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Building Better Signcryption Schemes with Tag-KEMs

Building Better Signcryption Schemes with Tag-KEMs. Tor E. Bj ørstad and Alexander W. Dent University of Bergen, Norway Royal Holloway, University of London, U.K. Signcryption. Introduced by Zheng in 1997. Combines the advantages of public-key encryption and digital signatures:

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Building Better Signcryption Schemes with Tag-KEMs

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  1. Building Better Signcryption Schemes with Tag-KEMs Tor E. Bjørstad and Alexander W. Dent University of Bergen, Norway Royal Holloway, University of London, U.K.

  2. Signcryption • Introduced by Zheng in 1997. • Combines the advantages of public-key encryption and digital signatures: • Confidentiality • Integrity/Origin authentiction • Non-repudiation? • A relatively new type of primitive. • Two competing security models.

  3. Signcryption Common Parameter Generation Sender Key Generation Receiver Key Generation (pkS,skS) (pkR,skR) Signcryption of message m using pkR and skS Unsigncryption of signcryption C using pkS and skR

  4. Signcryption • An, Dodis and Rabin (2002) security model. • Two user model. • Outsider security • Security against attacks made by third parties, i.e. anyone who isn’t the sender or the receiver. • Insider security • Full security, prevents attacks against the integrity of the scheme made by the receiver. • Baek, Steinfeld and Zheng (2002) model.

  5. Signcryption • Confidentiality. No third party should be able to learn any information about the message from the signcryption. • IND security against attacker with encryption and decryption oracles. • Integrity. No party should be able to forge ciphertexts that purport to be from the sender. • Existential unforgability against attacker with the private key of the receiver and an encryption oracle.

  6. Hybrid Signcryption • Adapts a well-known technique in public-key encryption schemes. • Involves using symmetric algorithms as subroutines in public-key schemes. • Typically involves randomly generating a symmetric key and an asymmetric encryption of that key. • Formalised for an encryption scheme by Cramer and Shoup (1998).

  7. Hybrid Signcryption • Elegant solution for hybrid signcryption with outsider security proposed in ISC 2005. • Messy but workable solution for hybrid signcryption with insider security proposed in ACISP 2005. • Poor security reduction involving multiple terms • Confidentiality relies on the KEM being unforgeable. • We propose an elegant new solution using the Tag-KEM ideas of Abe et al (2005).

  8. Tag-KEMs pk tag • A public/private key generation algorithm. • A symmetric key generation algorithm. • An encapsulation algorithm. • A decapsulation algorithm. Sym Encap ω K C tag sk C Decap K

  9. Tag-KEMs • Combine with a (passively secure) symmetric encryption scheme to give a (strongly secure) asymmetric encryption scheme. Sym Encap ω C1 pk tag K ENC C2 m

  10. Tag-KEMs • Decryption works in the obvious way. • Note that C2is acting both as the tag that allows the recovery of K and as the encryption of m. sk C1 Decap C2 K DEC m

  11. Signcryption Tag-KEMs Sym Encap ω C1 pk tag K ENC C2 m

  12. Signcryption Tag-KEMs skS Sym Encap ω C1 pkR tag K Confidentiality proven in the same way as in for public-key encryption: it must be infeasible to gain any information about a symmetric key from its encapsulation. ENC To get integrity protection we must insist that it is infeasible to produce a pair (tag,C1) where C1 decapsulates properly to give a key K with the given tag – in other words C1 acts as a strongly secure signature on tag. C2 m

  13. Signcryption Tag-KEMs • Many existing signcryption schemes can be thought of as using SCTKs implicitly. • We show Zheng’s scheme can be proven secure as a signcryption Tag-KEM. • The security reduction for confidentiality is: • In the KEM case, this was:

  14. Signcryption Tag-KEMs • We also propose a new signcryption scheme based on the Chevallier-Mames signature scheme (2005). • This has the tightest security bounds of any signcryption scheme we could find: • Tight reduction to GDH for confidentiality • Tight reduction to CDH for integrity • Reasonably efficient.

  15. Open Problems • Non-repudiation presents an interesting challenge. Does the existence of the symmetric key K help with non-repudiation? • Signcryption Tag-KEMs are very similar to signature schemes. Can we find a method for turning a general signature scheme into a signcryption scheme? How about a Fiat-Shamir signature scheme?

  16. Conclusions • We presented a new paradigm for constructing signcryption schemes, which • Has all the advantages associated with hybrid encryption, • Does not have the disadvantages of previous attempts to produce hybrid signcryption paradigms. • We presented two schemes in this model, including a completely new scheme with the best known security bounds of any signcryption scheme. • We also discuss (in the paper) the use of SCTKs as a key agreement mechanism.

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