1. Access Control

2. Access Control • Authentication:Who goes there? • Determine whether access is allowed • Authenticate human to machine • Authenticate machine to machine • Authorization:Are you allowed to do that? • Once you have access, what can you do? • Enforces limits on actions • Note: Access control often used as synonym for authorization Chapter 7 Authentication

3. Chapter 7Authentication Passwords Biometrics Smartcard

4. Who Goes There? Are Have Know • How to authenticate a human to a machine? • Can be based on… • Something you know: a password • Something you have: a smartcard • Something you are: your fingerprint Chapter 7 Authentication

5. Password Chapter 7 Authentication

6. Something You Know • Passwords • Lots of things act as passwords! • PIN (Personal Identification Number) • Social security number • Mother’s maiden name • Date of birth • Name of your pet, etc. Are Have Know Chapter 7 Authentication

7. Trouble with Passwords - 1/2 • Passwords • are one of the biggest practical problemsfacing security engineers today. • Onesolution • use cryptographic keys as passwords • Cryptographic keys • are also large, expensive to maintain, • difficult to manage, • and they pollute the environment. Chapter 7 Authentication

8. Trouble with Passwords - 2/2 • Humans • are incapable of securely storing high-quality cryptographic keys, and • have unacceptablespeed and accuracy when performing cryptographic operations. Chapter 7 Authentication

9. Why Passwords? • Why is “something you know” more popular than “something you have” and “something you are”? • Two reasons • Cost: passwords are free • Convenience: easier for System Administrator to reset password than to issue new smartcard Chapter 7 Authentication

10. Password issues • Keys and Passwords • Choosing Passwords • Attacking Systems via Passwords • Password Verification • Math of Password Cracking • Other Password Issues Chapter 7 Authentication

11. Keys vs Passwords – 1/2 • Crypto keys • Spse key is 64 bits • Then 264 keys • Choose key at random • Then attacker must try about 263 keys • Passwords • Spse pwds are 8 characters, and 256 different choices for 1 character • Then 2568 = 264 pwds • Users do not select passwords at random • Attacker has far less than 263 pwds to try (dictionary attack) Chapter 7 Authentication

12. Keys vs Passwords - 2/2 • DictionaryAttack • “dictionary” of 220≈1,000,000passwords: reasonable probability to crack any given password • But for randomly generated 64-bits key • Given of 220≈ 1,000,000 passwords, • Then the chance to success is only220 / 264 = 1/ 244≈ 1/17,000,000,000,000 • Nonrandomness of pwds is the root of problems Chapter 7 Authentication

13. Choosing Password - 1/4 • Bad passwords • frank • Fido • password • 4444 • Pikachu • 102560 • AustinStamp • Good Passwords? • jfIej,43j-EmmL+y • 09864376537263 • P0kem0N • FSa7Yago • 0nceuP0nAt1m8 • PokeGCTall150 Chapter 7 Authentication

14. Choosing Password - 2/4 • Passphase isanother solution for pwd • a sequence of words or other text used to control access to a computer system • A passphrase is similar to a password in usage, but is generally longer for added security. • Experiment: three groups of users • Group A:At least 6 chars, 1 non-letter • Group B: Password based on passphrase • Group C: 8 random characters Chapter 7 Authentication

15. Choosing Password - 3/4 • Results • Group A:About 30% of pwds easy to crack • Group B:About 10% cracked • Passwords easy to remember • Group C: About 10% cracked • Passwords hard to remember winner Chapter 7 Authentication

16. Choosing Password - 4/4 • Assigned passwords sometimes best • User compliance hard to achieve • In each case, 1/3rd did not comply and about 1/3rd of those easy to crack! • If passwords not assigned, best advice is • Choose passwords based on passphrase • Use pwd cracking tool to test for weak pwds • Require periodic password changes? Chapter 7 Authentication

17. Attacks on Passwords - 1/2 • Attacker could… • Target one particular account • Target any account on system • Target any account on any system • Attempt denial of service (DoS) attack • Common attack path • Outsider  normal user  administrator • May only require one weak password! Chapter 7 Authentication

18. Attacks on Passwords - 2/2 • Suppose system locks after 3 bad passwords. How long should it lock until SA restores service ? • 5 seconds – (insufficient to deter automatic attack) • 5 minutes – (open door to a DOS) • What are +’s and -’s of each? • The correction answer of it is not readily apparent Chapter 7 Authentication

19. Password Verification - 1/5 • To determine the validity of an entered password, the computer must have something to compare against • But need a way to verify passwords • Store pwds in a file • Store pwds in a file after hashing • Store pwds in a file after salt hashing • Bad idea to store passwords in a file Chapter 7 Authentication

20. Password Verification - 2/5 • Cryptographic solution: hash the passwords • Store y = hash(password) • Can verify entered password by hashing • If attacker obtains password file, he does not obtain passwords • Of course, • If attacker with pwd file can guess x and check whether y = hash(x), then attacker has found pwd! • But, • At least, the attacker can not use the file directly! Chapter 7 Authentication

