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This document outlines significant changes and recommendations for the MultiPath Transmission Control Protocol (MPTCP) security mechanisms, emphasizing the need for enhanced security measures. Key highlights include the importance of not relying solely on ingress filtering, implementing reachability checks with a random nonce before adding new addresses, and using keyed HMAC for securing address additions. The document also advocates for support of pre-shared keys, prevention of replay attacks via sequence numbers, and the extensibility of the protocol to accommodate various security solutions.
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MPTCP threats MPTCP WG - IETF79 marcelo bagnulo
Changesfrom 02 version • Clarifiedtonotrelyoningressfilteringforsecurity • Clarifiedsomepartsof SCTP behaviour
Reccomendation • MPTCP shouldimplementsomeformofreachabilty check using a randomnonce (e.g. TCP 3-wayhandshake) beforeadding a newaddresstoanongoingcommunication in ordertopreventflooding • Thedefaultsecuritymechanismsfor MPTCP should be toexchange a key in theestablishmentofthefirstsubflowandthensecurefollowingaddressadditions by using a keyed HMAC usingtheexchangedkey. • MPTCP securitymechanismshouldsupportusing a pre-sharedkeyto be used in thekeyed HMAC, providing a higherlevelofprotectionthanthepreviousone. • A mechanismtopreventreplayattacksusingthesemessagesshould be providede.g. a sequencenumberprotected by the HMAC • The MPTCP protocolshould be extensible anditshouldabletoaccommodatemultiplesecuritysolutions, in ordertoenabletheusageof more securemechanismsifneeded.