditions, substantial rehab cannot be done in distressed neighborhoods without significant subsidy ($60-90K per house) • Demolition requires subsidy of $10K per house Question: • Can a model of vacant house rehab be developed that requires either no subsidy or no more subsidy than demolition?

  23. Rehab – Method of Inquiry • Identify 6 different Neighborhood Markets • Identify a test house in each market • Develop full specs and pro formas for five different rehab levels • Develop both For-Sale and Rental scenarios • Rehab is “Feasible” if gap is less than or equal to $10,000

  24. Strong Market Test Property Old Brooklyn Neighborhood

  25. Distressed Market Test Property Slavic Village Neighborhood

  26. Rehab Modeling Summary Gut Rehab: Does not work in any of the neighborhoods we studied, including Old Brooklyn. Mod Rehab: Only worked in the stronger Old Brooklyn neighborhood. Code Plus: Also only worked in the stronger Old Brooklyn neighborhood. Code-Only: Is feasible but offers little sustainability, and does not provide for green standards. $10,000 Gap: On a case-by-case basis, re-engineering Code-Only spec to arrive at a $10K gap does permit significant upgrades.

  27. Closing Recommendations • To Change Bank and Investor REO practices • To Recover Stabilization Costs • To Move distressed properties to Beneficial Owners

  28. Recommendations • Sheriff Sales: list code violations and condemnations with properties for sale. • County Recorder: refuse to file deeds if taxes delinquent, or if investor is not registered with Secretary of State. • Cities: inspect properties coming out of Sheriff Sale, condemn during bank ownership before bank dumps them.

  29. Recommendations….. • Enact municipal ordinance holding prior owners accountable for costs, if conditions were documented during prior ownership (Cleveland has recently done this). • Require foreclosing lenders to post a $10,000 bond to compensate city if demo is required (Youngstown, Canton, Warren).

  30. Recommendations - Rehab • Re-think traditional notions of an acceptable rehab standard. • Re-think regulations that mandate green standards or other amenities not feasible in the current market. • Consider limiting rehab subsidy to no more than demo subsidy, unless case is made for strategic importance. • Engage banks in discussion about a loan product for rehab projects; alternatively, consider spreading risk among several banks pooling funds thru a CDFI.

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