21. Password Verification - 3/5 • Spse attacker pre-computeshash(x) for all xin a dictionary of common pwds • and attacker gets access to pwd file containing hashed pwds • Attacker only needs to compare hashes to his pre-computed dictionary • Same attack will work each time • Can we prevent this attack? Or at least make attacker’s job more difficult? Chapter 7 Authentication

22. Password Verification - 4/5 • Salt valuecan make attacker more difficult • Slat serves as IV of CBC mode: IV is not secret • Given password, choose random s, compute y = hash(pwd, s) and store the pair (s,y)in the password file • Note: The salt value is not secret Chapter 7 Authentication

23. Password Verification - 5/5 • Easy to verify password • To verify pwd z, retrieve (s,y) from pwd file • Compute hash(z,s) and compare it y • Attacker must recompute dictionary hashes for each user  lots more work! • Spse Alice’s pwd is hashed with sa , Bob’s sb • Then to crack Alice’s pwd using the dictionary, • Trudy must compute hashes of the word in dic with sa , but crack Bob’s Trudy must recompute the hashes using sb Chapter 7 Authentication

24. Math of Pwd Cracking – 1/7 • Assumptions • Pwds are 8 chars, 128 choices per character • Then 1288 = 256 possible passwords • There is a password file with 210 hashed pwds • Attacker has dictionary of 220 common pwds (hashed pwds) • For experience, Probability of 1/4 that a pwd is in dictionary • Work is measured by number of hashes • Comparisons are free Chapter 7 Authentication

25. Math of Pwd Cracking – 2/7 • Case I • Attacker want to find Alice’s pwd w/o using the dictionary • Case II • Attacker want to find Alice’s pwd using the dictionary • Case III • Attacker want to find any one pwd in the hashed pwd file w/o using the dictionary • Case IV • Attacker want to find any one pwd in the hashed pwd file, using the dictionary Chapter 7 Authentication

26. Math of Pwd Cracking – 3/7 • Case I: password without dictionary • Must try 256/2 = 255 on average • Just like exhaustive key search • Case II: password with dictionary • Expected work is about 1/4 (219) + 3/4 (255) ≈ 254.6 • But in practice, try all in dictionary and quit if not found  work is at most 220 and probability of success is 1/4 Chapter 7 Authentication

27. Math of Pwd Cracking – 4/7 • Case III: Attack any of 1024(210) pwds in file without dictionary • Assume all 210 passwords are distinct • Need 255 comparisons before expect to find password • If no salt, each hash computation gives 210 comparisons  the expected work (number of hashes) is 255/210 =245 • If salt is used, expected work is 255 since each comparison requires a new hash computation Chapter 7 Authentication

28. Math of Pwd Cracking – 5/7 • Case IV: Attack any of 1024 passwords in file with dictionary • Probability at least one password is in dictionary is 1 - (3/4)1024 ≈ 1 • We ignore case where no pwd is in dictionary • If no salt, work is about 219/210 = 29 • If salt, expected work is less than 222(ref next slide) • Note: If no salt, we can precompute all dictionary hashes and amortize the work Chapter 7 Authentication

29. Math of Pwd Cracking – 6/7 • If salt, expected work is less than 222 • y0,y1,…,y1023: pwd hashes s0,s1,…,s1023: the corresponding salt values d0,d1,…,d(2^20)-1: dictionary words • Trudy first compute h(d0,s0) and compares it to y0, then she compute h(d1,s0) and compares it to y0 and so on. • That is, Trudy compares first compare y0 to all of hashed dic. words. Then she compares y1 to to all of hashed dic. words. Chapter 7 Authentication

30. Math of Pwd Cracking – 7/7 • If y0 is in dic (prob ¼), Trudy can expect to find it about 219hashes. If not (prob ¾), Trudy compute 220hashes • If Trudy find y0 is in dic, then she’s done. If not, Trudy will have 220 hashes before moves on to y1 • Continuing, in this manner, the expected work • ¼(219) + ¾•¼(220 +219) + (¾)2•¼(2•220 +219) + … + (¾)1023•¼(1023•220 +219) < 222 Chapter 7 Authentication

31. Other Password Issues -1/3 • Too many passwords to remember • Results in password reuse • Why is this a problem? – Trudy would be wise to try it other place where you use a password. • Failure to change default passwords • Social engineering • If someone calls you, claiming to be a SA who needs your pwd in order to correct prob., would you give out your pwd? - 34% will give it and 70% will give their pwd away for a candy bar Chapter 7 Authentication

32. Other Password Issues -2/3 • Who suffers from bad password? • ATM PIN: only you • Login password: every one of the system • Error logs may contain “almost” passwords • Bugs, keystroke logging, spyware, etc. Chapter 7 Authentication

33. Other Password Issues -3/3 • Popular password cracking tools • Password Crackers • Password Portal • L0phtCrack and LC4 (Windows) • John the Ripper (Unix) • Admins should use these tools to test for weak passwords since attackers will! • Good article on password cracking • Passwords - Conerstone of Computer Security Chapter 7 Authentication

