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IAEA Safeguards at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant SGOA3 & SGTS-TND 2012/01/24. Topics. Background Spent Fuel Transfer & Storage Process Safeguards- By- Design Safeguards Measures Detection of Missing Pins with DCVD Summary. Background.

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  1. IAEA Safeguards at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Chinshan Nuclear Power PlantSGOA3 & SGTS-TND 2012/01/24

  2. Topics • Background • Spent Fuel Transfer & Storage Process • Safeguards- By- Design • Safeguards Measures • Detection of Missing Pins with DCVD • Summary

  3. Background • Cinshan nuclear power plants consist of two 636 MWe BWRs which have been in operation over 30 years. • The spent fuel ponds (SFPs) are nearing the capacity of their storage capability. • An independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) is under construction with space for 1680 spent fuel assemblies (SFAs). • The IAEA and TWN authorities are implementing safeguards by-design features and innovative technology which were adopted in the early design stage of ISFSI.

  4. Spent Fuel Transfer & Storage Process 56 SFAs Transportable Storage Canister -will be loaded with 56 spent fuel assemblies TSC/SFAs are loaded into TFR TSC/SFAs are loaded into VCC Final installation TSC OD 1.70 m Ht. 4.84 m Wt. 16.65 t VCC OD 3.45 m ID 1.89 m Ht. 5.70 m Wt. 112.73 t TFR OD 2.12 m ID 1.72 m Ht. 5.13 m Wt. 46.18 t AOS Sq. foot 4.5 x 4.5 m OD 4.20 m Wall thk. 0.35 m Ht. 6.03 m Wt. 81.20 t Transfer Cask - to convey the TSC from the spent fuel ponds into the VCC. Vertical Concrete Cask-used for long storage of the spent fuel assemblies Add On Shield - to provide additional shielding for radiation protection.

  5. Spent Fuel Transfer & Storage Process (cont’d) Day-1/2/3 TFR/TSC Preparation Day-3 Day-7/8/9/10 Day-7 Day-4/5/6 TFR Immersing Positioning Shield Lid Lift up Wash Drain Fuel Loading Tie Down Decon H2 Monitoring Shield Lid Welded Pneumatic Test Drain Vacuum Dry He Purge Port Cover Welded He Leak Test Structure Lid Welded Day-13/14 Day-12 ISFSI VCC Moving Storage monitoring Day-11 Transfer VCC Ready Adapter Ready TFR Lifting Tie Down TSC Transfer VCC Closed

  6. Safeguards- By- Design • Two important features were incorporated in early design stage of the ISFSI; 1. Innovative Digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD) technology to perform SF verification for PD. 2. Unique dual sealing arrangement to address all credible diversion scenarios. • Reduction of field efforts to a minimum level was an important factor in the design process. • According to Agency requirements: LWR spent fuel assemblies considered as easily dismantle are due to partial defect (PD) verification when transferred to difficult to access conditions, in order to assure that at least half of the fuel rods are present. • Continuity of knowledge (CoK) will be maintained by means of containment and surveillance during the SF transfer process.

  7. Safeguards Measures Surveillance in reactor hole (RH) Day-1/2/3 Spent fuel is verified by DCVD for PD prior to loading TFR/TSC Preparation Day-3 Day-7/8/9/10 Day-7 Day-4/5/6 TFR Immersing Positioning Shield Lid Lift up Wash Drain UW cam Fuel Loading Inputs From UW& reactor building cameras Tie Down Decon H2 Monitoring Shield Lid Welded Pneumatic Test Drain Vacuum Dry He Purge Port Cover Welded He Leak Test Structure Lid Welded SDIS A (main) SDIS B (back up) Surveillance in transfer hatch Remote Monitoring (RM) Day-12 Day-13/14 ISFSI VCC Moving Storage monitoring Dual seals Seals on the VCC Day-11 Inspector Inspector Transfer VCC Ready Adapter Ready TFR Lifting Tie Down TSC Transfer VCC Closed

  8. Safeguards Measures (cont’d) • The VCC is the containment for • the spent fuel - for safeguards • purposes - on which the dual • seals are applied. • The top cover of the VCC in • conjunction with AOS side walls • are the components to be sealed • and immobilized to the concrete • pad.

  9. Detection of Missing Pins with DCVD • The Cerenkov light emitted from SFA is recorded as a digitized image. • PDT is performed in real time by quantitative analysis of the Cerenkov light pattern with custom software (DCView). • Cerenkov light intensity emitted from SFA is a function of burn up (BU) and cooling time (CT). Pin substitution by un-irradiated dummies leads to a decrease of light intensity, pin removal to an increase.

  10. Detection of Missing Pins with DCVD (cont’d) Missing pins • Missing pins lead to high intensity spots on Cerenkov light image. • Missing pins are detected and marked by an automated analysis in DCView based on local intensity comparison with fuel template. • DCView software performs comparison between measured Cerenkov light intensity and expected intensity values calculated from declared BU and CT. • Off-line re-evaluation is possible.

  11. Summary • Safeguards-by-design features and a process by which they were successfully incorporated in the design phase, have been introduced. • Innovative DCVD technology for PD verification of SF, • prior to its shipment to difficult to access conditions, • has been presented. • Unique dual sealing arrangement to maintain CoKon • SF which is stored in difficult to access conditions, has • been presented.

  12. Thank you for your attentionAny questions?

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