Ian Apperly University of Birmingham

1. What is belief reasoning? (And why do researchers from the “theory of mind” and social cognition traditions find it so hard to talk to each other?) Ian Apperly University of Birmingham

2. Collaborators • Dana Samson • Elisa Back • Jason Braithwaite • Dan Carroll • Glyn Humphreys • Kevin Riggs • Andrew Simpson • Funding • British Academy • Leverhulme Trust • ESRC • MRC

3. Overview • Background • Recent behavioural data on theory of mind in adults • Observations, problems and questions about the link between theory of mind and social cognition

4. What is “Theory of Mind”? • Folk psychology, mentalising, social cognition • False belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • Ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

5. Background on ToM • We know a lot about development • We know something about the cognitive and neural basis in adults • Yet we know almost nothing about the basic operating characteristics of theory of mind processes • What kinds of mental representations? • Specialised versus generic functional and neural processes? • Automatic versus controlled processing? • What role in on-going cognitive activity (social cognition, communication)?

6. Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view Why is it important to study ToM in adults? Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex

7. ToM (or “mentalizing”, or “perspective-taking”, “mind reading” etc…….)is not a unitary ability

8. ToM inferences Sometimes we must infer mental states

9. Non-inferential “holding in mind” Sometimes we are told what someone thinks (and should not confuse this with what we know) All George needs is the guiding hand of a trusted friend

10. ToM Use e.g., Interpreting what people say in terms of what they know Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate? Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life You was caned? Respect man, respect

11. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

12. Are ToM inferences automatic? Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci. • Rationale: • In a situation where there is no particular reason to make ToM inferences, will the inferences nonetheless be made?

13. Are ToM inferences Automatic? Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci. Condition 1: Monitor Reality Is belief monitored too? Condition 2: Track Reality and Belief Condition 3: Track Belief

14. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes • ToM inferences are not automatic: They require cognitive control • But this may not always be true

15. Automatic perspective taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite & Andrews, submitted) 1,2, or 3 discs Self / Other Consistent You / He 2 Disc position varies Self / Other Inconsistent You / He 2

16. Automatic perspective taking? Egocentric interference RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

17. Automatic perspective taking? Altercentric interference RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

18. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes • ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control

19. Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition. Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this information

20. Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition. Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this False belief + reality Unrelated belief + reality

21. * * * ~ Processing Efficiency (RT/Proportion Correct) Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.

22. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes • ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control • To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)

23. ToM Use Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission). • Rationale • Very easy ToM inference • Can this inference be used to guide interpretation of speech? • E.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr (2003)

24. Instructor: Experimental

25. Instructor: Control

26. No-instructor: Experimental

27. Average number of errors ToM Use Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission).

28. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes • ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control • To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa) • Using ToM information can be a difficult task-set to maintain

29. ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex

30. ToM processing model: (after Leslie, 1992, 2005) Observed Behaviour ToMM SP Modular: Fast, automatic, domain-specific…. “Executive selection”: Slow? Controlled? Domain-General?

31. (after Shallice & Burgess, 1996)

32. ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising” Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex

33. ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising” Important role for cognitive control processes Understanding ToM will require more than understanding the functional and neural basis of ToM-specific processes Some of the “social network” may be concerned with control processes Some processes critical for ToM are almost certainly subtracted out in existing analyses Caution when interpreting meta-analyses of imaging data Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex

34. The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions • “Beliefs” in the ToM tradition are usually transitory states closely linked to epistemic access • But enduring beliefs surely play a similar causal role in explaining and predicting behaviour • “Transitory versus enduring” is an important dimension • I’m not sure if it can discriminate different kinds of mental states in a clear way

35. The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions • The ToM tradition studies beliefs as the causal consequences of epistemic access. Any rational, sentient agent will have such beliefs. • Contrast with social cognition tradition which tends to see beliefs as characteristics of the target - the “kind of person” they are • Target characteristics are irrelevant for typical ToM problems • Self-other similarity is irrelevant to these typical ToM problems • Is it nonetheless an influence?

36. The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions • Self-reflection and projection (or egocentric anchoring and adjustment) are possible but not necessary processes in ToM reasoning • We can make ToM judgements even when we don’t have to infer hidden mental states, when we don’t know reality and when we don’t care about the content of the mental state

37. Clever new methods + Careful task analysis = plenty of interesting work Neuroscience research Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003) What do they do? mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex

45. Functional and neural processes specific to ToM? • Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls • Very short stories • False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies • Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM stimuli?

46. L-TPJ Left hemisphere Functional and neural processes specific to ToM? • Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls • Very short stories • False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies • Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM-related stimuli? Responds selectively for thinking about beliefs, desires, intentions Not for people’s appearance or background social information, (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005) or non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006) Responds selectively for thinking about false beliefs andnon-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006) R-TPJ Right hemisphere

47. So what have we found? • Perspective-taking in left-TPJ? • (Perner et al. 2006) • ToM is specific to right-TPJ and is independent of processes for inhibition and cognitive control? • (e.g., Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004) • We can accept that these findings are informative, but still think that other processes are equally interesting and equally necessary for ToM