34. Passwords • The bottom line • Password cracking is too easy! • One weak password may break security • Users choose bad passwords • Social engineering attacks, etc. • The bad guy has all of the advantages • All of the math favors bad guys • Passwords are a big security problem Chapter 7 Authentication

35. Biometrics Chapter 7 Authentication

36. Something You Are • Biometric • “You are your key” Schneier • Examples • Fingerprint • Handwritten signature • Facial recognition • Speech recognition • Gait (walking) recognition • “Digital doggie” (odor recognition) • Many more! Are Have Know Chapter 7 Authentication

37. Why Biometrics? • Biometrics seen as desirable replacement for passwords • Cheap and reliable biometrics needed • Today, a very active area of research • Biometrics are used in security today • Thumbprint mouse • Palm print for secure entry • Fingerprint to unlock car door, etc. • But biometrics not too popular • Has not lived up to its promise (yet?) –Why? Chapter 7 Authentication

38. The DARK SIDE … • Social acceptance: Perceived as invasive; • People liked facial scans less as fingerprints as a substitute for a PIN in ATM. • Easy to forge: • Biometric measurements are easy to forge. • It's easy to steal a biometric after the measurement is taken. • Impossible to revoke: • What happens if a biometric is stolen? It can not be revoked…Once someone steals your biometric, it remains stolen for life. • Privacy: • issues…Biometrics are personal Chapter 7 Authentication

39. Ideal Biometric • Universal보편성 applies to (almost) everyone • In reality, no biometric applies to everyone • Distinguishing구별성 distinguish with certainty • In reality, cannot hope for 100% certainty • Permanent영구성 physical characteristic being measured never changes • In reality, want it to remain valid for a long time • Collectable수집성 easy to collect required data • Depends on whether subjects are cooperative • Safe, easy to use, etc., etc. Chapter 7 Authentication

40. Biometric Modes • Identification 식별 Who goes there? • Compare one to many • Example: The FBI fingerprint database • Authentication 인증 Is that really you? • Compare one to one • Example: Thumbprint mouse • Identification problem more difficult • More “random” matches since more comparisons • We are interested in authentication Chapter 7 Authentication

41. Two phases of Bio system • Enrollment phase • Subject’s biometric info put into database • Must carefully measure the required info • Itcould be needed slow and repeated measurement • A weak point of many biometric schemes • Must be very precise for good recognition • Recognition phase • Biometric detection when used in practice • Must be quick and simple • But must be reasonably accurate Chapter 7 Authentication

42. Cooperative Subjects • We are assuming cooperative subjects • In authentication,subjects are cooperative • In identification, problem often have uncooperative subjects • For example, facial recognition • Proposed for use in Las Vegas casinos to detect known cheaters • Also as way to detect terrorists in airports, etc. • Probably do not have ideal enrollment conditions • Subject will try to confuse recognition phase • Cooperative subjects make bio prob much more tractable!!! Chapter 7 Authentication

43. Biometric issues • Type of Error • Biometric Examples • Fingerprints • Hand Geometry • Iris Scan • Biometric Error Rates • Biometric Conclusions Chapter 7 Authentication

44. Biometric ExamplesType of Error Chapter 7 Authentication

45. Biometric Errors • Fraud rate기만율versus insult rate모욕률 • Fraud  user A mis-authenticated as user B • Insult  user A not authenticate as user A • For any biometric, can decrease fraud or insult, but other will increase • For example • 99% voiceprint match  low fraud, high insult • 30% voiceprint match  high fraud, low insult • Equal error rate: rate where fraud == insult • The useful measure for comparing different biometric system Chapter 7 Authentication

46. Biometric ExamplesFingerprint Chapter 7 Authentication

47. Fingerprint History - 1/2 • Ancient China: as a form of signature • Scientific Form • 1798  J.C. Major suggest that Fingerprint might be unique • 1823  Professor J. E. Purkinje discussed 9 fingerprint patterns • 1856  Sir W. Hershel used fingerprint (in India) on contracts • 1880  Dr. H. Faulds article in Nature about fingerprints for ID • 1883  M.Twain’s Life on the Mississippi, a murderer ID’ed by fingerprint Chapter 7 Authentication

48. Fingerprint History - 2/2 • Widespread use of fingerprint • 1892 Sir Francis Galton (cousin of Darwin) developed classification system • His system of “minutia” is still in use today • Also verified that fingerprints do not change • Some countries require a number of points (i.e., minutia지문특징) to match in criminal cases • In Britain, 15 points • In US, no fixed number of points required Chapter 7 Authentication

49. Fingerprint Comparison • Examples of loops제상문, whorls외상문 and arches궁상문 • Minutia extracted from these features Loop (double) Arch Whorl소용돌이꼴 Chapter 7 Authentication

50. Fingerprint Biometric - 1/2 • Capture image of fingerprint • Enhance image • Identify minutia Chapter 7 Authentication